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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this dissertation is to determine the spatial and dynamic 
mechanisms that govern the supply of oil and natural gas. 
Specifically, the research evaluates how fear of the future affects 
behavior today and thereby it tests whether non-renewable resource 
owners behave in the forward-looking manner described by Harold 
Hotelling in the 1930s. Understanding what governs the supply of 
oil and natural gas is vital, as these fuels have significant economic 
and environmental implications for the planet. Integrating original 
research papers, the dissertation unfolds in seven chapters. The first 
and second chapters provide the foundation for the following 
research, by introducing the existing literature on oil and gas 
management. The subsequent three chapters discuss common pool 
problems as a method of identifying forward-looking behavior. 
Retaining this focus on weak property rights, chapter six evaluates 
the short-term relationship between government stability and oil 
extraction in authoritarian petro-states. The final chapter 
summarizes the main findings and outlines key implications. 
Drawing on new datasets and novel methodological tools, this 
dissertation demonstrates how fear of common pool problems 
governs exploration and extraction in the oil and gas industry 
today. However, contrary to conventional theory, this dissertation 
does not find that political instability motivates authoritarian 
regimes to accelerate their extraction.  
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
The energy generated from oil and natural gas keeps the wheels of industry 
turning and thus functions as the driving force behind the global economy. At the 
same time, however, the greenhouse gases associated with the use of these fossil 
fuels pose a threat to the natural environment that civilization depends on. As a 
result of this dilemma, understanding the mechanisms governing the supply of oil 
and natural gas is more pressing than ever. Drawing on novel datasets and new 
methodological tools, this dissertation demonstrates how forward-looking 
behavior plays a key role in the exploration for and production of oil and gas. This 
finding has important implications for both the optimal management of 
hydrocarbon resources and the effectiveness of current climate regulation.  
This dissertation unfolds in seven chapters that integrate original research 
papers. Following this introduction, the second chapter provides a brief outline of 
the oil and gas industry and reviews the wider literature on resource management 
to which this dissertation seeks to add. Both dynamic and spatial aspects of 
recovery are discussed. Drawing on the seminal work of Harold Hotelling (1931), 
forward-looking behavior is introduced as a key theoretical concept in the 
management of oil and gas resources. Based on inter-temporal optimization, 
Hotelling demonstrated that non-renewable resource owners should only keep 
reserves in situ if resource prices are expected to increase at a rate at least equal to 
the return on the next best asset. This theoretical description of forward-looking 
behavior underlines the importance of future conditions in determining current 
extraction. However, as the literature review in this dissertation demonstrates, the 
predictive power of this dominant theoretical paradigm is uncertain and findings 
have remained inconclusive to date. This is partly because existing studies have 
been vulnerable to statistical problems related to data availability and omitted 
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variable bias. There is thus a discrepancy between what theory predicts and what 
empirical findings reveal. It is this shortcoming that this dissertation seeks to 
address, by studying how owners behave when exposed to the risk of losing 
access to their resources.  
Following a discussion of the background literature in Chapter 2, the 
dissertation proceeds in four main research chapters, each of which constitutes a 
discrete piece of work. Chapter 3 develops a new theoretical model that 
demonstrates how spatial competition affects the deployment of exploration wells. 
Based on the Ising model, borrowed from the field of ferromagnetism, the setup 
realistically mimics the way in which information about the location of resources 
propagates across space as exploration is deployed. The analysis shows that 
forward-looking behavior in combination with common reservoirs results in 
inefficient clustering of exploration and aggregate profit losses. These results are 
empirically testable and form the theoretical foundation for the subsequent two 
chapters, which use common pool problems as a method of identifying forward-
looking behavior. 
Chapter 4 empirically analyzes the distribution of wells around national borders 
and evaluates the extent to which the predictions of Chapter 3 apply in 
international oil and natural gas exploration. Borders drawn prior to the discovery 
of hydrocarbons are the focus of this investigation. This ensures that property 
demarcations are independent of oil and gas deposits, which allows using national 
borders as an exogenous treatment of common pools. In line with the theoretical 
predictions of Chapter 3, the analysis finds strong evidence of forward-looking 
behavior, as a significant clustering of wells is observed in areas without 
unitization agreements. This general result is then further investigated, by 
evaluating the distribution of exploration in countries with unitization agreements. 
Such transnational aggrements of joint development are found to result in a 
relatively larger share of exploration being located away from borders. This 
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suggests that agents, in line with theory, seek to internalize informational gains 
from exploration. 
By zooming in on Colorado’s natural gas industry, Chapter 5 evaluates how 
spatial competition affects the extraction of existing wells. Using novel panel 
data, it assesses how the production of a well responds to the arrival of new 
neighbors who potentially threaten future extraction. In line with Hotelling’s 
predictions about forward-looking resource owners, the analysis shows that 
“rivals” located in close proximity motivate accelerated extraction, whereas 
distant neighbors do not affect behavior. Whether real or only perceived, resource 
leakage occurring in common pools is thus found to alter the relative time 
preference of extraction and thereby distort gas production in Colorado. In sum, 
the empirical results in Chapters 4 and 5 highlight that forward-looking behavior 
occurs both in the exploration and production phase of resource management.  
Finally, Chapter 6 evaluates the short-term relationship between government 
stability and oil extraction using monthly production data from 32 authoritarian 
petro-states. Prima facie, focusing on the role of political risk may appear to be in 
contrast to the three previous research chapters that analyze common pools. 
However, what both problems have in common is that owners fear not having 
access to their resources in future periods, which theoretically should motivate 
changed extraction today. It is this prediction of forward-looking behavior that is 
tested throughout this dissertation. Based on panel data, Chapter 6 finds no 
evidence of Hotelling behavior when evaluating month-on-month fluctuations in 
the oil extraction of authoritarian petro-states. Resource extraction is thus found to 
slow when regimes become unstable. In contrast to past assumptions (Bohn & 
Deacon, 2000), this suggests that government stability is an enabling factor for oil 
recovery even in the very short run. The conventional Hotelling principle, in other 
words, does not explain the observed relationship between extraction and 
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stability. This opens up promising avenues for future research to establish what 
mechanisms govern the short-term behavior of authoritarian petro-states.  
Chapter 7 of the dissertation summarizes the main findings, discusses their 
implications and proposes avenues for future research. Policy options to improve 
the management of oil and gas resources and current climate regulation are also 
examined.   
 12 
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Chapter 2. 
Literature review 
This chapter offers a brief introduction to the oil and gas industry and reviews 
the wider economic literature on resource management to which this dissertation 
seeks to add.1 Prior to evaluating existing academic research, it is important to 
establish the context for this literature: the global oil and gas industry. This 
chapter therefore begins by discussing recent statistics on the location and 
ownership of reserves as well as major production and price trends. Against this 
industry background, the chapter then proceeds with the assessment of economic 
research on oil and gas management. 
2.1. Industry background 
The oil and gas resources studied in this dissertation play a dominant role in 
international energy markets. Over the past 25 years, global energy consumption 
has increased by almost 60 percent. In 2014, oil and gas accounted for a 
staggering 57 percent of this consumption (BP, 2015). Over the next 25 years, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2015) in their central scenario forecasts global 
energy consumption to rise by nearly one-third and oil and gas are predicted to 
continue constituting a significant share. It is against this backdrop that this 
dissertation studies the economic mechanisms governing extraction behavior.  
Global oil and gas reserves are extensive but deposits are spatially concentrated 
and ownership is therefore a privilege of the few. At current production levels, 
existing oil reserves2 could last for another 52.5 years. In the case of natural gas, 
 
1
 As subsequent chapters form independent pieces of work, they include separate references to relevant literature that 
may not be discussed in this review. 
2
 Reserves are here, and in general, understood as the proven quantity of a resource that is recoverable at today’s prices 
with today’s technology and which is legally mineable. 
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this reserves-to-production ratio is 54.1 years (BP, 2015). The substantial size of 
known reserves highlights that physical scarcity is unlikely to become a concern 
within the foreseeable future. Furthermore, current reserves are not necessarily the 
upper bound for the global stock of oil and gas. Examples such as the American 
shale gas revolution, examined later in this dissertation, show that technological 
development constantly makes new resources accessible. For example, horizontal 
drilling in conjunction with hydraulic fracturing have made previously 
inaccessible fields profitable (Deutsche Bank, 2011). A more immediate worry is 
that the global distribution of resources is highly asymmetric. Due to the lack of 
homogeneity of the Earth’s geological structures, reserves are thus concentrated 
in only a few countries. As presented in Figure 2.1, the former Soviet Union and 
the twelve OPEC countries3 control more than 75 percent of both oil and gas 
reserves. On a country level, the largest oil reserves exist in Venezuela (17 
percent) and Saudi Arabia (16 percent). Iran (18 percent), Russia (17 percent) and 
Qatar (13 percent) dominate global gas reserves.  
 
OIL  
(1,700 thousand million barrels) 
NATURAL GAS  
(187 trillion cubic meters) 
   
FIGURE 2.1. DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL RESERVES 2015 
Notes: *Former Soviet Union; Source: BP, 2015; author. 
 
3
Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Venezuela. 
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A common feature of the resource-rich countries in OPEC and the former 
Soviet Union is that their governments wield significant power over the extraction 
industry (Deutsche Bank, 2011). More broadly, it is estimated that governments 
and national oil companies (NOCs) own approximately 90 percent of all known 
oil reserves (IEA, 2012). The same pattern applies in natural gas where NOCs like 
Gazprom and Qatar Petroleum control significant reserves (Deutsche Bank, 
2013). By comparison, international oil companies (IOCs) such as BP, Exxon 
Mobil and Shell only control a small share of resources. To understand general 
supply dynamics in the oil and gas market, it is thus important to identify the 
mechanisms governing the extraction behavior of governments. 
Extraction predominantly occurs in reserve-rich areas. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, 
OPEC continues to dominate global oil production. At the end of 2014, the twelve 
member countries produced 41 percent of all oil in the world. The main producers 
outside OPEC are Russia and the US respectively, accounting for 13 and 12 
percent of global production.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.2. GLOBAL OIL PRODUCTION 
Source: BP, 2015; author. 
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Figure 2.2 also shows that global oil extraction has been gradually rising with 
demand over the past 20 years. Despite this general trend, periods of economic 
downturn such as the 2007–08 financial crisis have temporarily dampened 
production. This highlights that growing oil and gas demand is dependent on 
continued economic growth. The principle underpinning this is that technological 
development, ceteris paribus, reduces the energy intensity of the global economy 
over time. 
Production trends in natural gas markets have been less stable than in the oil 
industry. This is predominantly due to the introduction of new extraction 
technologies such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. As illustrated by 
Figure 2.3, these technologies have enabled the USA to overtake Russia as the 
world’s largest gas producer. In contrast to other big oil and gas producing 
countries, many small private companies dominate the American extraction 
industry (Deutsche Bank, 2013). As the US now accounts for 21 percent of global 
gas production, the behavior of relatively small producers has thus become 
increasingly important for global supply. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.3. NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION 
Source: BP 2015; author. 
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As illustrated by the discussion of production and reserves, OPEC plays a key 
role in the global management of hydrocarbon resources. Established in 1960, the 
official aim of this institution is:  
 
“[T]o coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and 
ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic 
and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and 
a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry”.  
(OPEC, 2015) 
 
Functioning as an international oil cartel, OPEC seeks to achieve this aim by 
setting production targets for its member countries. However, history has shown 
that the members do not always follow these targets. This is because extraction 
reductions often conflict with the short-term economic needs of member states 
(Colgan, 2014). Despite this, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 
2015) concludes that OPEC continues to have significant market power even in 
current low price markets. When the organization reduces its production targets, 
oil prices thus tend to increase. Yet, it should be noted that this pattern is 
predominantly driven by the behavior of a single member, namely Saudi Arabia 
(EIA, 2015). Furthermore, the absence of a production cut in response to the 
recent lower oil prices suggests that OPEC’s market power might be diminishing. 
Despite vague attempts by Russia and Iran (The Wall Street Journal, 2007) there 
remains no equivalent cartel institution in natural gas markets. OPEC is thus 
unique to the oil industry where, despite being weakened, it continues to act as a 
cartel producer (Lin, 2015).  
In contrast to global production and reserve developments, oil and gas prices 
are notoriously volatile and therefore difficult to forecast even in the short run. As 
seen in Figure 2.4, the historical record shows substantial variability in spot prices 
for both oil and gas. This makes it complicated to forecast prices, which is 
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illustrated by the recent collapse in oil markets. Almost nobody predicted that 
prices would fall from over $100 per barrel to less than $50 in the course of a few 
months. Despite this recent slump, IEA (2015), in their central scenario, predict 
that markets will rebalance at $80 per barrel in 2020 with prices increasing further 
thereafter. The financial crisis and the associated reductions in global demand for 
fuels explain the drop in prices observed in the middle of 2008. As oil and gas are 
partial substitutes, there is a certain degree of covariance between their prices. 
Modern technologies thus allow many users to switch between fuels meaning that 
if the price of one commodity rises too much they will change to the other. This 
effect of substitution ensures that oil and gas prices will not diverge completely. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4. SPOT PRICE DEVELOPMENT 
Source: EIA, 2015; author. 
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North America are the big importers, whereas the Middle East, Africa and Russia 
are the big exporters. The European gas market illustrates these trade movements 
well. According to BP (2015), Russia exports 51 percent of its gas production to 
Europe via an extensive pipeline system. This has generated economic 
interdependencies between the two regions. Seaborne trade is an alternative and 
more flexible method of transporting oil and gas. However, tankers and LNG4 
ships are relatively expensive and therefore mostly used in situations where 
alternatives are not available. The imports of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are 
a good example of this practice, as pipeline infrastructure does not exist in their 
region.  
Another important step before raw resources can be sold to end-users is 
refining. This is especially true for oil, where crude is only marketable after 
having been refined into more useful products such as gasoline, diesel or asphalt. 
Refinery capacity is generally located in industrialized areas. The three most 
significant countries are the US, China and Russia which respectively account for 
18, 15 and 7 percent of global capacity (BP, 2015). Although there has been 
excess global refinery capacity since the 2008 global financial crisis, significant 
regional differences persist in capacity utilization (Deutsche Bank, 2013). Older 
refineries can also not instantly alter the products emerging from the refining 
process. It is thus difficult to tailor regional production to meet market needs and 
it may be impossible for a refinery to satisfy local demands for a particular refined 
product even if spare capacity exists. As important links between the upstream 
production and end consumer markets, both refinery and transport capacity can 
thus make it challenging to adjust extraction rapidly. This is a key insight that will 
be discussed further in subsequent chapters.  
 
4
 Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas that has been converted to liquid form to ease storage or transport. 
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In sum, the above review highlights the economic importance of oil and gas and 
raises the question of what determines the extraction of these resources. The 
discussion of industry statistics clarifies that reserves are extensive but spatially 
concentrated, meaning that relatively few resource owners have significant power 
over global supply. Focusing on who these owners are, two main trends were 
identified. First, OPEC countries and their NOCs continue to dominate the 
industry and it is consequently vital to understand how governments make 
extraction decisions. Second, new technologies have changed global production 
patterns and made relatively small American companies increasingly important 
for supply. Despite the substantial differences between US companies and Arab 
oil sheikhs the economic literature has identified common mechanisms governing 
extraction behavior in general. 
The remainder of this chapter will discuss existing academic research on 
resource management. Both oil and gas are non-renewable within any meaningful 
human time frame. Hydrocarbons are formed over thousands of years when layers 
of buried organic matter are exposed to intense heat and pressure. In contrast to 
timber or fisheries, hydrocarbons extracted today will, therefore, not be available 
within the foreseeable future. Recognizing this property, much economic research 
has been dedicated to determining at what rate resources should be extracted. 
Against this backdrop, the second section of this chapter introduces the existing 
literature on dynamic recovery. Another physical property that has guided 
economic research is that oil and gas are fluid. Unlike solid minerals, such as 
gold, hydrocarbons can migrate across space if underground conditions allow it. 
Accordingly, economists have studied the risk and consequences of spatially 
dependent common pool problems. Against this backdrop, the third section will 
review the literature on spatial aspects of recovery. The final section of this 
chapter situates the aims of this dissertation in the literature and maps out its core 
contributions. 
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2.2. Questions of timing 
Current knowledge on when to extract oil and gas is dominated by the work of 
Harold Hotelling (1931). This original theoretical framework considers the 
problem of a non-renewable resource owner who seeks to maximize the present 
value of future profits stemming from extraction. Recognizing the finite nature of 
non-renewable resources, Hotelling stipulated that owners face a one-dimensional 
optimization problem, whereby the speed of extraction is the only decision 
parameter. The solution to this problem is known as the Hotelling rule and 
describes the time path of extraction that maximizes the present value of the 
resource stock:  
(2.1) 
?̇?
𝑝⏟
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢
= 𝑖⏟
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
  
 
As an equilibrium condition, the Hotelling rule in Equation 2.1 states that non-
renewable resource rents must increase at the rate of interest on financial assets. 
An optimizing resource owner will thus only keep reserves in situ if resource 
rents are expected to increase at a faster rate than the rate of interest on financial 
assets, the competing investment. If resources’ rents increase at a rate less than 
the rate of interest, the owner should extract the entire remaining stock and sell it 
to invest in the best alternative asset. Arbitrage opportunities will thus temporarily 
arise if the Hotelling rule is not satisfied so, in equilibrium, Equation 2.1 must 
hold. 
The Hotelling framework has been a profound contribution to the study of non-
renewable resources as it outlines that owners should recognize that the 
opportunity cost of extraction today equals reduced recovery tomorrow. Another 
important insight of Hotelling’s original research is that under perfect competition 
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and appropriately set interest rates,5 resource owners will engage in socially 
optimal extraction. Hotelling finds that resources will be extracted at a slower 
than optimal rate by monopolies. This follows from the monopolist’s trade-off 
between increased extraction and falling prices. Nonetheless, it is important to 
note that this result is dependent on the elasticity of demand (Stiglitz, 1975). 
Despites its theoretical completeness, the original Hotelling model has been 
criticized for being overly simplistic in its description of non-renewable resource 
markets. The original model assumes that extraction is costless, independent of 
the remaining stock and that joint production6 does not occur. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that both the stock and demand is known and fixed over time. Most of 
these assumptions do not apply in actual non-renewable resources markets. The 
original theoretical framework has therefore been expanded significantly since its 
inception. Important contributions include models that account for exploration 
dynamics (Pindyck, 1978; Pesaran, 1990), endogenous research and development 
(Kamien & Schwartz, 1978; Lin et al., 2009), uncertainty (Hoel, 1977; Pindyck, 
1980; Reynolds, 2013), joint production of oil and natural gas (Pindyck, 1982), 
market imperfections (see Khalatbari, 1977; Polasky, 1992; Stiglitz, 1976; 
Sweeney, 1977), insecure property rights (Bohn & Deacon, 2000) and different 
stock effects in extraction costs (see Farzin, 1992; Hanson, 1980; Rouillon, 2013; 
Solow & Wan, 1976). Furthermore, the theory has been applied to timber prices 
despite forests not traditionally being considered non-renewable resources 
(Salant, 2013). All of these models have refined the original Hotelling framework 
and improved its applicability to real-life scenarios. 
Economic research on optimal extraction has also had theoretical implications 
outside the narrow arena of oil and gas recovery. For example, German economist 
 
5
 Social and private interest rates must be aligned. 
6
 Examples of by-products are air and soil pollution but also the joint production of oil and natural gas.  
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Hans-Werner Sinn draws on the Hotelling framework in his argument that the 
forward-looking behavior of resource owners might jeopardize the effectiveness 
of existing climate regulation (Sinn, 2008). In what he dubs the ‘Green Paradox’, 
Sinn outlines why a gradual expansion of demand-reducing regulation can 
exacerbate the problem of anthropogenic climate change: Existing climate 
policies induce expectations of falling future demand and prices, which 
incentivize resource owners to extract more of their fossil fuels today. The result 
is that emissions, and consequently climate change, are accelerated. Hotelling’s 
description of forward-looking non-renewable resources owners thus has 
significant theoretical implications for oil and gas market participants and climate 
change regulators alike. Yet the theoretical insights gained are only relevant if the 
Hotelling rule actually applies in real-life non-renewable resource markets. 
A number of scholars have attempted to assess the empirical validity of the 
Hotelling framework but their findings have been inconclusive and vulnerable to 
criticism. Constant shocks and changing expectations in real non-renewable 
resource markets make it challenging to assess whether owners act as predicted by 
Hotelling theory. Disentangling a potential trend from the constant fluctuations 
observed in actual market data is thus difficult. For example, contrary to 
Hostelling’s classic description, resource prices have not uniformly increased over 
the past 125 years (see Pindyck, 1999; BP, 2015, p. 15). Slade (1982) explains 
this pattern as a combination of exogenous technical change and gradually 
increasing scarcity. Her model suggests that non-renewable resource prices should 
have a U-shaped time path. This is because technological advances, combined 
with economies of scale, initially reduce extraction costs and thereby prices. 
However in the long run, scarcity implies that extraction costs will eventually 
increase and this results in surging prices. An alternative explanation for the 
observed price volatility could be that resource owners simply re-evaluate their 
expectations and thus their Hotelling extraction behavior. New discoveries are an 
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example of what might trigger such expectation adjustments (Livernois, 2009). 
The difficulty with testing this hypothesis is that data on resource owner 
expectations are not easily available. Empirical work is therefore largely forced to 
rely on indirect testing procedures, which complicates assessing the empirical 
validity of Hotelling theory (Withagen, 1998).  
Most works within the empirical Hotelling literature are time series-based tests 
of the relationship between resource prices and interest rates (e.g. Heal & Barrow, 
1980; Smith, 1981). The results of these tests have not been supportive of the 
Hotelling principle (Halvorson & Smith, 1991). Miller and Upton (1985) together 
with Krautkraemer (1998), however, argue that these tests suffer from limited 
data availability, which risks undermining the trustworthiness of their results. 
Their critique specifically concerns the use of market prices instead of net prices.7 
The predictions of the Hotelling framework are based on net prices. Yet, the lack 
of knowledge concerning marginal extraction costs means that these are often 
unobservable in practice. This problem of data availability has resulted in the 
reliance on market prices as a proxy for net prices, which can lead to systematic 
measurement errors. Alternatively, others have used estimated in situ resource 
prices8 and found these follow the price trends predicted by Hotelling’s rule 
(Miller & Upton, 1985).  However, the approach of using in situ prices has its 
own statistical caveats. Adelman (1990) argues that this method overvalues the 
non-renewable resources, as the in situ prices used neglect development costs. 
The restricted cost function approach used by Halvorson and Smith (1991) and 
later Chermak and Patrick (2001) offers an alternative method of testing Hotelling 
theory. Similar to that of Miller and Upton (1985), their approach utilizes the 
prediction that the value of underground resource deposits should increase at the 
 
7
 Net prices are market prices minus the marginal extraction costs. 
8
 In situ prices are estimated prices on underground deposits based on the stock market price of extraction firms 
adjusted for their liabilities and non-resource assets. 
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rate of interest. The authors test this prediction of Hotelling theory by estimating 
the shadow prices of the resource stock using an indirect cost function. Whilst 
Halvorson and Smith (1991) rely on macro data from the Canadian metals 
industry, Chermak and Patrick (2001) use panel data from 29 natural gas wells. 
Neither study finds evidence in support of the Hotelling rule. However, their tests 
rely on relatively small samples, which limit the explanatory power of their 
analysis. Furthermore, both studies use ex post interest rates. This is problematic, 
since actual resource owners base their behavior on expectations. Consequently, 
ex ante interest rates would be more representative but corresponding data are not 
easily available. 
In sum, the above discussion clarifies that limited data availability undermines 
the effectiveness of existing empirical tests. The fact that findings remain 
inconclusive across existing studies suggests that some of the research suffers 
from statistical problems. Withagen (1998) even concludes that empirical tests of 
the Hotelling rule, in any of its current formulations, are bound to encounter 
difficulties. It thus remains unclear whether resource owners extract in a forward-
looking manner as predicted by Hotelling theory. This poses a wider dilemma for 
economic research on resource extraction, as the validity of influential theories 
such as the Green Paradox remains ambiguous. To resolve this current impasse, 
further research is needed that uses new datasets and methods to explore the 
underlying mechanisms driving dynamic extraction behavior. 
2.3. Questions of space 
Despite playing an important role in actual oil and gas production, spatial 
considerations remain absent from the Hotelling framework of non-renewable 
resource extraction. Considering other strands of literature is therefore necessary 
in order to provide a nuanced understanding of the mechanisms governing the 
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supply of hydrocarbons. A natural place to start this investigation is Hotelling’s 
1929 model of a spatial market. Originally developed to demonstrate the 
relationship between location and pricing behavior of firms, the model considers a 
market where consumers are distributed evenly along a straight line of unit length. 
However, the framework has diverse applications. Within the resource literature, 
the line model has been used to study product differentiation in exhaustable 
resource markets (Koldstad, 1994). Returning to questions of geographic space, 
there are two spatially-dependent externalities that might affect how owners 
manage their oil and gas resources. First, a so-called “extraction externality” is 
present as underground resources can leak between owners when production is 
spatially clustered. Second, an “information externality” can occur in exploration, 
as the shared geology of reservoirs makes it more likely to find resources in areas 
surrounding past discoveries. To grasp how spatial aspects affect oil and gas 
supply, this section reviews the existing literature on these two externalities. 
The reservoirs studied as part of this dissertation can cover hundreds of square 
kilometers. This means that a deposit is rarely the sole property of a single owner 
and underground passageways can allow fluid resources to flow across property 
lines. Some oil and gas reserves are, as a result, non-excludable and share 
properties with resources such as fisheries. The literature on this type of mobile 
resource provides insights on how common pool problems might jeopardize the 
efficient management of oil and gas resources. For example, Gordon (1954) 
shows that an open access fishing ground would incentivize each individual 
fisherman to fish until the average product equals marginal costs. As a 
consequence, the profitability of the fishing ground would converge to zero. This 
inefficient outcome occurs because individual fishermen do not have a private 
incentive to account for the effect current extraction has on future yields through 
reduced stock. This insight is transferable to shared oil and gas reservoirs, where 
extraction externalities encourage inefficiently high recovery rates and excess 
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investments in extraction capital (Khalatbari, 1977; Libecap & Wiggins, 1985). 
An associated effect of this rush for resources is that overly rapid extraction may 
damage the reservoir and reduce total physical recovery (Chermak & Patrick, 
2001). The consequences of a spatial extraction externality are thus not limited to 
economic inefficiencies but can also include physical ones. 
Models from the literature on groundwater management provide an improved 
description of common pool problems. The studies discussed so far have treated 
resources as static and uniform and thus do not explicitly model how fluids move 
across space. This simplification is problematic, as oil and gas resources do not 
travel unconstrained underground. To counter the shortcomings of existing one-
dimensional models, Alley and Schefter (1987) build a multi-cell system to study 
groundwater resources. Their setup has the advantage that it explicitly models the 
horizontal flow of liquids across space. The authors thus provide a more 
sophisticated description of fluid resources such as water or oil and gas. Building 
on the idea of a multi-cell system, Brozović et al. (2010) explicitly model the 
spatial distribution of water wells and conclude that this design makes water 
resources less of a public good. Traditional one-dimensional models thus 
overestimate the risk and consequences of common pool problems. Drawing on 
the groundwater literature, it is clear that two-dimensional spatial models are 
necessary to decompose the implications of an extraction externality. This 
dissertation transfers these insights to the spatial deployment of oil and gas wells 
to compensate for the lack of research on this topic. 
Despite the limitations of the existing literature, it is evident that the fluid 
nature of oil and gas can lead to economically inefficient outcomes and even 
armed conflicts. Spatial extraction externalities thus result in aggregate welfare 
losses, which could be avoided if reservoirs were managed as single entities. This 
raises the question of why common pools might remain. Drawing on the “Coase 
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theorem”,9 externalities, such as those present in common reservoirs, can be 
internalized if trade is possible and transaction costs are sufficiently low. 
However, a Coasian bargaining process does not always result in an efficient 
outcome in the oil and gas industry. One reason for this is that enforcement is 
often weak. An implicit assumption of the classic Coase Theorem is that property 
rights are respected. This might apply within sovereign states; however, oil and 
gas reservoirs often exceed national boundaries. This is problematic because there 
is no international governing body with the authority to enforce cross-border 
property rights and resources might therefore be contested by neighboring 
countries. Caselli et al. (2014) show that conflict is more likely when at least one 
country has natural resources; when the resources in the resource-endowed 
country are closer to the border; and, in the case where both countries have 
natural resources, when the resources are located asymmetrically vis-a-vis the 
border. However, national borders are not a necessity for resource wars. Morellia 
and Rohner (2015) thus find that civil wars are more likely when resource 
concentration and ethnic group concentration are high. However, even if conflict 
is avoided, the management of resources is complicated by the fact that 
underground oil and gas flows are difficult to monitor in practice. The challenge 
of cross-border externalities is, however, not unique to oil and gas extraction but 
has been discussed extensively in the context of international environmental 
problems (e.g Guruswamy et al., 2012).  
The challenge of international enforcement is not the only reason why common 
pool problems might persist. An alternative explanation could be that the net 
benefits of unifying the management of reservoirs are too low (Demsetz, 1967). 
This argument has been challenged by examples of successful unification 
 
9
 The “Coase Theorem” is commonly accredited to Coase (1960). However, Ronald Coase himself attributed the 
theorem to George Stigler and criticized it for describing an unrealistic theoretical situation where transaction costs are 
zero.  
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agreements10 in the American oil and gas industry (Libecap & Smith, 1999). 
Despite these positive cases, numerous examples remain where common pool 
problems do persist. By analyzing fields in Oklahoma and Texas, Libecap and 
Wiggins (1984) conclude that unification agreements are unlikely in areas with 
many producers. This can be attributed to high bargaining costs but may also be 
explained by land heterogeneities and producers having diverging views on how 
to share production (Wiggins & Libecap, 1985).  
There are even some agents who might benefit from continued common pool 
problems. As argued earlier, the theoretical implication of spatial competition is 
that resource owners are incentivized to accelerate extraction. This is socially 
inefficient but some agents, such as drilling operators, petroleum engineers and 
geoscientists, stand to gain from the excess capital investment needed to 
accelerate production (Weitzman, 1974). These diverging interests might further 
complicate a contractual solution to existing common pool problems. If a 
unification agreement is not reached, Yuan (2002) shows that it is individually 
rational for landowners to subdivide their landholdings and delegate production to 
many competing firms. This behavior further increases the efficiency loss of 
common pools but, as highlighted by this section, it remains difficult to 
internalize extraction externalities. 
Resource leakage is not the only spatial challenge facing the effective 
management of resources as information externalities have also been identified as 
playing an important role in applied oil and gas exploration. Knowledge about the 
exact location of underground deposits is incomplete and exploration therefore 
occurs under considerable uncertainty. The geology of hydrocarbons, however, 
entails that resources tend to be spatially correlated. This means that a resource 
owner is more likely to find oil and gas in areas of past discoveries than in 
 
10
 Unitization agreements are legal agreements whereby the leaseholders of a common reservoir merge their leases and 
operate the field as a single entity. 
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unexplored ones. The shared geology of the reservoir means that exploration 
outcomes are more highly correlated in the case of common pools (Porter, 1995). 
This has important implications for the deployment of exploration, as a well 
yields not only the oil and gas it can produce; it also generates valuable 
information about its surrounding geology. The exploration of neighbors thus 
provides owners with useful insights about the expected location of resources on 
their own lands. As drilling is costly, there can be a private incentive to postpone 
exploration until the respective neighbors have deployed. This can lead to a 
strategic waiting game, whereby common reservoirs are inefficiently explored 
(Isaac, 1987; Hendricks & Kovenock, 1989; Hendricks & Wilson, 1995). The 
empirical evidence of such slowed exploration, however, remains inconclusive. 
Hendricks and Porter (1996) find supportive evidence using data from the Gulf of 
Mexico. However, focusing on the same region but using a different measure of 
neighbors, Lin (2009) finds no evidence of inefficient petroleum exploration. 
These mixed findings might be attributed to the counteracting effect of the 
extraction externality. Engaging in a strategic waiting game can thus be too 
costly, as a neighbor in the meantime can extract oil and gas from underneath 
one’s land. Although this clarifies the importance of understanding the interplay 
between spatial externalities, there are no theoretical models in the existing 
literature that capture these relationships. To make headway in this area, a new 
model design that accounts for both extraction and information externalities is 
introduced in this dissertation.  
2.4. Conclusion and contributions 
This chapter analyzed the literature on oil and gas management and identified a 
series of caveats that this dissertation seeks to address. Timing and space were 
introduced as the two key dimensions governing the recovery of oil and gas 
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resources. Against this backdrop, Chapters 3 and 4 focus solely on spatial aspects, 
whereas Chapters 5 and 6 test the dominant theoretical paradigm on dynamic 
recovery of non-renewable resources.   
The literature review identified extraction and information externalities as 
important spatial factors that influence the recovery of oil and gas. Despite this 
significance, most theoretical models have assumed that resources are uniform. 
This closes off the possibility of offering explicit depictions of spatial phenomena, 
which may explain why empirical findings remain unclear to date. As discussed, 
the groundwater literature offers notable examples of two-dimensional spatial 
models. Nonetheless, these only account for an extraction externality and thus 
ignore knowledge spillovers from exploration. To counter this shortcoming, 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation derives a novel model that incorporates both 
extraction and information externalities. Resting on principles of physics, this 
two-dimensional theoretical framework is unique in its ability to describe the 
deployment of exploration wells across space. To test the empirical relevance of 
this proposed framework, Chapter 4 evaluates the deployment of exploration 
around national borders. A shortcoming of the two-dimensional model introduced 
in Chapter 3 is its computational complexity. As a result, classic game theoretical 
solution concepts such as the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium are not easily 
applied. To test the proposed framework, the model is therefore simplified to 
describe oil and gas exploration along a line. Consisting of two agents, this setup 
is a good representation of neighboring countries separated by a joint border. 
Using this insight, Chapter 4 tests the extent to which extraction and information 
externalities affect oil and gas recovery by comparing observed exploration 
development with that predicted by the theoretical model. 
On the dynamic recovery of non-renewable resources, Hotelling theory was 
introduced as the dominant theoretical paradigm. Yet the literature review 
highlights that the empirical evidence supporting this framework remains limited. 
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To address this shortcoming, Chapters 5 and 6 test whether resource owners do 
indeed accelerate recovery when their future extraction is threatened. As becomes 
clear from the industry statistics discussed earlier, the increase in American shale 
production has significantly altered global supply dynamics. It was shown how 
many small private resource owners characterize this new and increasingly 
important industry. Against this backdrop, Chapter 5 analyzes how spatial 
competition affects the extraction of existing private gas wells in Colorado. The 
test is based on the hypothesis that new neighbors may jeopardize future 
extraction, which, drawing on the Hotelling framework, should lead to accelerated 
extraction. By testing this theoretical prediction in the context of Colorado, 
Chapter 5 assesses the empirical relevance of Hotelling theory in the new and 
growing American gas industry.  
Focusing solely on the behavior of private extraction companies is, however, 
too limited. The discussion of industry statistics clarified that the majority of 
known oil and gas reserves remain government-owned. It is therefore crucial to 
understand what governs the extraction behavior of this type of agent. To do so, 
Chapter 6 analyzes how government stability affects oil extraction in authoritarian 
petro-states. Although this question has been investigated previously (see Bohn 
and Deacon, 2000), this dissertation is the first to employ relatively high 
frequency monthly data. This method improves existing research by bringing to 
bear its capability to identify responses to fast-developing political events. 
In sum, this dissertation makes four important contributions to the existing 
literature. First, it introduces a new theoretical model that describes the spatial 
interplay between extraction and information externalities. Second, it tests the 
empirical validity of this framework, using global exploration data. Third, this 
dissertation evaluates the empirical validity of Hotelling theory in the growing 
American gas industry. Fourth, it is the first to use high frequency data in the 
analysis of how government stability affects oil extraction in authoritarian petro-
 33 
states. Combined, these four dimensions offer a way forward to address key 
limitations that have obstructed economic research on oil and gas management in 
the past. In doing so, this dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of a 
recurring question among resource economists and practitioners: What 
mechanisms determine actual extraction decisions? 
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Chapter 3. 
Spatial rules of attraction in petroleum extraction 
By THOMAS BLIGAARD NIELSEN AND THOMAS SCAFFIDI* 
This chapter introduces a two-dimensional model that demonstrates 
how spatial competition can lead to a clustering of exploration 
wells and thereby the socially inefficient underprovision of 
geological information. The setup consists of two agents competing 
over access to a fluid resource such as an oil or gas reservoir. In 
line with real-life scenarios, knowledge about the location of 
resources is incomplete and propagates across space as exploration 
is conducted. To replicate this effect, the Ising model of 
ferromagnetism, commonly used in physics, is employed. Based on 
conditional probabilities generated by Bayesian inference, agents 
alternate in deciding whether and where to deploy wells. Using 
Monte Carlo simulations, two competing strategies of exploration 
are compared. The analysis shows that common reservoirs can 
cause inefficient clustering of exploration and aggregate profit 
losses. To avoid this adverse outcome and secure sufficient 
provision of geological information, practitioners are recommended 
to implement spacing regulation, unify the management of 
reservoirs or apply appropriate taxes.  
* Nielsen: London School of Economics, The Grantham Research Institute, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE (e-
mail: t.b.nielsen@lse.ac.uk) Scaffidi: University of Oxford, Rudolf Peierls Centre for Theoretical Physics, 1 Keble Road, 
Oxford, OX1 3NP (e-mail: thomas.scaffidi@physics.ox.ac.uk) 
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Maximizing the economic value of oil and gas resources requires addressing 
both dynamic and spatial considerations. Many studies have previously addressed 
the question of when to extract (e.g. Hotelling, 1931; Vousden, 1973; Pindyck, 
1980) but the question of where to drill has received less theoretical attention. 
This is problematic because many oil and gas reservoirs have common pool 
characteristics, which makes spatial considerations key for their effective 
management. This chapter aims to address this analytical void by developing a 
novel two-dimensional model to study the question of where to deploy 
exploration. Integrating insights from the field of ferromagnetism, the model is 
unique in its ability to replicate the propagation of information across space, as 
wells are deployed. This makes it possible to show how non-cooperative 
interaction between resource owners adversely affects exploration. Common 
reservoirs are thus demonstrated to motivate clustering around property lines at 
the expense of a socially more efficient spacing of wells.    
Harold Hotelling (1931) showed that non-renewable resources such as oil or gas 
reservoirs could be efficiently managed from a social perspective if resource 
owners act as price takers, private discount factors are in line with social ones and 
property rights are perfectly defined. However, property lines or even national 
borders do not confine hydrocarbon deposits and entire reservoirs are rarely the 
sole property of a single owner. This would not be problematic if oil and gas 
remained in place like gold or iron ore deposits do. Yet, the fluid nature of 
hydrocarbons means that extraction can cause resources to cross property lines. 
Such an extraction externality implies that owners cannot exclude their neighbors 
from accessing in situ resources. Insights from the literature on fisheries highlight 
why such a common pool situation is problematic. Gordon (1954) demonstrated 
how the open access of fisheries motivates the entrance of boats until profits are 
driven to zero. This insight is transferable to oil and gas, where competing rights 
to the common pool encourage inefficiently high extraction rates (Khalatbari, 
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1977; Libecap & Wiggins, 1985). Hotelling’s prediction of efficient management 
thus collapses, as in practice agents do not have a private incentive to account for 
the effect current extraction has on future yields through reduced stock.  
Imperfect property rights associated with resource leakage are not the only 
challenge facing the effective management of common reservoirs. Information 
externalities also play an important role in applied oil and gas exploration. Most 
countries require proprietary seismic data to be publicly disclosed after a certain 
confidentiality period (see Oil & Gas UK, 2011). Nonetheless, knowledge about 
the location of resources (“information” henceforth) remains incomplete and 
firms face considerable uncertainty when deploying exploration wells. Oil and gas 
deposits are, however, spatially correlated across property lines in the case of 
common pools (Porter, 1995). The shared geology of the reservoir thus renders it 
relatively more likely to find hydrocarbons in areas of past discoveries than in 
unknown ones. Figure 3.1 illustrates this empirical observation for the case of the 
Wattenberg field in Colorado, USA.  
The spatial correlation of oil and gas has important implications for the social 
efficiency of exploration because a well yields not only the hydrocarbons it can 
produce; it also generates valuable information about its surrounding geology. 
Information has widely been considered a public good (see Samuelson, 1954; 
1958). However, the value of geological information arises when it informs future 
drilling, which puts it in the realm of private goods. Many economists have thus 
argued that additional information about a market creates economic value through 
its use and this makes it rivalrous and excludable (see Boulding, 1966; Demsetz, 
1967; Marshall, 1974; Stigler, 1983). However, unlike conventional private 
goods, such as chocolate bars and cars, information has unique features which can 
jeopadise the social efficiency of its supply (Arrow, 1962; Hall, 1981). In the 
context of oil and gas drilling, the exploration of neighbors provides owners with 
useful insights about the expected location of resources on their own lands. This 
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spatial externality is uncompensated and because drilling is costly, the marginal 
cost of generating information is not equal to the private marginal benefit. As 
highlighted by Coase (1974) this can lead to a chronic underprovision of 
information. Furthermore, there is a private incentive to postpone exploration 
until the respective neighbors have deployed. In isolation, the information 
externality can thus lead to a strategic waiting game, whereby common reservoirs 
are inefficiently explored (Hendricks & Porter, 1996). However, one cannot study 
information and extraction externalities separately. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1. GAS OUTPUT PER LAND UNIT (WATTENBERG FIELD, COLORADO 2013) 
Source: Based on gas production data from COGCC (2014) and mapping data from Google Maps (2015) 
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The literature on the strategic implications of extraction and information 
externalities is extensive, yet the empirical evidence remains inconclusive. For 
example, Lin (2009) finds no evidence of strategic interaction when studying 
exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. This could be because the effects of spatial 
externalities go in opposite directions. Waiting for information is thus costly, as 
leakage through the extraction externality can occur in the meantime. The failure 
to identify a net impact may hence be attributed to the two externalities canceling 
out. This suggests that the theoretical description of spatial interaction, on which 
the existing empirical work rests, is overly simplistic. Current studies have not 
explicitly accounted for the two-dimensional nature of space. Hendricks and 
Porter (1996) quantified the effect of neighbors using the area boundaries drawn 
by the US federal government. Similarly, Lin (2009) used simple distance 
measures. Yet, exploration is a spatial problem where reservoirs differ 
significantly. This affects the distance over which extraction and information 
externalities apply. Shale gas extraction, for example, tends to be relatively 
confined in spatial terms leading to short-distance extraction externalities (Davies 
et al., 2012), whilst long-distance information externalities may remain.  
To address limitations in the exiting literature, this chapter introduces a two-
dimensional model capable of realistically describing the interplay between 
information and extraction externalities across space. The latter of these 
externalities is modeled by introducing incomplete property rights in a border 
area. To imitate the spatial correlation of resources found in reality, the Ising 
model (Ising, 1925) is deployed. The use of this well-studied model, drawn from 
statistical physics, allows replicating two-dimensional resource landscapes as 
illustrated by Norberg et al. (2002). Agents are modeled to correctly update their 
expectations concerning the likely location of resources by Bayesian inference 
using knowledge about the Ising model as input. Consequently, agents learn about 
the location of resources as exploration is deployed. The caveat of modeling the 
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spatial propagation of information in this two-dimensional fashion is that no 
analytical solution exists. Deriving the exact optimal strategy of exploration 
therefore requires computationally complex numerical simulations that are 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, two competing strategies that represent 
archetypal attitudes towards exploration are compared. Both strategies are chosen 
to account for the informational spillovers arising from exploration. They thus rest 
on the same fundamental principles and the only difference is that one gives 
preference to exploration of contested resources. Using Monte Carlo simulations 
these two archetypical strategies are then compared in different combinations and 
predictions about profitability and well clustering are deduced.  
This chapter makes several important contributions. First, it offers an explicit 
physics-based method to model information and extraction externalities. In doing 
so, the chapter is the first to realistically replicate the propagation of information 
across a two-dimensional space thereby allowing better predictions. Second, the 
work illustrates how non-cooperative behavior affects profits through the spatial 
distribution of wells. As a result, this study provides new avenues for empirical 
analysis into the underprovision of geological information. Third, it allows the 
identification of how the range of resource leakage affects the aforementioned 
parameters and how policymakers should react. Despite the focus on a natural 
resource problem, the application of this cross-disciplinary framework is not 
limited to the oil and gas industry but relevant to a wide category of investment 
problems. On a broader scale, the model introduced in this chapter can thus be 
used to analyze other investment problems where information externalities and 
contest over assets apply.  
The chapter unfolds in four sections. Section One introduces the theoretical 
model. Section Two presents the strategies of exploration. The numerical results 
obtained from the Monte Carlo simulations are presented in Section Three and 
Section Four provides policy recommendations and concluding remarks. 
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3.1. Model 
The setup consists of two neighboring agents who share joint borders and 
sequentially decide whether and where to deploy their next well. These agents are 
identical apart from their exploration strategies. Both are risk-neutral, can access 
the same exploration technology and have no preference regarding the timing of 
revenue flows.11 In every sequential move (‘turn’ henceforth), the agent chooses 
between different potential drilling sites. Exploring each of these so called “tiles” 
can either result in a successful discovery or finding it empty. To capture the cost 
of drilling, discovery is calibrated to yield one unit of profit, whereas unsuccessful 
exploration is set to result in a negative profit of one. The specific landscape used 
in this chapter consists of twelve-by-twelve tiles and is presented during different 
stages of exploration in Figure 3.2.  
To replicate the extraction externality, the twelve-by-twelve grid is divided into 
resources which are governed by perfect property rights and resources which are 
accessible to both agents. As seen in Figure 3.2, there are thus resources which 
only agent A can extract (∀∈ [𝐴]), resources that only agent B can extract (∀∈
[𝐵]) and a contested pool of resources which both agents can access (∀∈ [𝐶]). 
This allows for replicating that resources close to property lines are more likely to 
leak between neighbors than ones that are further away. The design also makes it 
possible to adjust the range of extraction externalities, by changing the relative 
size of the contested area. For technical reasons, the landscape is modeled on a 
torus. This means that the top and bottom borders, as well as the borders on the 
left and right sides of the twelve-by-twelve grid, are connected. To ease the 
understanding of this modeling method, it is useful to imagine the setup as a 
 
11
 A discount rate of zero allows the isolating of spatial effects from questions of timing, which have been extensively 
studied by Hotelling and others. Section 3.3.B discusses the implcations of incorporating more realistic temporal 
preferences. 
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scenario in which a resource owner has neighbors on each side. Using a torus 
allows replicating this setup but eliminates boundary problems and reduces 
computational requirements when conducting numerical simulations. 
 
  
(STARTING POINT) (AFTER 1 TURN) 
  
(AFTER 15 TURNS) (END OF EXPLORATION) 
FIGURE 3.2. INFORMATION AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF EXPLORATION 
Notes: The plots are based on both agents playing the “indifferent strategy” (introduced later). The tiles that have already 
been drilled are marked with a cross for agent A and a diamond for agent B. The color of these explored tiles is dark red in 
the case of a resource discovery and dark blue when the well is dry. All unmarked tiles correspond to sites that have not yet 
been drilled. Their color identifies the conditional probability of them containing resources according to the color scale 
presented to the right of the figures. These probabilities are generated through Bayesian inference, given all previous 
drillings. The letters at the bottom of the graphs signify the property rights governing that column of tiles. An “A” (resp. 
“B”) indicates that the resources in that column are only accessible to agent A (resp. B) whereas a “C” denotes contested 
resources, which both agents can access. 
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To imitate the spatial correlation of oil and gas resources, we employ the two-
dimensional Ising model (Onsager, 1944). Borrowed from the field of 
ferromagnetism, this model was originally designed to capture the physics of 
magnetic moments (spins) with a binary set of possible states (up or down). 
Placed on a square lattice, these magnetic moments interact with their direct 
neighbors. This interaction makes it thermodynamically favorable to have clusters 
of magnetic moments with the same state. The specific phase of the Ising model 
used in this chapter is the so-called “paramagnetic phase”, for which clusters are 
statistically distributed over space with an average cluster size determined by a 
“temperature” parameter. A magnetic field can be applied everywhere on the grid 
thereby statistically favoring one spin orientation (say up) over another (down). 
By altering a “magnetic field” parameter, one can thus adjust the unconditional 
probability of a given state. 
Changing the terminology of the Ising framework allows for replicating the 
spatial distribution of resources found in reality. Each tile on the twelve-by-twelve 
grid, presented in Figure 3.2, can either contain hydrocarbons or not, 
corresponding to the magnetic moment being up or down in the Ising model. The 
fact that neighboring magnetic moments, on average, prefer to be parallel means 
that hydrocarbon resources tend to be spatially clustered, forming what could be 
understood as lakes in geological terms. The original “temperature variable” now 
governs how correlated resources are across space, or in other words the average 
size of reservoirs. Correspondently, the “magnetic field” variable controls the 
unconditional probability of successful discovery, meaning the uniform default 
probability of finding hydrocarbons on a given tile when no knowledge pre-exists. 
In practical terms, this would relate to the average resource concentration for the 
given region. Adjusting the “temperature” and the “magnetic field” variable in the 
original Ising framework thus allows for simulating different resource landscapes. 
The interested reader is refered to Appendix A for a detailed introduction to the 
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Ising model and the stochastic process that generates the spatially correlated 
resource landscapes.  
We assume that agents know both the unconditional probability of discovery 
and the average size of hydrocarbon reservoirs. The values of both the 
“temperature” and the “magnetic field” parameters in the original Ising 
framework are thus assumed to be public knowledge. Initially, when no well has 
been drilled, the probability of finding hydrocarbons is the same on any tile and is 
equal to the unconditional probability. The fact that the occurrence of resources is 
correlated across space implies the following: If a well is drilled and a discovery 
is made, the surrounding tiles have a higher probability of containing 
hydrocarbons than tiles far away for which information is much poorer. Using the 
knowledge about the unconditional probability of discovery, the average size of 
hydrocarbon reservoirs and that resources are distributed according to the Ising 
model, agents are able to compute the conditional probability of finding 
hydrocarbons on any tile in the system given the success or failure of previous 
drillings. This calculation constitutes an example of Bayesian updating and, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.2, it results in a propagation of information across space as 
wells are deployed. To mimic common disclosure requirements, geological 
information is treated as a public good. This means that agents instantly and 
identically update their expectations about the distribution of resources following 
a new drilling. 
Other studies have previously applied insights from statistical mechanics to 
understand social scientific problems, particularly in finance (see Weidlich, 1971; 
2000; Weidlich & Huebner, 2008 for works on social interaction and Phan et al, 
2005 for references on financial models based on the Ising framework). What is 
missing thus far is an approach that employs the Ising model to simulate 
geological conditions, which motivate information externalites in oil and gas 
exploration. This chapter fills this research gap.  
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3.2. Strategies 
With the framework in place, it is now possible to outline the strategies that 
agents use when conducting exploration. A strategy is defined as a set of rules 
governing an agent’s decision of whether and where to drill every turn, given the 
entire history of previous exploration. The range of possible strategies is naturally 
extensive. To be precise, there are 7.308 ∗ 1070 possible candidates just for the 
twelve-by-twelve landscape evaluated in this chapter.12 This enormous set of 
options makes it computationally challenging to solve the exploration problem 
using standard game theoretical solution concepts such as the sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium. Identifying the exact optimal sequence of exploration is 
consequently beyond the scope of this chapter. However, one might argue that the 
computational complexity of the problem also makes it de facto impossible for 
actual landowners to be strictly optimal. Instead of focusing on the exact optimal 
strategy, we therefore propose two nested strategies that represent archetypal 
attitudes towards information and extraction externalities. As will be shown later, 
both of these are consistent with good exploration behavior as they significantly 
improve on random deployment. 
At any given time, the entire information set is encapsulated in the conditional 
probabilities of discovery (𝑝𝑖) defined for each tile 𝑖. Building on these, and 
motivated by the spatial correlation of resources, a benefit function Ω𝑖 is defined 
for each tile 𝑖. This takes into account the probability of discovery not only on the 
tile 𝑖, but also on its adjacent tiles. The benefit function is a weighted sum of two 
terms: First, the probability of discovery at a given tile 𝑖, and, second, the 
estimated value of the additional information about surrounding tiles 𝑖′1−4 that is 
 
12
 The total number of options is the number of possible landscapes (312
2
) times the number of tiles (122). 
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acquired when drilling at 𝑖. 13 The parameter 𝛽 controls the relative importance 
given to this latter information component. The 𝜆𝑖′ factor allows for 
differentiating between different types of information. It takes its full value of 1 
when the neighboring tile is within the agent’s perfect property area (∈ 𝑃), a value 
of 0.5 when the neighboring tile is located in the contested area (∈ 𝐶), and a value 
of 0 when the neighboring tile is already occupied by a well or belongs to another 
agent. Both strategies are based on this benefit function, defined in Equation 3.1.  
(3.1) 𝛺𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽(𝜆𝑖1′𝑝𝑖1′ + 𝜆𝑖2′𝑝𝑖2′ + 𝜆𝑖3′𝑝𝑖3′ + 𝜆𝑖4′𝑝𝑖4′ ) 
 where 𝑖′1−4 are the tiles neighboring tile 𝑖 and where 𝜆𝑖′  is defined by 
 if 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑃, 𝜆𝑖′ = 1, 
if 𝑖′ ∈ 𝐶, 𝜆𝑖′ = 0.5, 
otherwise 𝜆𝑖′ = 0. 
 
Building on the benefit function, two competing strategies are considered: First, 
the “indifferent strategy”, which does not factor potential resource leakage into 
the decision about well deployment. According to this strategy, the tile with the 
highest positive value of Ω𝑖 should be drilled as long as this value is higher than 
0.5. This applies regardless of whether the tile is located in 𝑃 or 𝐶. The limit of 
0.5 ensures that isolated tiles (for which the second term of Ω𝑖 vanishes) are only 
explored when the expected profit is positive. The indifferent strategy is formally 
presented in Equation 3.2 below.   
(3.2) Let there be 𝑖∗ ∈ 𝑃 ∪ 𝐶 such that 𝛺𝑖∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖∈𝑃∪𝐶
𝛺𝑖 
 Drill at 𝑖∗ if 𝛺𝑖∗ > 0.5 
otherwise, do NOT drill. 
 
13
 Note that it is only possible to go from probabilities to benefits because we earlier defined discoveries to yield one 
unit of profit and empty wells to result in minus one unit of profit. 
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In contrast to the indifferent strategy, the “rival strategy” gives preference to 
exploring sites in the contested area 𝐶. Agents following the rival strategy thus 
deploy wells in the contested area first, as long as these sites are associated with 
positive expected profit. This strategy is based on the premise that agents realize 
contested recourses may be acquired by a rival neighbor if not explored today. 
Only when no such option is available does the rival strategy revert to the benefit 
function criteria used in the indifferent strategy. The formal representation is 
presented in Equation 3.3. 
(3.3) Let there be 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝐶 such that 𝑝 ?̃? = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖∈𝐶
𝑝𝑖 
 Drill at 𝑖̃ if 𝑝?̃? > 0.5 
otherwise, 
 Let there be 𝑖∗ ∈ 𝑃 ∪ 𝐶 such that 𝛺𝑖∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖∈𝑃∪𝐶
𝛺𝑖 
 Drill at 𝑖∗ if 𝛺𝑖∗ > 0.5 
otherwise, do NOT drill. 
 
It is noteworthy that, by design, agents are willing to drill on tiles for which the 
expected profit is negative (i.e. for which 𝑝𝑖 is smaller than 0.5) as long as this 
yields sufficient information about the surrounding tiles. According to this 
reasoning, agents are thus willing to invest in information because it enables more 
efficient future exploration. 
3.3. Results 
Using Monte Carlo methods, well deployment is repeatedly simulated 
according to the aforementioned strategies for a series of Ising-generated resource 
distributions. The data obtained is then used to conduct statistical inference 
comparing exploration outcomes, profitability and the clustering of wells for each 
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possible strategy combination (i.e. indifferent vs. indifferent, indifferent vs. rival 
and rival vs. rival).  
For the baseline estimations, 1,000 repetitions are conducted for each setup. A 
𝛽 of 0.125 is chosen in the benefit function to ensure that agents value 
information. The “temperature” parameter, which governs the clustering of 
resources, is set to 4. This ensures that the average cluster size is containable 
within the twelve-by-twelve system. If instead one had calibrated the model to 
have very high levels of spatial correlation (a high “temperature” parameter), a 
single discovery would indicate that the entire landscape contained oil. Visa 
versa, zero spatial correlation means that there are no informational spillovers 
from extraction. The unconditional probability of successful discovery is set by 
the “magnetic field” parameter to be 0.45 meaning that the unconditional 
probability of successful discovery is 45%. This implies that complete exploration 
(i.e. drilling wells on all tiles) would yield an expected net loss. Positive expected 
profits will thus verify that the proposed strategies succeed in using the 
knowledge about resource clustering. Figure 3.2 presents typical resource 
distributions optained when calibrating the model as described above. To 
eliminate any starting point effect, the agent who initiates the game is randomized 
as is the location of the first well deployed.  
The following three subsections introduce the results of the Monte Carlo 
simulations. The first reviews profitability. The second shows how strategy 
combinations affect the timing of profit flows, and the third focuses on the spatial 
distribution of wells. 
3.3.A. Profitability 
Figure 3.3 presents the estimated profits for the three possible strategy 
combinations and for two different leakage setups. A situation of far-reaching 
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extraction externalities is presented to the left, and a situation of spatially limited 
leakage is presented to the right. The bars represent the expected cumulative 
profit attained by each agent at the end of exploration. It becomes clear that all 
proposed strategies perform better than randomized exploration, which would 
yield an expected net loss of 0.05 for each tile explored. There are thus clear 
benefits to basing exploration decisions on the benefit function introduced earlier. 
 
  
(LARGE CONTESTED AREA) (SMALL CONTESTED AREA) 
FIGURE 3.3. EXPECTED TOTAL PROFITS 
Notes: Error bars signify ninety-five percent confidence intervals. On each plot, from left to right, we show the expected 
profit for the following situations: Indifferent vs. indifferent, indifferent vs. rival, and rival vs. rival. “Ind.” stands for the 
indifferent strategy. To mimic a situation of far-reaching extraction externalities, a “large contested” area is used covering 
a four-by-twelve area constituting one third of the entire region (as presented in Figure 3.2). To replicate cases with more 
limited extraction externalities, a “small contested” area is used covering a two-by-twelve area, which constitutes one sixth 
of the entire region. 
 
The expected profit estimates show that common reservoirs result in a 
“prisoner’s dilemma” type situation. Playing the rival strategy strictly dominates 
playing the indifferent strategy. The only possible Nash equilibrium14 is therefore 
both agents playing the rival strategy. However, this is inefficient in terms of 
aggregate profits. Both agents would thus benefit if they could commit to playing 
the indifferent strategy. The only difference between the far-reaching and limited 
 
14
 The Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of multiplayer non-cooperative games where it is assumed that each 
player knows the equilibrium strategies of the other players. The Nash equilibrium exists when no player has anything to 
gain by changing only his or her own strategy.  
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extraction externality is that the increase in profits occurring when switching to 
the rival strategy is smaller in the latter case. As expected, the incentive to follow 
the rival strategy thus increases with the size of the contested area. 
The counterproductive outcome associated with the prisoner’s dilemma occurs 
due to a combination of the information and extraction externalities. Knowledge 
about the expected location of resources is valuable because it enables more 
effective explorations in the future. Investing in information by spreading out 
exploration today is, however, costly as the respective neighbors can acquire 
contested resources in the meantime. This effect is further enhanced by 
information being a public good. Agents can thus ‘free ride’ on the information 
investments of their neighbors. From a social perspective, the rival strategy 
wastefully gives preference to exploring contested resources at the expense of 
more informative sites. Opting for the more exploratory indifferent strategy is, 
however, irrational from a private gains perspective. 
3.3.B. Timing of profits 
Figure 3.4 shows how expected cumulative profits evolve over time (turns) for 
different strategy combinations and thereby highlights the role of investment 
timing. It can be seen from the figure, that the expected profit from exploring the 
first tile is always negative (precisely -0.05). This originates from the model 
calibration, as the unconditional probability of discovery is set to 0.45. For 
random exploration, the curve in Figure 3.4 would be decreasing linearly with a 
negative slope of 0.05. Instead, we find that, for all strategy combinations, profits 
grow monotonically with time. Furthermore, the cumulative profits shown in 
Figure 3.4 exhibit two regimes: First, the curve is convex for approximately 15 
turns, corresponding to an increasing marginal profit of deployment. This is due 
to the information gathered through exploration, which gradually allows for more 
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efficient drilling. After this, the curve becomes concave corresponding to a 
decreasing marginal profit. This is the result of there being fewer and fewer tiles 
available and agents are thus forced to increasingly invest in less promising tiles.  
 
 
FIGURE 3.4. CUMULATIVE PROFITS OVER TIME 
Notes: Error bars signify ninety-five percent confidence intervals.  
 
As we explained earlier, the expected profit at the end of exploration is larger 
for a rival, regardless of the strategy used by his or her neighbor. It is however 
noteworthy that this is not the case throughout the entire exploration period. 
Between turns 10 and 35 the expected cumulative profit of both agents following 
the indifferent strategy is higher than for any other strategy combination. This can 
be explained in the following way: The more agents adopt the indifferent strategy, 
the more exploration is initially spread out and the more information is acquired 
early on. This positive learning effect yields higher expected private profits in the 
intermediate term. However, following the rival strategy and letting one’s 
respective neighbor follow the indifferent strategy dominates in the long run. This 
is because a rival firstly secures relatively uncertain tiles in the contested area and 
only secondly deploys wells in the interior. This leaves tiles in the perfect 
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property domain, which can be accessed in later phases of exploration, leading to 
cumulative profits overtaking in the long run.  
The model introduced in this chapter does not incorporate a discount factor and 
agents consequently do not have a preference regarding the timing of profit flows. 
In reality, however, firms might have an incentive to receive profits early. 
Combined with the insights from Figure 3.4 this suggests that a sufficiently high 
discount factor could tilt the relative expected profits associated with different 
strategies. The situation in which both agents follow the indifferent strategy could 
thus potentially become a Nash equilibrium if profits made at later stages of 
exploration were valued sufficiently less. This could help solve the prisoner’s 
dilemma situation described in the previous subsection and thereby prevent the 
occurrence of a suboptimal aggregate profit. 
3.3.C. Spatial distribution 
Analyzing the distribution of wells unravels the spatial consequence of strategic 
interaction. The well distributions at the end of turn 15 and at the end of 
exploration are plotted for the three different strategy combinations in Figure 3.5. 
Each diagram presents the share of wells located at different distances from the 
center of the agent’s domain. The domain is here defined as the area where 
resources are accessible for exploration (including both perfect property and 
contested resources).  
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AFTER 15 TURNS END OF EXPLORATION 
  
(INDIFFERENT STRATEGY VS. INDIFFERENT STRATEGY) 
  
(INDIFFERENT STRATEGY VS. RIVAL STRATEGY) 
  
(RIVAL STRATEGY VS. RIVAL STRATEGY) 
FIGURE 3.5. SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF WELLS 
Notes: Error bars signify ninety-five percent confidence intervals. 
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There are two important things to note when interpreting Figure 3.5: First, 
contested resources are, by definition, accessible to both agents. This means that 
fewer tiles per agent tend to be available for exploration in this area. If strategies 
are identical, for instance, only half as many tiles are available in the contested 
area as in the comparable private property area. Second, the distribution of wells 
will naturally flatten as pre-deployed wells increasingly restrict the space of 
possible exploration investments.  
As seen in Figure 3.5, different strategy combinations lead to different 
distributional outcomes. Agents following the indifferent strategy tend to deploy a 
higher proportion of wells in the center of their domain. This tendency can be 
directly attributed to the 𝜆𝑖′ factor in the benefit function. Exploration close to a 
border is thus relatively less attractive as information about resources outside the 
perfect property domain is valued less or not at all. By construction, agents 
following the rival strategy tend to deploy a relatively greater share of their wells 
in the contested area. This is driven by the first criterion of the rival strategy.  
Having a rival neighbor even induces agents following the indifferent strategy 
to shift investment focus closer to the contested area. This behavior is driven by a 
knowledge spillover as the extensive investment of a neighbor into the contested 
area provides superior information about the border region, which in turn makes 
investments here more likely.  
Spatial competition over contested resources will thus motivate a clustering of 
exploration activity around property lines. This result remains true even when 
only one of the two neighboring parties gives preference to exploration of 
contested resources. This insight offers a new avenue for empirical research into 
the potential occurrence of common pool problems in the oil and gas industry. 
Assuming that capital and labor constraints limit the ability to instantaneously 
deploy wells, a symptom of common pool problems would be a significantly 
higher clustering of wells around property lines in early stages of exploration. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a novel, physics-based and explicit method to model 
how information and extraction externalities influence oil and gas exploration 
across a two-dimensional common pool reservoir. Using the Ising model, 
knowledge about the location of resources was modeled to propagate across space 
as exploration is deployed. Extraction externalities were replicated by defining a 
subset of contested resources that are accessible to both agents. Using Monte 
Carlo simulations, two competing exploration strategies were compared.  
Both strategies accounted for knowledge spillovers from exploration and 
thereby significantly improved on a randomized deployment of wells in terms of 
attained profit. Substantial differences in the relative profits associated with 
different strategy combinations were revealed. These differences result in a 
prisoner’s dilemma type problem where the only possible Nash equilibrium is 
both agents following the socially inefficient rival strategy.  
This inefficient outcome can be interpreted as a result of underinvestment in 
public information. Knowledge about the location of resources persists throughout 
the exploration period and acquiring it early is advantageous from an efficiency 
perspective. This, in isolation, should motivate information seeking behavior. Yet, 
extraction externalities incentivize the socially wasteful but privately rational 
clustering of wells around borders in the early phases of exploration. Such 
clustering was suggested as a signature of common pool problems, which offers 
promising avenues for future empirical analysis. 
The economic inefficiencies revealed in this chapter suggest that there is room 
for policy intervention but implementing these successfully may be difficult. 
Broadly, three avenues are possible: command and control policies, 
taxes/subsidies and Coasian solutions. Most current regulation falls within the 
first category. Legal restrictions on the spacing of wells thus remain the preferred 
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policy tool in most countries (Lowe, 2010). However, the model developed in this 
chapter implies that the effectiveness of such policies can be questioned. If large 
enough, implementing a legal “no man's land” between two resource owners 
might thus not only eliminate the extraction externality; it will also make some 
underground resources inaccessible. Regulating the spacing of wells may thus 
create new inefficiencies, which could be as large as the ones that it seeks to 
correct. 
An alternative to current command and control policies could be implementing 
appropriate taxes or subsides. While this chapter showed that the rival strategy is 
strictly dominant in the long run this is not the case throughout exploration. The 
situation where both agents follow the indifferent strategy maximizes private 
profits in the intermediate run. This result originates from the rival forgoing 
higher immediate profits in order to secure contested resources. It is this behavior 
that is socially inefficient and it therefore also presents a potential avenue for 
corrective policies. Imposing a tax on profits, which increases sufficiently over 
time, could thus change the relative appeal of different exploration strategies. 
Introducing such a tax might thereby make the socially efficient outcome, where 
both agents follow the “indifferent strategy”, an alternative Nash equilibrium. The 
level of an efficient tax is dependent on the relative time preference of resource 
owners and the extent of extraction externalities. Alternatively, a government 
could provide subsidies to disincentivize clustering around borders. A problem 
with both taxes and subsidies is however, that a regulator might not know the 
exact extent of information and extraction externalities. Faced by this lack of 
knowledge, it is almost impossible to implement optimal taxes or subsidies and 
the regulator might thus end up exacerbating economic inefficiencies.    
The classic ‘Coase Theorem’ (Coase, 1960) offers an alternative solution to the 
common pool problem described in this chapter. Assuming that transaction costs 
are sufficently low and property rights are assigned, bargaining could thus result 
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in the economically efficent outcome where reservoirs are managed as one entity. 
In practice, this could be achieved through private acquisition of neighboring 
lands, joint development agreements15 or unitization contracts.16 All of these 
methods have the potential to internalize extraction and information externalities. 
However, land heterogeneities and producers having diverging views on how to 
share production can complicate such cooperation agreements (Wiggins & 
Libecap, 1985).  
The model introduced in this chapter could easily be expanded to replicate more 
realistic situations but its core predictions should first be empirically tested. Some 
of the theoretical additions worth considering are: Moving beyond the sequential 
setup and accounting for asymmetric agents. The turn based setup presented in 
this paper assumes that landovners are identical in their capacity to drill. However 
exploration might occur in areas where neighboring agents have very different 
access to capital and technology. To mimic such setups one might alter the 
theoretical model allowing one agent relatively more turns then his or her 
neighbor. The potential implications of unequal drilling capacities are explored in 
more detail in Appendix C. Other theoretical addtions could be incorporating 
physical damages to the reservoir following overly rapid extraction and 
weakening the assumption of public information in order to capture the effect of 
temporary confidentiality periods. However, before expanding the framework one 
should first seek to identify the optimal search strategy and test the empirical 
validity of the model’s predictions. A first step in this process would be to reduce 
computational complexity, by moving away from the large two-dimensional 
 
15
 A Joint Development Agreement is a deal between two states to jointly develop an oil or gas reservoir to which 
either or both of the participating parties may be entitled in international law. The financial split between parties is subject 
to negotiation and varies on a case-by-case basis. Examples include, but are not limited to: The 1974 Japan-Korean Joint 
Development Zone, the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty and the 2001 Nigeria-São Tomé and Príncipe Joint Development Zone. 
16
 Unitization is an agreement between two or more parties by which a shared reservoir is managed as a single unit. 
The arrangement is made when multiple agents (states, firms or private individuals) hold exploration rights in a common 
oil or gas reservoir. 
 63 
setting studied in this chapter. One could simplify the problem to describe 
hydrocarbon exploration along a line and solve this using backwards induction. 
Such a model setup would be a representative depiction of neighboring countries 
separated by a joint border. As a result, the predictions of the framework could be 
tested using international exploration data. 
Despite currently describing a natural resource problem, the model used in this 
chapter fundamentally analyzes optimal investment in situations of information 
externalities and contest over assets. Consider the case of two or more national 
airline companies that are deciding on which new flight destinations to invest in. 
Each airline might have a de facto monopoly on their home market but face 
competition over international routes. Furthermore, adding a new destination is 
likely to yield insider information about the profitability of other destinations in 
the surrounding geographic area. This airline investment problem is comparable 
to that studied in this chapter and the proposed framework could thus be expanded 
to identify the optimal expansion of flight routes. The wider applicability of the 
model is, however, limited by the assumption that agents need to know the Ising 
parameters. This might not be realistic for most investment problems outside the 
oil and gas industry. The model can thus only be applied to strategic problems 
where agents know both the unconditional probability of success as well as the 
average clustering of outcomes. 
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Chapter 4. 
Borders and Resources: Evidence of strategic exploration 
By JAMES CUST, TORFINN HARDING, THOMAS BLIGAARD NIELSEN AND THOMAS SCAFFIDI* 
Divided into two main parts, this chapter show how the presence of 
information spillovers and potential contestability of deposits at 
property boundaries affect oil and gas exploration. Using data for 
more than 100,000 wells in over 120 countries, we first analyze the 
spatial distribution of wells. This empirical investigation finds 
evidence of excessive drilling close to national borders. However, 
this is not observed at borders with unitization agreements that are 
intended to solve the problem of cross-border resource leakage. 
Instead, states with unitization agreements have undertaken 
relatively more of their drilling in the interior of their countries. 
Recognizing that exploration and borders are correlated, the second 
part of the chapter applies techniques from statistical physics to 
model observed behavior. This analysis shows how a race to 
capture common pool resources can result in a peak of exploration 
near borders and how agents seeking to internalize informational 
spillovers can lead to an interior clustering of wells. As geology and 
not property lines should govern exploration, practitioners should 
aim to internalize spatial externalities. However, this chapter finds 
that existing unitization agreements remain unsuccessful in doing so 
as drilling activity remains dependent on borders.   
* James Cust, University of Oxford, jim.cust@economics.ox.ac.uk; Torfinn Harding, NHH Norwegian School of 
Economics, torfinnh@gmail.com; Thomas Bligaard Nielsen, London School of Economics, T.B.Nielsen@lse.ac.uk; 
Thomas Scaffidi, University of Oxford, thomas.scaffidi@physics.ox.ac.uk 
 68 
Subsoil natural resources such as oil and gas represent tremendous value 
globally. Even at current low oil prices, the global production of crude was worth 
more than 4.8 billion US dollars daily in 2015 (BP 2016). It is well known that the 
exploration for and extraction of these resources may not be socially efﬁcient due 
to two spatial externalities. First, reservoirs can straddle property lines and the 
migratory nature of hydrocarbons gives rise to an “extraction externality”: 
resources around property lines may be non-excludable, meaning that a 
neighbor’s extraction can inﬂuence one’s own extraction. This risk incentivizes 
landowners to accelerate extraction and drill inefﬁciently many wells in border 
areas (Khalatbari1977; Libecap and Wiggins 1985a; 1985b). Second, due to 
geology, oil and gas resources tend to be statistically clustered across space. This 
leads to an “information externality”: The likelihood of discovering resources is 
greater in areas of past discoveries than in unexplored areas. A neighbor’s 
exploration can thus provide useful information about the geology of one’s own 
land. As drilling is costly, this might incentivize a strategic waiting game, 
whereby exploration of common reservoirs is inefﬁciently postponed (Hendricks 
and Kovenock 1989; Hendricks and Wilson 1985; Isaac 1987; Porter 1995).  
In this chapter we show that drilling behavior in the global oil and gas industry 
is consistent with the presence of these two externalities. In the ﬁrst part of the 
chapter, we study offshore oil and gas exploration, using data for more than 
100,000 individual wells in over 120 countries. Close to national borders without 
a unitization agreement,17 we ﬁnd evidence of excessive exploration drilling. 
However, this pattern is not as present at borders with a unitization agreement, 
which is intended to internalize the extraction externality. Instead, countries with 
a unitization agreement have undertaken relatively more of their drilling close to 
 
17
 Unitization is an agreement between two or more parties by which a shared reservoir is managed as a single unit. 
The arrangement is made when multiple agents (states, firms or private individuals) hold exploration rights in a common 
oil or gas reservoir. 
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the interior of their countries. The previous literature studied the US exploration 
in Texas and the Gulf of Mexico. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst 
study of the global oil and gas industry, and hence the role of property lines in the 
form of country borders.  
In the second part of the chapter, we model the dynamic game between two 
neighboring agents searching for a subsoil natural resource such as oil or gas. The 
focus is on where drilling takes place in relation to the property line between the 
two agents. To be able to solve the dynamic game of exploration and model the 
spread of geologic information as wells are drilled, we draw on insights from the 
ﬁeld of ferromagnetism in statistical physics. The previous literature has shown 
that the two spatial externalities, the extraction externality and the information 
externality, are, separately, important to understanding drilling behavior. 
However, our model is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst to incorporate them 
simultaneously.  
The empirical ﬁndings of this chapter are as follows: In countries without 
unitization agreements, an excess of drilling activity is observed close to national 
borders compared to a random distribution of exploration. In the sub-sample of 
country borders subject to a unitization agreement, we do not ﬁnd significant 
over-exploration close to borders. Instead, such areas have a greater share of 
exploration situated away from neighbors towards the interior of the countries. To 
confirm that these patterns are independent of geology or other natural 
geographical features, we present suggestive evidence of no relation between 
country borders and discovery rates. Independence between country borders and 
geology is also found by Caselli et al. (2012) and Cust and Harding (2013). There 
is thus little evidence to suggest that our findings are explained by a systematic 
correlation between national border demarcations and the presence of oil and gas. 
Our theoretical results show that the empirical ﬁndings of the chapter are 
consistent with the presence of both the extraction externality and the information 
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externality. In isolation, the extraction externality creates a race for resources 
close to the property line, manifested as an over-exploration in border areas. In 
contrast, the information externality provides an incentive to explore away from 
neighbors and closer to the interior of countries, as this is where drilling yields the 
most information about the geology of one’s own property domain. As the two 
externalities work in opposite directions, they are hard to isolate. However, a 
successful unitization agreement assigns property rights to common pool 
resources, removes the extraction externality and eliminates the incentive to over-
explore border areas. This explains why excess exploration of border areas is 
observed in countries without unitization agreements but not in countries with 
them. However, a unitization agreement does not remove the information 
externality and exploration therefore remains dependent on borders even in 
countries with such arrangements. There is thus an over-representation of 
exploration away from borders in countries with unitization agreements. 
Our results illustrate that both the extraction and information externalities affect 
where wells are located but the observed patterns are likely inefﬁcient. From a 
social planning perspective, it is geology rather than property lines that should 
govern where exploration takes place and there is thus room for policy action. In 
terms of policies to reduce the strategic exploration, many countries have not 
reached unitization agreements with their neighbors. This is not surprising, given 
that even private ﬁrms often fail to make such a contract voluntarily due to 
heterogeneity and information asymmetries across parties (Libecap and Wiggins 
1985a; 1985b). The information externality may be reduced by the mandatory 
provision of exploration data. This explains why some countries, such as the UK, 
Norway and Denmark, require seismic information to be made publicly available 
after a certain confidentiality period. However, the sharing of exploration data 
across country borders remains uncommon and there thus remains room for 
policy intervention to internalize the information externality.  
 71 
This chapter builds on past research of strategic interaction in the oil and gas 
industry. Notably, Hendricks and Porter (1996) find that information externalities 
slow exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. However, focusing on the same region 
but using a different measure of neighbors, Lin (2009) finds no evidence of such a 
strategic waiting game. However, the counteracting effect of externalities is likely 
to explain these mixed findings. Waiting for information arising from additional 
drilling is thus made costly by the risk of cross-border leakage. Despite this, there 
remains no comprehensive theoretical framework that describes the interplay 
between information and extraction externalities across space. The existing 
description of behavior is thus incomplete. As this chapter serves to highlight, it is 
necessary to unravel strategic incentives and their impact on the spatial 
distribution of exploration in order to identify inefficiencies and improve 
outcomes. 
The chapter proceeds in three main parts. Section One introduces the empirical 
analysis and is composed of subsections introducing the empirical strategy, data 
and results. Section Two is dedicated to the theoretical model and is composed of 
four subsections introducing the landscape, agents, solution concept and 
predictions. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses their 
implications. 
4.1. Empirical distribution of wells 
This section is dedicated to testing whether, and if so how, exploration activity 
is dependent on property demarcations. It does so by evaluating the distribution of 
wells around national borders and analyzing how these depend on institutional 
arrangements such as unitization agreements. We first discuss the data and 
empirical strategy and then move on to the results.  
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4.1.A. Empirical strategy and data 
We use GIS (Geographic Information System) data on national borders and 
offshore exploration wells to test the relationship between property lines and 
drilling activity. Specifically, the PathFinder database owned by Wood 
Mackenzie (2011) is used. This provides the exact location of over 100,000 oil 
and gas exploration wells, together with information about when they were drilled 
and whether they contained oil and gas or not. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the most comprehensive global database on exploration drilling in existence. 
The GADM database of Global Administrative Areas version 2.0 (Hijmans et al., 
2010) is used to identify the location of onshore national borders and the EEZ 
Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase version 6.1 (Claus et al., 2013) is used for data 
on the location of offshore maritime borders.  
A series of data restrictions are performed to ensure that the distribution of 
borders is independent of geology and thus the location of oil and gas resources. 
We exclude onshore wells and focus on offshore exploration to minimize the risk 
of capturing effects related to natural geography such as mountain chains or rivers 
that might be correlated with the location of borders. Furthermore, we follow Cust 
and Harding (2013) and only include borders with locations that have remained 
unchanged since 1965 and focus on wells drilled in the period after 1966. This 
ensures that borders are predetermined with respect to drilling. The location or 
outcome of exploration have thus not influenced the location of borders. To 
capture the full density of drilling we include all wells up to 2010. See Cust and 
Harding (2013) for further details on the data sources used. This yields a subset of 
29, 285 ofshore wells. 
The empirical analysis of this chapter rests on the assumption that the 
unconditional likelihood of discovering oil and gas is uniform across space. This 
is necessarily an assumption, as geology is unobservable in practice. The closest 
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we get to observing the geology is the discovery rate; that is, the share of wells 
drilled that did have economically viable oil or gas. Figure 4.1 shows the 
discovery rate of offshore oil and gas wells across different distances from 
country borders.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.1. DISCOVERY RATES AT DIFFERENT DISTANCES FROM COUNTRY BORDERS 
Notes: Based on all countries. Horizontal axis shows distance to nearest country border, vertical axis the share of non-dry 
wells. Red dots are estimated coefficients on dummies per one km. the blue line is local linear means estimation using a 
standard Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 5 km. Ninety-five percent confident intervals are marked in gray. 
 
As seen from Figure 4.1, the discovery rate shows seemingly little variation 
according to the distance from the border. This supports the assumption that 
borders and geology are independently distributed and follows previous findings 
by Caselli et al. (2012) and Cust and Harding (2013). Given the validity of the 
assumption, we are able to analyze the distribution of wells around borders 
without worrying that geology rather than behavior drives the patterns. 
Having defined the restricted sample, it is possible to plot the density of 
offshore wells at different distances from national borders, as is done in Figure 
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4.2. This figure presents the absolute density of exploration activity at different 
distances from country borders. It is clear that there is more drilling close to 
borders and there may be three reasons for this. First, the available area of any 
country is geometrically shrinking when approaching the center. This is because 
the radius is decreasing. Second, it is only large countries that contain areas far 
away from borders while all countries are represented at the border. To illustrate 
this insight, a small country like Singapore contains no point which is further then 
50 kilometers from the nearest border. Third, there may be strategic drilling close 
to borders due to the extraction externality described in the introduction.  
 
  
FIGURE 4.2. DENSITY OF EXPLORATION ACTIVITY AT DIFFERENT DISTANCES FROM COUNTRY BORDERS 
Notes: Figures are based on all offshore oil and gas wells in the sample.   
 
To isolate the effect of strategic drilling from questions related to the size and 
shape of countries, we identify the spatially dependent density of wells assuming 
random exploration. This is done by randomly assigning 100,000,000 points on 
the globe and recording the histogram of those points that are situated offshore. 
As seen in Figure 4.1, the distribution of these random points differ from that 
empirically observed distribution of wells. Specifically, a greater share of 
observed exploration appears to be located in border areas than a random 
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distribution would suggest. To quantify this clustering, we calculate the following 
normalized density of exploration activity in bin 𝑏: 
(4.1) 𝑁𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏 =
∑ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑏
[∑𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠]/𝑁
∑ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑏
[∑𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠]/𝑁
, where 𝑁 is the number of bins 
 
As evident from Equation 4.1, the normalized density of exploration will only 
equal one if the actual and random density of exploration is identical. If 
𝑁𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏 > 1, it means that the density of exploration is higher than predicted 
by random exploration. Visa versa, 𝑁𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏 < 1 means that a smaller 
proportion of wells is located in the bin relative to a random allocation. 
The areal extent of analysis has important implications for the normalized 
density of exploration. For the rest of this chapter, we focus on the first 100 
kilometers from national borders as we have little support that extraction or 
information externalities apply beyond such vast distances. Furthermore, we seek 
to avoid oversampling big countries which have more areas far from borders. We 
therefore drop all wells that are further then 100 kilometers from a border. This 
reduces the sample from 29, 285 to 12,954 offshore wells. Following a trade-off 
between variance and precision, we use five kilometer bins in this chapter. 
Smaller bins would result in fewer observations within each distance band and the 
variance of estimates therefore increases. Larger bins reduce the variance but 
suffer from less precision, as estimates describe the average density across the 
entire zone.  
To study the possible effect of a unitization agreement we split the sample into 
two subsamples. The first contains wells drilled close to borders with an active 
unitization agreement (6,853 wells) whereas the second contains wells drilled 
close to borders without such an agreement (6,101 wells). A border is defined as 
having an active unitization agreement if the neighboring countries have signed at 
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least one transnational agreement relating to oil and gas development. Here we 
include any Joint Development Zones (JDZs), Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUs) regarding unitization or the bilateral delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
The bilateral agreements signed between the United Kingdom and Norway on 
March 10, 1965 and between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on 
October 6, 1965 constitute good examples of active unitization agreements (see 
Bastida et al., 2007). In contrast, the South Pars/North Dome natural gas field, 
located between Iran and Qatar, lack such an an agreement of joint development. 
The data on unitization agreements was collected manually by reviewing publicly 
disclosed documents from national governments, the Wood Mackenzie 
PathFinder database and the records of oil and gas companies.  
4.1.B. Results 
This subsection introduces the findings of the empirical analysis outlined above. 
Figure 4.3 presents the normalized density of exploration for wells respectively 
located in areas with and without unitization agreements.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.3. NORMALIZED DENSITY OF EXPLORATION ACTIVITY 
Notes: Figure is based on all offshore oil and gas wells in the sample. Dotted lines are fourth-order polynomial 
approximations.   
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Focusing on the first 100 kilometers from borders, Figure 4.3 suggests that 
exploration activity is not independently distributed with respect to property lines. 
Specifically, drilling activity appears to be more concentrated around borders in 
areas without an active unitization agreement then the random allocation of wells 
would suggest. For areas with a unitization agreement, exploration activity 
appears to peak further away from borders.  
To test whether observed patterns are statistically significant, it is useful to 
apply fourth-order polynomial approximations as presented by the dotted lines in 
Figure 4.3. Comparing the functional form of these approximations with a 
constant function equal to one, it is possible to deduce whether and how the 
distribution of exploration is significantly different from the random allocation. 
Table 4.1 presents the output obtained when estimating the fourth-order 
polynomial approximations and statistically comparing them to the constant 
function of random allocation. It should be noted that all significance tests 
presented in the table are two-sided tests for a sample mean of 0 except for the 
test of the constant (intercept), which is a two-sided test for a sample mean of 1. 
This equates to testing whether the distribution is significantly different from 
random allocation and whether there is excessive drilling close to borders. 
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TABLE 4.1. TESTING IF DISTRIBUTIONS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM RANDOM 
Normalized density of exploration activity Without unitization agreements With unitization agreements 
   Constant (intercept) 1.448*** 
[0.063] 
0.989 
[0.228] 
Distance to border (km) 0.017 
[0.012] 
0.070 
[0.050] 
[Distance to border (km)]2 -0.002*** 
[0.000] 
-0.003 
[0.002] 
[Distance to border (km)]3 0.000*** 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
[Distance to border (km)]4 -0.000*** 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
F-test  
[H0: Cons=1; Dist=0; Dist
2=0; Dist3=0; Dist4= 0] 
Rejected  
at a < 1 percent level 
Rejected  
at a 5 percent level 
R2 0.914 0.289 
Number of observations 20 bins based on 6,101 wells  20 bins based on 6,853 wells 
Number of countries 41 30 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (clustered at 5 km intervals). All significance tests are two-sided tests 
for a sample mean of 0 except for the test of the constant (intercept), which is a two-sided test for a sample mean of 1. 
This equates to testing whether the distribution is significantly different from random and whether there is excessive 
drilling close to borders.  
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
 
Reviewing Table 4.1, the estimated role of borders differs greatly between wells 
located in areas with a unitization agreement and wells located in areas without 
such arrangements. However, the F-test reveals that the distribution of exploration 
is statistically different from random for both subsamples (at a five percent level). 
Furthermore, there is statistically significant evidence of exploration clustering in 
border areas without a unitization agreement. The constant is thus significantly 
larger than one at the 1 percent level. More precisely, the density of exploration is 
expected to be 45 percent higher at borders without unitization agreements then 
predicted by the random distribution. 
Focusing on areas with a unitization agreement, there is no statistically 
significant evidence that exploration is clustered around borders. Furthermore, a 
one-sided test confirms that the intercept in areas of unitization is significantly 
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smaller then that observed for wells in areas without a unitization agreement. This 
suggests that unitization shifts the distribution of drilling activity away from 
borders and towards the interior of countries.  
In sum, the empirical analysis has revealed three main insights: 
(i) Exploration activity is dependent on borders both in cases with 
and without unitization agreements. 
(ii) There is a clustering of exploration near borders without 
unitization agreements. 
(iii) Unitization agreements are associated with a greater share of 
exploration being located away from borders than is observed in 
areas without a unitization agreement.   
The next section is focused on introducing a theoretical model that explains 
how the two spatial externalities, the extraction externality and the information 
externality, might explain the observed patterns.         
4.2. Theoretical model of exploration 
This section develops an original theoretical model that integrates insights from 
theoretical physics in order to analyze the deployment of exploration wells across 
space. The framework is based on two neighboring agents who explore a one-
dimensional landscape for underground oil and gas resources. The section begins 
by outlining the landscape and agent characteristics upon which the framework 
rests. A solution concept is then developed in order to determine the optimal 
deployment strategy for the agents. The section concludes with a discussion of the 
model’s predictions with respect to the expected spatial distribution of wells. 
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4.2.A. Landscape 
Figure 4.4 graphically illustrates the landscape explored in the theoretical 
model. Land rights are evenly split and perfectly assigned to the two neighboring 
agents. However, property lines do not necessarily confine underground 
resources. This, results in two categories of potential resource discoveries. The 
first category is private resources (∀ ∈ [𝐴] for agent “A” and ∀ ∈ [𝐵] for agent 
“B”). This resource type is fully contained within a single landowner’s property. 
As a result, it is only accessible to one agent and its rents are therefore excludable. 
The second category is contested resources (∀ ∈ [𝐶]) that can flow across 
property lines. Located in cross-border reservoirs, these resources are accessible 
to both landowners and therefore non-excludable (i.e. a common pool resource). 
Agents search for oil and gas by deciding on whether and where to deploy 
exploration wells on the landscape. These wells can be drilled on a fixed set of 
potential drilling sites. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the sites are spaced evenly 
across the landscape. Those sites that are located close to the property line access 
contested deposits whereas interior sites access private resources. The exploration 
of each site can either result in striking oil and gas or finding a dry hole. To 
capture the cost of drilling, discovery is calibrated to yield one unit of instant 
profit, whereas unsuccessful exploration is set to result in a negative profit of one. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.4. THE LANDSCAPE 
 81 
As discussed in the introduction, the shared geology of underground rock 
formations mean that oil and gas deposits tend to be statistically clustered across 
space. Ceteris paribus, this implies that an agent is more likely to find 
hydrocarbons in areas of past discoveries than in areas surrounding unsuccessful 
exploration wells. To mirror this key feature of oil and gas exploration, the one-
dimensional Ising model (Onsager, 1944) is employed. Borrowed from the field 
of ferromagnetism, this model was originally designed to capture the physics of 
magnetic moments (spins) with a binary set of possible states (up or down). 
Placed on a line, magnetic moments interact with their direct neighbors, making it 
more likely to find clusters of spins with the same state. The Ising model 
describes how these clusters are statistically distributed over space. In its original 
form, a “temperature” parameter governs the average size of the clusters, whilst 
the unconditional probability of a given state (up or down) is determined by a 
“magnetic field” parameter. 
The relevance of ferromagnetism to solve a problem of oil and gas exploration 
may not be obvious. Yet, a slight alteration in terminology highlights the Ising 
model’s usefulness. As described, each drilling site on the landscape can either 
contain hydrocarbons or not. This corresponds to the magnetic moment either 
being up or down in the Ising model. As neighboring magnetic moments, on 
average, tend to be parallel, regions with hydrocarbons will statistically be 
clustered across space. In geological terms, these clusters can be understood as 
reservoir formations. Ising’s original “temperature” variable now controls how 
correlated resources are across space, that is, the average size of hydrocarbon 
reservoirs (“resource clustering”). The magnetic field variable controls the 
unconditional probability of discovering hydrocarbons (“resource richness”). This 
refers to the general probability of finding oil and gas when no wells have 
previously been drilled. In practical terms, this would relate to the average 
resource concentration for the region in question. By adjusting the “resource 
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clustering” and the “resource richness” parameters, the framework developed in 
this chapter is thus capable of simulating different exploration settings. The 
interested reader is referred to Appendix A for a detailed introduction to the Ising 
model and the stochastic process that generates the spatially-correlated resource 
landscapes. 
4.2.B. Agents 
The two neighboring agents in the model are assumed to be identical and profit 
maximizing. Both are risk neutral and have no time preference regarding the flow 
of profits. Furthermore, the agents know the unconditional probability of 
discovery and the average size of hydrocarbon reservoirs. Translated into the 
Ising framework, this implies that both the “resource clustering” and the “resource 
richness” parameter are publicly known. Knowing the statistical process 
governing the distribution of resources, agents can compute the conditional 
probability of finding hydrocarbons anywhere in the landscape, based on the 
outcome of previous drillings. This calculation constitutes an example of 
Bayesian updating and rests on the assumption that agents know the “resource 
clustering” and “resource richness” parameters in the underlying Ising model. The 
result is a learning effect whereby geological information spreads across space as 
wells are deployed. In the model, such geological knowledge is assumed to be a 
public good. Agents therefore instantly and identically update their expectations 
about the likely distribution of resources after a new drilling. A graphical 
representation of this process is presented in Appendix A.  
As agents are assumed to have identical investment capabilities, the option to 
drill is designed to occur sequentially. Agents thus alternate on deciding whether 
and where to deploy their next well. This turn-based design captures situations 
where both agents have access to the same capital and technology. However, 
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sequential deployment does not represent setups where neighbors have different 
exploration capabilities. The interested reader is referred to Appendix C for an 
example where the assumption of sequential deployment is relaxed.  
 
4.2.C. Solution concept 
Following the above model outline, it is now possible to determine where wells 
will likely be drilled across the landscape. A first step towards making this 
distributional prediction is to identify the exploration strategy that maximizes the 
expected profit of the respective agent. Determining this privately optimal 
strategy is, however, complicated by the fact that exploration is a dynamic 
problem in which the strategic interaction of agents is key. Any optimal behavior 
should thus account for both the outcome of past exploration as well as the 
expected location and outcome of future wells. To solve this dynamic game, it is 
useful to draw on the idea of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium borrowed 
from game theory. The aim is to identify the strategy profiles in which neither of 
the two agents can increase their expected profits by unilaterally changing their 
exploration strategy. 
These sub-game perfect Nash equilibria are found using backward induction. 
Specifically, one first considers the last time an exploration decision might be 
made and what decision would be made in that given situation. Using this result, 
one then determines how to proceed at the second-to-last time a well is deployed. 
This process of reasoning backwards is repeated until the best exploration 
decision for every possible situation has been identified. The result is a strategy 
vector, which classifies the optimal exploration behavior for every conceivable 
landscape of wells. As each of the 𝑛 drilling sites can either contain no well, a dry 
well or a successful discovery there are 𝑛3 possible landscapes. Deducing this 
substantial strategy vector is computationally cumbersome, as it requires 
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identifying the Nash equilibria of every sub-game in the extensive form game. To 
ease this procedure, the game is programed using recursive equations in the 
standard mathematical software package MATLAB. The interested reader is 
referred to Appendix B for a formal derivation of the optimal exploration strategy. 
Before making predictions regarding the distribution of wells, it is necessary to 
simulate optimal deployment for every conceivable landscape of resources. The 
strategy vector provides the optimal exploration decision for all possible 
situations. However, it does not describe how likely those situations are. To make 
predictions about the expected location of wells, it is therefore necessary to solve 
the exploration game for every conceivable landscape. In practice, this is achieved 
by letting the agents apply the optimal strategy to all possible resource 
distributions and then sum over the probabilities for each landscape. The result is 
a distribution function that describes the exact probability of observing 
exploration on every given site in the system. 
4.2.D. Predictions 
This section analyzes the spatial consequences of strategic interaction, by 
evaluating the distribution of wells predicted by the model. The specific setup 
consists of 22 drilling sites, of which each agent initially has eleven to pick from. 
To avoid starting point bias, the first exploration site is chosen randomly and the 
game is initiated if a discovery is made. As a consequence, none of the agents 
have a systematic first-mover advantage. With respect to the Ising-parameters, the 
core estimations are based on a “resource clustering” parameter set to 0.5 and a 
“resource richness” parameter set to 0. This specific calibration corresponds to a 
50 percent unconditional probability of discovery and an expected size of 
hydrocarbon deposits that is containable within the 22-site system.  
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The effect of common pool reservoirs is best illustrated by estimating the model 
for two different resource setups. In the first scenario, all potential oil and gas 
discoveries are modeled as private resources. This setup serves as a baseline and 
represents a situation of perfect property rights where resource leakage is not 
possible. One can think of this setup as a situation where a successful unitization 
agreement has internalized the extraction externality. In the second scenario, the 
two drilling sites directly adjacent to the property line are modeled to access the 
same contested resource pool. This represents a situation of imperfect property 
rights equivalent to a situation without a unitization agreement.  
Figure 4.5 illustrates the probability of exploration and the normalized density 
of exploration activity predicted under the two distinct resource setups. As agents 
are identical and the first exploration site is chosen randomly, the solution is 
symmetrical for both agents and the figure therefore focuses only on the expected 
distribution of agent A’s exploration.   
 
 86 
 
 
FIGURE 4.5. THE EFFECT OF COMMON POOLS 
Notes: The top figure presents the expected probability of exploration identified by the model and the bottom figure 
presents the normalized density of exploration. Dotted lines are fourth-order polynomial approximations. The drilling sites 
are categorized as follows: ∀ ∈ [𝐴] access resources private to agent 𝐴 and ∀ ∈ [𝐶] access-contested resources. Resources 
are perfectly assigned in the perfect property rights setup and all sites thus access private resources.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.5, common pool problems significantly increase 
the likelihood of observing wells in border areas. This is because the opportunity 
cost of postponing the exploration of contested deposits (∀ ∈ [𝐶]) is significant. 
The reason for this is that a neighbor might access these resources and make them 
inaccessible in the future. In turn, this incentivizes agents to initiate their 
exploration close to the property line even in situations where the probability of 
discovery here is smaller than on alternative interior drilling sites. The theoretical 
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model is thus capable of replicating the exploration distributions observed in areas 
without unitization agreements. 
The predicted exploration behavior in situations of imperfect property rights is 
in stark contrast to that identified when all resources are treated as private. In such 
situations of perfect property rights, agents have no risk of forfeiting access to 
underground resources. This eliminates the race for contested deposits and allows 
agents to focus solely on identifying the most likely location(s) of oil and gas 
deposits on their own lands. If agents operated alone, the best strategy to achieve 
this would be to initiate exploration in the center of one’s own property domain. 
Such a strategy would provide the best understanding of the private resource 
landscape and therefore allow for the optimal deployment of wells in subsequent 
stages of exploration. According to the theoretical model, the majority of 
exploration would thus be found in and around the center of the private property 
domain. However, as agents are not alone, they expect some informational 
spillover from the exploration of neighbors. This alters optimal behavior, as it 
incentivizes exploration to be skewed slightly away from the property line. As a 
consequence, we see the skewed interior spikes in exploration observed in Figure 
4.5. These findings are in accordance with the empirical results, which 
highlighted that exploration is not independent of borders even in areas where 
unitization agreements are in place. 
Having established the implications of information and extraction externalities, 
it is now possible to analyze the relationships between the predicted distribution 
of wells and reservoir characteristics. The proposed model allows for altering both 
the unconditional probability of discovery and the statistical clustering of 
resources. Focusing on the latter of these two, Figure 4.6 plots the expected 
distribution of exploration wells when the “resource clustering” parameter (Bj) is 
altered. 
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(PERFECT PROPERTY RIGHTS) (IMPERFECT PROPERTY RIGHTS) 
FIGURE 4.6. CHANGING THE SIZE OF RESOURCE CLUSTERS 
Notes: The top figures present the expected probability of exploration identified by the model and the bottom figures 
present the normalized density of exploration. Dotted lines are fourth-order polynomial approximations. The drilling sites 
are categorized as follows: ∀ ∈ [𝐴] access resources private to agent 𝐴 and ∀ ∈ [𝐶] access-contested resources. Resources 
are perfectly assigned in the perfect property rights setup and all sites thus access private resources.  
 
Calibrating the model with a high value of the “resource clustering” parameter 
(Bj) corresponds to oil and gas being strongly correlated across space. A discovery 
thus significantly increases the probability of finding hydrocarbons on 
surrounding sites, whereas a dry well greatly decreases the likelihood. This means 
that drilling yields substantial information about the likely location of surrounding 
resources. In contrast, a low value of the “resource clustering” parameter entails 
that the information gains from exploration are limited.  
As shown in Figure 4.6, the spatial correlation of resources affects the 
theoretically predicted distribution of exploration. The general trend is that a 
higher “resource clustering” parameter (Bj) motivates a more even distribution of 
 89 
wells further away from the property line. Agents terminating their exploration 
when faced by dry wells explain this pattern. The insight that resource leakage 
induces clustered exploration around property lines remains, nonetheless, robust 
to different levels of spatial resource correlation.  
Governing the unconditional probability of discovery, the “resource richness” 
(Bh) controls how resource-rich a region is. Keeping the “resource clustering” 
parameter constant at 0.5, Figure 4.7 illustrates the expected distribution of 
exploration for three “resource richness” values.  
 
  
  
(PERFECT PROPERTY RIGHTS) (IMPERFECT PROPERTY RIGHTS) 
FIGURE 4.7. CHANGING THE UNCONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF DISCOVERY 
Notes: The top figures present the expected probability of exploration identified by the model and the bottom figures 
present the normalized density of exploration. Dotted lines are fourth-order polynomial approximations. The drilling sites 
are categorized as follows: ∀ ∈ [𝐴] access resources private to agent 𝐴 and ∀ ∈ [𝐶] access-contested resources. Resources 
are perfectly assigned in the perfect property rights setup and all sites thus access private resources.  
 
As shown by Figure 4.7, a smaller unconditional probability of discovery 
reduces the general likelihood of observing exploration. Calibrating the “resource 
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richness” parameter (Bh) to a value of -0.3, 0 and 0.3 thus corresponds to a 35, 50 
and 65 percent unconditional probability of discovery, respectively. The insight 
that resource-rich regions are associated with a relatively higher number of wells 
is intuitive, as the expected gains from exploration increase with the probability of 
discovery. For sufficiently resource-rich environments, the distribution of wells 
will converge toward uniformity, as complete exploration becomes rational. 
Following the model’s design, the predicted probability of observing exploration 
on every site would thus be constant at 100 percent. Conversely, a sufficiently 
resource-poor environment eliminates the benefits from exploration. This means 
that the probability of observing wells would be zero across all sites. On their 
own, however, these two extreme scenarios are not insightful, since most 
exploration occurs under uncertainty. In uncertain environments, the distribution 
of exploration is predicted to be non-uniform as illustrated by Figure 4.7. Previous 
conclusions regarding the concentration of exploration in border areas are thus 
theoretically robust as long as some uncertainty about exploration outcomes 
remains.  
However, as illustrated by Figures 4.6 and 4.7, the location of interior peaks in 
exploration activity relative to the border depends on reservoir characteristics. 
One can therefore not expect to find empirically significant evidence of interior 
peaks when averaging over many different types of reservoirs. This might explain 
why we do not identify a single point of interior clustering when evaluating 
exploration behavior under unitization agreements in Section 4.1 of this chapter. 
Instead, we thus find suggestive evidence of a series of interior peaks at different 
distances from the border.  
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4.3. Conclusion 
Based on a global dataset of offshore oil and gas wells, this chapter showed that 
the distribution of exploration activity depends on national demarcations. It 
documented over-exploration in areas close to borders which are not covered by a 
unitization agreement. This pattern is not identified in areas of unitization, where 
exploration instead is concentrated away from borders towards the interior of 
countries. To explain these patterns, a new theoretical framework was introduced.  
Deploying the Ising model, borrowed from the field of ferromagnetism, this 
spatial setup was capable of mimicking empirically-observed exploration patterns 
by accounting for both information and extraction externalities. It showed how a 
clustering of exploration around borders without a unitization agreement can be 
rationally explained by agents responding to the risk of an extraction externality. 
Furthermore, the theoretical model highlighted that the presence of informational 
spillovers would result in a non-uniform distribution of exploration even in cases 
where the extraction externality is internalized. This was explained by agents 
seeking to internalize as much of the information externality as possible and 
supported by the empirical evidence which suggested a clustering of exploration 
away from borders in the case of unitization.  
The patterns identified in this chapter are socially inefficient but persist because 
agents optimize exploration across their private lands. From a social planning 
perspective, it is geology rather than property lines that should govern where 
wells are drilled. However, as oil and gas deposits are not constrained by legal 
boundaries, information and extraction externalities remain. The presence of these 
uncompensated cross-border effects implies that the first welfare theorem breaks 
down and that strategic exploration, as identified in this chapter, is thus not Pareto 
efficient. It is important to note that not all clustering is wasteful. The information 
externality must be factored into the optimal deployment of wells. To maximize 
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the learning effect of drilling, exploration should thus be initiated in the center of 
the resource landscape. The caveat is that the geological and political centers are 
not necessarily identical. From an efficiency perspective, there should not be 
peaks in the distribution of exploration relative to borders. 
Drawing on the “Coase theorem”, the management of underground oil and gas 
resources could be improved if trade in externalities was possible and bargaining 
costs were zero. Practically, this could be achieved through private acquisition of 
neighboring lands, joint development agreements18 or unitization contracts as 
studied in this paper. In theory, this would eliminate at least the extraction 
externality and thus the clustering of exploration around borders. However, in 
reality bargaining costs are not zero and enforcement of international agreements 
is complicated. This explains why all countries have not implanted unitization 
agreements. Furthermore, as highlighted by the empirical evidence presented in 
this paper, the information externality continues to influence exploration even in 
cases of successful unitization. There thus remains room for unifying the 
management of underground reservoirs both through the spread of unitization 
agreements and ensuring that the informational spillovers from exploration are 
internalized through appropriate compensation systems or public disclosure 
programs.   
  
 
18
 A Joint Development Agreement is a deal between two states to jointly develop an oil or gas reservoir to which 
either or both of the participating parties may be entitled in international law. The financial split between parties is subject 
to negotiation and varies on a case-by-case basis. 
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Chapter 5. 
The curse of neighbors in Colorado’s gas industry 
By THOMAS BLIGAARD NIELSEN* 
A fragmented property landscape and the “ad coelum” doctrine in 
American mineral law motivate common pool problems when wells 
are spatially clustered and gas can, or is perceived to, flow between 
resource owners. Drawing on the Hotelling framework on non-
renewable resources, such situations of potential leakage should 
induce owners to accelerate extraction. Using original spatial panel 
data, this chapter evaluates how the owners of existing wells 
respond to the threat posed by new neighbors. In line with the 
theoretical predictions, rivals located in close proximity are found 
to motivate accelerated extraction, whereas distant neighbors do 
not affect behavior. From a social perspective, the prospect of 
resource leakage thus distorts extraction. As a consequence, 
practitioners are recommended to internalize externalities by 
unifying the management of resources. 
* Grantham Research Institute, LSE, Houghton St, London, WC2A 2AE, e-mail: t.b.nielsen@lse.ac.uk. 
The decision to extract non-renewable resources such as natural gas is 
irreversible, as their stock cannot be increased through investments or 
conservation. Recognizing this property, Harold Hotelling (1931) identified the 
optimal extraction path that maximizes the value of the resource stock. His 
original use of inter-temporal optimization and the idea of the forward-looking 
owner became the dominant theoretical paradigm in the field of non-renewable 
resource management. Yet, its empirical validity remains questionable (see 
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Krautkraemer, 1998; Withagen, 1998). To make headway in the field, this chapter 
investigates whether the Hotelling framework is consistent with observed 
extraction behavior in Colorado’s gas industry. Weak property rights and 
underground passageways sometimes allow subterranean gas to flow between 
landowners. This risk of leakage increases the opportunity cost of postponing 
extraction, as current reserves may be unattainable in the future. A forward-
looking resource owner should then respond by accelerating extraction. This 
implication of Hotelling theory is tested in this chapter by analyzing how the 
owners of existing wells respond to the arrival of new neighbors who might 
threaten underground reserves. 
Home to seven percent of all American gas wells (EIA, 2014), Colorado is at 
the heart of modern fossil fuel extraction and therefore a good testing ground for 
assessing the wider relevance of the Hotelling framework. The wells in Colorado 
primarily extract unconventional gas made accessible by the pioneering work of 
George P. Mitchell (Yergin, 2012). Including shale gas, coal-bed methane and 
tight gas, unconventional gas refers to natural gas trapped within fine-grained 
sedimentary rocks (EIA, 2011, pp. 4-5). Unlike traditional reservoirs (Setup C, 
Figure 5.1), these resources require hydraulic fracturing (commonly known as 
‘fracking’) in order to become productive. A mixture of water and chemicals is 
pumped into the source rock creating a network of fractures, which allow trapped 
gas to flow to the well (Setup A and B, Figure 5.1). These cracks do not spread 
uniformly and the areal extent of production varies according to the 
permeability19 of the source rock (Reynolds et al., 1961). Natural passageways 
sometimes link up with hydraulically stimulated fractures leading to a larger than 
expected area of extraction (Cipolla et al., 2008). Despite generally being 
geographically confined (Davies et al., 2012), production networks reaching up to 
 
19
 Permeability is a measure of the ability of a porous rock to allow fluids to pass through it. 
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460 meters away from the wellbore have been identified using microseismic maps 
(Warpinski et al., 2005). There are even examples of unintended frac hits where 
one well pushes water into a neighboring well (see Figure 5.1). This highlights 
that uncertainty surrounds the extent of production. In turn, this is likely to 
motivate common pool concerns, as leakage between competing owners may 
occur when wells are spatially clustered. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.1. FUNDAMENTALS OF GAS EXTRACTION 
 
A fragmented property landscape and American mineral law further enhance 
the risk of common pool problems. Previously undeveloped areas in Colorado are 
now filled with hundreds of wells, as unconventional gas has become accessible. 
Yet, the property demarcations of this new landscape are not drawn based on the 
location of hydrocarbon deposits. In contrast to most other countries, American 
natural gas reserves are generally governed by the “ad coelum” doctrine (Lowe, 
2010, p. 9), which states that landowners have the legal right to everything from 
the heavens above the surface to the core of the earth. Some mineral rights have 
since been severed from surface rights but the original borders still largely apply. 
Operators (oil and gas companies) typically lease plots from landowners who, in 
exchange, are paid an up-front lease bonus payment plus a royalty percentage of 
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the value of any production. De facto, this makes the operator the acting resource 
owner. However, original property structures continue to shine through and single 
operators rarely have the sole right to an entire deposit. The implication is that gas 
can migrate between neighboring operators if natural or stimulated passageways 
allow for it. To counter this problem, Colorado courts generally apply the 
“ownership-in-place” principle, which terminates the ownership claim to a unit of 
natural gas if it migrates to the property of another operator (Lowe, 2010, p. 30). 
This clarifies that resources cannot be considered truly private until extracted, 
which should give rise to common pool problems when wells are clustered. 
The research design introduced in this chapter exploits this potential scenario of 
common pool problems to test the theoretical premises of forward-looking 
resource owners. The chapter unfolds in six sections. First, a Hotelling model 
with incomplete property rights is introduced to derive testable theoretical 
predictions. Second, common pool problems are quantified using new spatial data 
from Colorado. Third, a two-stage statistical model is deduced. Fourth, the results 
are presented. Fifth, the robustness of the findings is tested. The sixth and final 
section summarizes the main findings. In line with the theoretical predictions, this 
chapter finds that operators accelerate their extraction when “rival” neighbors 
threaten their reserves. Practitioners are therefore recommended to internalize 
externalities by unifying the management of gas deposits 
5.1. Theory 
The first step in testing whether resource owners are forward-looking when 
faced by common pool problems is to identify how the risk of leakage affects the 
optimal extraction path identified by Hotelling. In the original 1931 model, 
resources were defined as private goods, meaning that owners had perfect 
property rights over current and future extraction. However, as described earlier, 
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natural gas deposits are often better characterized as common pool resources. It is 
thus costly, but not impossible, for resource owners to exclude others from 
obtaining benefits from their reserves. To illustrate how this affects the Hotelling 
extraction path, a simple theoretical model similar to that used by Khalatbari 
(1977) is introduced. This consists of n identical resource owners who operate 
under perfect competition and therefore take the resource royalty Pt as given.
20 
Each owner 𝑗 decides on a time-dependent extraction level 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 seeking to 
maximize their individual discounted profit as presented in Equation 5.1 below. 
 (5.1) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑅𝑗,𝑡
∫ 𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑒
−𝑖𝑡𝑡=∞
𝑡=0
𝑑𝑡  
 
The total resource stock 𝑆̅ is fixed21 but, in contrast to the original Hotelling 
model, subterranean gas reserves can leak between neighbors. Leakage flows, 𝑙, 
are assumed to be identical in both directions and only extraction ensures 
excludability. The framework consists of a fixed and finite number of extractors 
who can access the reservoir. This design rests on the insight that land rights are 
required in order to engage in extraction and thus the trivial open-access case is 
eliminated. If agents could enter freely and there is no extraction cost, the 
resource would thus be depleted instantly (Khalatbari, 1977). Given the 
assumptions presented above, profit maximization must be subject to the 
following resource constraint: 
(5.2) ∫ 𝑅𝑡  𝑑𝑡 =
∞
0
𝑆̅ = 1 
(5.3)         ?̇?𝑗,𝑡 = −𝑅𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑙 ∗ 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑙
𝑛−1
∗ (𝑆1,𝑡+. . . +𝑆𝑗−1,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑗+1,𝑡+. . . +𝑆𝑛,𝑡)⏟                                      
𝑔(𝑆𝑗,𝑡, 𝑅𝑗,𝑡,𝑡)
  
 
20 By defining “Pt” as the market royalty, this model abstracts from marginal extraction cost. 
21 𝑆̅ is set to 1 to ease mathematical derivation but this does not jeopardize the main conclusions.  
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Assuming gas markets are regional, due to high transport costs, and specifying 
a demand function for this market (𝑃𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
−𝑣 where 0 < 𝑣 < 1) allows the 
maximization problem to be solved and the Hotelling extraction path presented in 
Equation 5.4 to be identified.22  
(5.4) 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = (
(𝑙+𝑖)
𝑣
∗
1
𝑛
∗ 𝑆𝑡) 
 
Drawing on Equation 5.4, the theoretical implications of resource leakage can 
be illustrated. Consider a situation in which two agents operate on the same field 
but no leakage occurs (i.e. 𝑙 = 0). Now assume that suddenly, in period 𝑡 = 𝜍, an 
unintended fracture joins the drainage area of the two producers (i.e. 𝑙 > 0). This 
risk of leakage would, according to Hotelling theory, motivate an instant 
acceleration of extraction. This scenario is graphically illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2. BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE TO INCREASED LEAKAGE RISK 
 
The accelerated extraction and faster depletion presented in Figure 5.2 can be 
understood as the consequence of a rise in the opportunity costs associated with 
preserving reserves. Postponing extraction is thus more expensive when the 
reservoir is common, since gas can leak to a “rival” neighbor before it has been 
 
22
 The interested reader is referred to Appendix D for a comprehensive derivation of the model as well as a discussion 
of optimal behavior assuming prices are internationally determined and exogeonous to extraction in Colorado. 
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exploited. As a result, accelerated extraction is incentivized. The effect is further 
enhanced by an agent’s ability to attract neighboring reserves. In other words, the 
risk of leakage in conjunction with neighbors alters the relative time preference of 
extraction, which is what governs behavior according to Hotelling. 
Despite clear theoretical predictions, the literature remains inconclusive about 
the empirical relevance of Hotelling theory (Withagen, 1998). On the one hand, 
this may be the result of inadequate statistical tests. On the other hand, it is 
possible that owners do not consider the examined resources scarce. The 
theoretical predictions identified in this section hinge on the assumption that 
future scarcity rents justify forward-looking extraction behavior. Drawing on the 
analysis of oil and coal, it has, however, been argued that scarcity rents play only 
a marginal or even nonexistent role in modern fossil fuel markets (Hart & Spiro, 
2011). If this holds true, Hotelling offers no explanation for why resource owners 
should postpone extraction. A price-taking owner who does not expect rising 
royalties has no incentive to wait and should thus simply determine extraction 
based on his or her marginal extraction costs. Analyzing whether operators 
accelerate their extraction when faced with “rival” neighbors thus offers a method 
of both determining the scarcity of natural gas and the extent to which agents 
engage in inter-temporal optimization, as predicted by Hotelling.  
5.2. Data 
The degree to which a resource owner faces a common pool problem can be 
quantified, by evaluating his or her surroundings. As mentioned earlier, it is the 
clustering of extraction that enables leakage of gas between owners. The extent of 
leakage risk faced by a given resource owner can thus be quantified by the 
proximity and number of neighbors surrounding his or her well. The Colorado Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) have compiled the coordinates and 
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production characteristics of every well operating in the state since 1999 
(COGCC, 2014). These spatial data make it possible to map production and 
identify the number of neighbors surrounding each well at different distance 
bands (Figure 5.3). Repeating this exercise for every year and merging the annual 
datasets by well, one can construct a panel. These novel longitudinal data describe 
how the surroundings of a well change over time and thereby the variation in 
leakage risk faced by a given operator. Distinguishing between neighbors is key, 
as common pool problems only arise when somebody else threatens future 
extraction. Wells managed by the same operator are therefore here defined as 
being “friendly” and wells managed by any other operator as being “rival”. This 
abstracts from potential within-firm conflicts of interest, cross-company cartels 
and different operators extracting under the same overarching landowner. 
However, if such effects are present they will only increase the difficulty of 
identifying a potential behavioral response to “rival” neighbors and later 
conclusions are thus not vulnerable to this design.  
 
 
FIGURE 5.3. MAPPING COLORADO’S GAS WELLS AND QUANTIFYING COMMON POOL PROBLEMS 
 
The areal extent of the investigation has important implications for the results of 
the study. In this chapter, distance bands of 100-meter intervals around each well 
are used (i.e. 0-100 meters, 100-200 meters and so on). The size of these zones is 
a trade-off between precision and variance. Smaller zones result in fewer 
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observations within each distance band and the variance of estimates therefore 
increases. Larger zones reduce the variance but suffer from less precision as 
estimates describe the average effect across the entire zone. Using 100-meter 
intervals offer the maximum degree of precision while maintaining a sufficient 
number of wells within each individual zone.23 Furthermore, empirical data 
suggests that fractures rarely extend beyond 600 meters from the wellbore 
(Davies et al., 2012). The first few zones should thus be able to capture the 
theoretically predicted effect of “rival” neighbors. To account for all possible 
effects associated with clustering of exploration, the investigation covers a one-
kilometer radius around each well. This means that every well in the dataset has 
ten 100-meter zone variables that describe its surrounding landscape of neighbors.  
To ensure the reliability of the sample, the constructed panel has to be 
restricted. First, wells within one kilometer of the state border are omitted from 
the analysis. This omission is necessary, as it is impossible to identify any 
potential neighbors outside Colorado’s state border. Second, boreholes 
commissioned before 1999 are excluded. For the purpose of this analysis, 
knowing the entire history of a well is necessary in order to account for the 
natural decline in reservoir pressure. Both data restrictions are made after the 
number of neighbors has been identified for all wells in the sample. This ensures 
that any well located closer than one kilometer from the state border will appear 
as a neighbor to wells that are located further away from the border. However, the 
data point itself will be excluded from the sample. Finally, it should be noted that 
non-producing exploration wells are excluded from the analysis. The rationale for 
this data restriction is that, in isolation, these wells do not pose a risk to 
underground reserves. Table 5.1 describes the restricted panel used in this chapter. 
 
 
23
 50-, 200- and 300-meter intervals were assessed as alternative intervals but 100-meter intervals were identified as 
offering the maximum precision while still including sufficient wells in each interval to ensure a meaningful analysis.   
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TABLE 5.1. DATA SUMMARY 
Variables: Description 
Well coordinates Exact coordinates of each boring to extract hydrocarbons 
(2,130 active wells in the sample)  
Operator identifier Code for the legal entity operating the well 
(179 unique legal entities in the sample)   
County identifier Code for the county in which the well is located  
(26 active counties in the sample) 
Formation identifier Code for the geological formation on which the well is located  
(55 active formations in the sample)  
Field identifier Code for the oil or gas reservoir on which the well is operating 
(111 active fields in the sample) 
Numerical variables: Min Mean Max Std. Dev 
Annual extraction (Btu) 1 106,688.51 1,551,121 121,382.91 
Annual extraction days 1 302.21 365 100.24 
Number of wells:     
- Within: 0-100 m 0 1.84 29 2.91 
- Within: 100-200 m 0 0.37 33 1.66 
- Within: 200-300 m 0 1.21 28 2.22 
                  … … … … … 
- Within: 900-1,000 m 0 5.18 67 6.03 
Number of “rival” wells:     
- Within: 0-100 m 0 0.03 3 0.19 
- Within: 100-200 m 0 0.03 9 0.25 
- Within: 200-300 m 0 0.06 9 0.42 
                  … … … … … 
- Within: 900-1,000 m 0 0.41 16 1.18 
- General - 
Unbalanced Panel N = 10,890 n = 2,130 T = 14 
 
5.3. Empirical strategy 
A two-stage statistical model is proposed to test the theoretical prediction that 
operators accelerate their extraction when faced by “rival” neighbors. The reserve 
expectations of resource owners are first estimated using historical data and these 
predicted expectations are then included as a control in the second stage, where 
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the impact of neighbors is ultimately tested. This two-stage setup is necessary 
because of data limitations and the way behavior is described in the Hotelling 
framework. Returning to Equation 5.4, “rival” neighbors introduce the potential 
for leakage (𝑙) but the optimal extraction path is also governed by the size of 
remaining reserves. Separating the causes of a change in extraction behavior 
consequently requires knowledge about both the flow and stock of resources. The 
gas reserves of a well are, however, largely unobserved in practice. Consequently, 
a necessary first stage in determining the role of neighbors is to estimate stocks.  
An implicit assumption of the theoretical model introduced earlier is complete 
information about the resource stock. In reality, however, information is 
incomplete and operators have to rely on their expectations when making 
extraction decisions (Krautkraemer, 1998). Rather than being determined by the 
actual stock (
1
𝑛
∗ 𝑆𝑡), extraction is thus governed by the expected sum of future 
production (𝐸[∫ 𝑅𝑗,𝑘
𝜏
𝑘=𝑡
𝑑𝑘]
𝑡
). This value is unobserved but can be reconstructed 
using knowledge about how operators form their expectations. Applied in both 
conventional and unconventional extraction (see Valko & Lee, 2010), decline 
curve analysis (DCA) is currently the industry’s preferred reserve estimation 
technique (Khanamiri, 2010; Bahadori, 2012). Building on Arp’s (1945) seminal 
work, the method fits the observed production rates of individual wells by a 
mathematical function in order to predict future extraction potential. Drawing on 
the widespread use of DCA, it is possible to reconstruct the reserve expectations 
of resource owners by replicating their statistical estimation technique. 
As a purely statistical exercise, DCA rests on the extrapolation of relationships 
between variables known today and future production outcomes. Identifying these 
empirical relationships requires a sample of wells for which the entire production 
history is known. Returning to the dataset introduced earlier, this information is 
only available for wells decommissioned in the period between 1999 and 2013 
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(1,953 wells). Focusing on this subgroup, it is possible to mimic the reserve 
estimation conducted by resource owners. The most popular types of DCA predict 
future production potential using the time a well has been active in combination 
with past flow rates (production per day). Another common technique plots future 
extraction against cumulative past production. To allow for flexibility, the DCA 
performed in the first stage used in this chapter relies on a combination of flow 
rate, time and cumulative production together with a series of field and time 
controls. Specifically, a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model such as that 
presented in Equation 5.5 is performed where 𝑅 is gas extraction, 𝐷 is the number 
of production days, 𝐹 is a set of field controls, 𝐶 controls for when the well was 
commissioned and 𝑇 is a set of time controls. 
(5.5) 𝐸[𝑙𝑛(∑ 𝑅𝑗,𝑘
𝜏
𝑘=𝑡 )]𝑡 = 𝜷
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ln (𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1)
ln (𝐷𝑗,𝑡−1)
ln (∑ 𝐷𝑗,𝑘
𝑡−1
𝑘=0 )
ln (∑ 𝑅𝑗,𝑘
𝑡−1
𝑘=0 )
𝐹𝑗
𝐶𝑗
𝑇𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , where 𝑡 is annual 
 
Resource owners are assumed to be rational and their expectations about 
reserves should therefore be non-biased. In order to replicate real expectations, 
the DCA used in the first stage must consequently have significant out-of-sample 
predictive power. Cross-validation can be used to validate this property (Stone, 
1974; Geisser, 1975) and the original data is therefore divided into two equally 
sized samples. The model from Equation 5.5 is then fitted to one of these two 
subsamples (the training set), and its predictive accuracy is assessed using the 
other (the validation set). Evaluating the coefficient of determination from the 
validation set illustrates the model’s out-of-sample predictive performance. To 
reduce variability, 5,000 random partitions are performed, and the validation 
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results are averaged over the rounds. The findings from this cross-validation 
procedure support the choice of model used in the first stage. By extrapolating the 
relationships identified using the test set, the DCA model can thus explain 85.04 
percent of the variation observed in the validation set. The first stage is thus 
highly efficient in predicting out-of-sample reserves. This supports the specific 
choice of DCA and underlines its ability to replicate expectations. 
Having established a method of reconstructing reserve expectation, attention 
returns to the core problem of identifying the impact of neighbors. To motivate 
the statistical design of this second stage, it is useful to revisit and modify the 
optimal extraction path that was presented in Equation 5.4. First, the reserve term 
(
1
𝑛
∗ 𝑆𝑡) is substituted by the well-specific expectations (𝐸[∫ 𝑅𝑗,𝑘
𝜏
𝑘=𝑡
𝑑𝑘]
𝑡
) deduced 
using the first-stage model. Second, the natural logarithm is taken to both sides in 
order to turn multiplications into additions and account for positive skewness. 
Performing these two alterations to the optimal extraction path results in the 
second-stage estimation presented in Equation 5.6. 
 (5.6)     ln(𝑅𝑗,𝑡) = 𝛽1 ln(𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡) − 𝛽2 ln(𝑣𝑡) + 𝛽3 ln (𝐸[∫ 𝑅𝑗,𝑘
𝜏
𝑘=𝑡
𝑑𝑘]
𝑡
) + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
 
With the core two-stage statistical model outlined, it is now possible to 
formulate a test of whether Colorado’s gas extractors operate as predicted by 
theory. Drawing on previous sections, the risk of leakage increases with the 
number of nearby “rivals”. Given that resource owners realize this risk, Hotelling 
theory predicts accelerated extraction. Evidence of a positive relationship between 
gas extraction and the number of nearby “rival” neighbors would thus support the 
empirical relevance of the Hotelling framework. Returning to the two-stage 
statistical model, this can be translated into a formal test with the following two 
hypotheses: H1, operators accelerate their extraction when faced by nearby “rival” 
neighbors (i.e. 𝛽1 > 0 in Equation 5.6). H0, operators do not accelerate extraction 
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when faced by nearby “rival” neighbors (i.e. 𝛽1 ≤ 0 in Equation 5.6). It is 
noteworthy that the response to “rivals” is expected to decrease with distance, as 
subsurface interaction becomes less likely. Effects should thus converge towards 
zero when evaluating the role of sufficiently distant neighbors. This insight later 
becomes useful as it offers a good first step in verifying the validity of results.  
5.4. Results 
Table 5.2 presents the results obtained from deploying the two-stage statistical 
model. Focusing on the coefficients obtained from the second stage, the table 
outlines four distinct model specifications, each of which constitutes a stepwise 
implementation of controls. The presented standard errors are bootstrapped (5,000 
repetitions) and clustered on a field level (111 fields). These standard errors are 
chosen because residuals are likely correlated across years within each field and 
conventional OLS standard errors are therefore unreliable. The first three models 
presented are pooled OLS estimations and the final one is a fixed effects (within) 
model. 
OLS-1 is the first and most streamlined of the models presented in Table 5.2. It 
pools the data and regresses annual gas extraction against the number of “rival” 
neighbors at different distances. This basic setup is, however, vulnerable to 
omitted variable bias, as it ignores factors that may be correlated with both the 
extraction and clustering of wells. To mitigate this potential problem, the 
following three models gradually incorporate a series of control measures. 
OLS-2 accounts for the number of annual extraction days as well as operator 
changes. The dataset used in this chapter is based on an annual frequency. This 
means that wells might be commissioned or acquired by other operators within a 
single data point. To reduce variation and approximate actual productivity, it is 
therefore useful to control for annual extraction days. Takeovers may, however, 
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be correlated with both the clustering and the productivity of wells. To account 
for this latter effect, a dummy is included for years in which wells change 
operators, together with an interaction term allowing for differences in well 
productivity throughout periods of ownership change. 
OLS-3 builds on the previous model by including a vector accounting for the 
influence of neighboring wells in general (both “friendly” and “rival”). This 
controls for any non-behavioral effects associated with a high degree of well 
clustering. One example of such an effect are the frac hits discussed earlier, where 
extensive fractures result in unintended well-to-well interaction. Little work has 
been done on the impact of frac hits, but existing knowledge suggests that fracture 
interference typically reduces the performance of wells (Jackson et al., 2013). As 
well-to-well interaction is more likely when extraction is spatially clustered, 
ignoring frac hits can offset the behavioral effect that this chapter seeks to test. 
However, given that these and other non-behavioral effects of clustering are 
independent of ownership structures, it is possible to avoid bias by using 
neighboring wells in general (both “friendly” and “rival”) as a control.  
FE-1 is, in contrast to the three previous models, a fixed effects (within) model. 
It utilizes the panel dimension of the dataset to account for both entity and time 
fixed effects (Stock & Watson, 2011, p. 396). Geology is an example of an entity 
fixed effect that varies across wells but not across time, and gas demand (𝑣 in 
Equation 5.6) is an example of a time fixed effect that varies across time but not 
across wells. To understand the necessity of using fixed effects, consider a region 
with gas reservoirs that are difficult to access. Such an area will need multi-well-
fracturing meaning that wells will be highly clustered but, on an individual level, 
relatively unproductive. The pooled OLS estimator mistakenly attributes such a 
geological effect to the presence of neighbors and thereby underestimates the 
potential behavioral response. By evaluating the “within well” effect of additional 
“rival” neighbors, the fixed effects model counters this problem. 
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TABLE 5.2. MODEL SELECTION 
ln(Annual extraction) 
OLS-1 
(Pooled) 
OLS-2 
(Pooled) 
OLS-3 
(Pooled) 
FE-1 
(Within) 
Number of “rival” wells: 
    
- Within: 0-100 m -0.031 
[0.159] 
0.056 
[0.127] 
0.089 
[0.100] 
0.452*** 
[0.078] 
- Within: 100-200 m -0.078 
[0.110] 
-0.022 
[0.160] 
0.001 
[0.164] 
0.224** 
[0.091] 
- Within: 200-300 m 0.036  
[0.064] 
0.030 
[0.071] 
0.038 
[0.073] 
0.033 
[0.068] 
              … … … … … 
- Within: 900-1,000 m -0.003 
[0.025] 
-0.008 
[0.020] 
-0.004 
[0.022] 
0.003 
[0.019] 
ln(Expected reserves) 0.834*** 
[0.028] 
0.730*** 
[0.021] 
0.730*** 
[0.022] 
0.452*** 
[0.072] 
Other control variables: 
ln(Annual extraction days)  0.935*** 
[0.076] 
0.933*** 
[0.081] 
1.100*** 
[0.056] 
Controls for operator change  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Number of wells: 
 
 
  
- Within: 0-100 m   0.053** 
[0.020] 
0.024*** 
[0.008] 
- Within: 100-200 m   0.000 
[0.037] 
-0.040 
[0.032] 
- Within: 200-300 m   -0.008 
[0.026] 
-0.007 
[0.019] 
              … 
 
 
… … 
- Within: 900-1,000 m   0.003 
[0.011] 
-0.005 
[0.007] 
Entity fixed effects (well)   ✓ 
Time fixed effects (annual)  ✓ 
Number of observations 8,758 8,758 8,758 8,758 
Number of clusters 111 111 111 111 
R-sq:  Within N/A N/A 0.695 0.704 
 
Between N/A N/A 0.802 0.837 
  Overall 0.851 0.862 0.757 0.802  
Notes: The first stage DCA analysis is based on a subset of the complete sample as it rests on data 
about already decommissioned wells.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (clustered at field-level). 
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
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Reviewing Table 5.2, the estimated effect of “rival” neighbors differs greatly 
between the four different setups. The three OLS models find no significant 
extraction effect associated with close “rival” neighbors and the estimates do not 
converge as expected towards zero when evaluating the role of distant neighbors. 
However, these findings are unreliable if factors such as geology and gas demand 
are correlated with both extraction and the clustering of extraction. By exploiting 
fixed effects, the FE-1 model eliminates this problem and finds strong support for 
the Hotelling framework. “Rival” neighbors within the first 200-meters are thus 
found to significantly (at a five percent level) increase extraction. As the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gas extraction, the coefficients in 
Table 5.2 are so-called semi-elasticities. This means that the expected effect of an 
additional “rival” neighbor within the first 100 meters is to multiply gas extraction 
by exp(0.452) = 1.571. Each additional “rival” is thus, ceteris paribus, associated 
with a 57.1 percent acceleration in extraction. To illustrate graphically how the 
response to neighbors diminishes as distance increases, Figure 5.4 plots the 
expected change in extraction associated with “rivals” at different distance bands. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.4. EXTRACTION RESPONSE TO A “RIVAL” NEIGHBOR DEPENDING ON DISTANCE 
Notes: Error bars signify ninety-five percent confidence intervals. 
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Having established that close “rival” neighbors motivate a statistically 
significant change in extraction, attention turns to evaluating whether the effect is 
economically significant. In Colorado, the average number of “rival” neighbors is 
0.03 within the first 100 meters and 0.03 in the span between 100 and 200 meters 
(see Table 5.1). Combining this knowledge with the results of the two-stage fixed 
effect model, adjacent “rivals” thus motivate an average 2.47 percent acceleration 
in extraction. As a share of Colorado’s annual production, this equates to about 
39.7 trillion British thermal units (BTU) of natural gas. To put this number into 
perspective, the average American annually consumes 312 million BTU of energy 
(EIA, 2011). Leakage risk in Colorado thus motivates an acceleration in annual 
gas extraction sufficient to satisfy the energy demand of approximately 127,300 
Americans. This significant number stands testimony to the substantial distorting 
effects common pool problems can and are inflicting on modern-day gas 
extraction. 
5.5. Robustness and model specification 
Any empirical investigation is vulnerable to potential flaws in its design and 
this makes the study of robustness crucial. To ensure the validity of the findings 
introduced earlier, this section therefore carries out four tests that examine the 
predictions of the research design when variables and assumptions are altered. 
5.5.A. Accounting for reserves 
The results of this chapter rest on the validity of the two-stage estimation 
procedure and specifically its ability to correctly account for reserve expectations. 
An implicit assumption of the analysis is thus that actual resource owners use a 
similar DCA method to that deployed in the first stage. To test whether the 
findings remain robust if this assumption is relaxed, it is useful to alter the method 
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of controlling for reserves. Building on the FE-1 framework, two alternative 
setups are proposed and the results obtained when estimating these models are 
presented in Table 5.3.  
 
TABLE 5.3. THREE APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING FOR RESERVES 
Second stage coefficients: 
- ln(Annual extraction) 
R-1 
(Within) 
R-2 
 (Within) 
FE-1 
(Within) 
    
Number of “rival” wells: 
   
- Within: 0-100 m 0.477***  
[0.087] 
0.267***  
[0.068] 
0.452*** 
[0.078] 
- Within: 100-200 m 0.071  
[0.137] 
0.098  
[0.063] 
0.224** 
[0.091] 
- Within: 200-300 m 0.078 
[0.112] 
0.045 
[0.028] 
0.033 
[0.068] 
              … … … … 
- Within: 900-1,000 m 0.001 
[0.028] 
0.002 
[0.012] 
0.003 
[0.019] 
Other control variables ✓ ✓ ✓ 
ln(“True” reserves or Expected reserves)  0.794*** 
[0.025] 
0.452*** 
[0.072] 
First stage coefficients: 
- ln(Sum of future extraction) 
Not  
applicable 
“True”  
reserves 
DCA 
(Pooled) 
    ln(Gas extraction last year)   0.441*** 
[0.023] 
ln(Days of activity last year)   -0.257*** 
[0.039] 
ln(Sum of past extraction days)   0.302*** 
[0.026] 
ln(Sum of past extraction)   -0419*** 
[0.040] 
Field dummies   ✓ 
Well commission dummies (annual)   ✓ 
Time dummies (annual)   ✓ 
Number of observations 10,886 6,578 8,758 
Notes: The first stage DCA analysis is based on a subset of the complete sample as it rests on data about 
already decommissioned wells. “Other control variables” includes controls for extraction days, operator 
changes, neighbors in general, and fixed effects.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (clustered at field-level)  
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
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The first model in Table 5.3, R-1, excludes reserves completely from the 
analysis.  It thus rests on the simplistic assumption that operators do not base their 
extraction decisions on reserve predictions. The second model, R-2, controls for 
reserve expectations using true reserves (i.e. the actual sum of future production). 
In doing so, this model assumes a situation where resource owners have complete 
knowledge about future extraction potential and base their extraction decisions on 
this. R-1 (complete ignorance) and R-2 (complete information) thus represent two 
respective extremes on the spectrum of operator information. When reviewing the 
predicted effect of “rivals” presented in Table 5.3, both simplified models reveal a 
statistically significant effect of neighbors within the first 100 meters. These 
results are in line with the findings of the main FE-1 model and underline the 
model’s robustness to alternative reserve formulations.  
5.5.B. Binary behavior 
So far, the analysis has built on the principle that the number of neighboring 
“rivals” governs the risk of resource leakage and thus determines operator 
behavior. However, if resource owners only distinguish between having and not 
having “rival” neighbors, then this assumption is too restrictive. To counter this 
potential problem, a binary response model is tested. This uses a statistical setup 
similar to that employed in the FE-1 model but replaces the number of neighbors 
with a series of dummies. These are coded ‘1’ if there are any “rival” wells 
located within the zone and ‘0’ otherwise. Drawing on the empirical observation 
that effects are limited to the first 200 meters, the binary analysis focuses on this 
confined area. A graphical comparison of the coefficient obtained from estimating 
the binary model and the original FE-1 model is presented in Figure 5.5. 
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FIGURE 5.5. A SIMPLE COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS 
Notes: Error bars signify ninety-five percent confidence intervals. 
 
As Figure 5.5 illustrates, the coefficients obtained from the two models appear 
similar. Yet, one should note that they describe two separate issues. The FE-1 
model identifies the expected change in extraction per “rival”. In contrast, the 
binary setup describes the predicted impact of having “rival” neighbors at all. 
This difference in interpretation can help explain why the binary coefficients 
appear generally larger than those obtained from the FE-1 model. The binary 
response model treats a well identically regardless of whether it has one or more 
“rival” neighbors. If numbers govern behavior, the FE-1 coefficients, by design, 
will be smaller than those obtained from the binary setup.  
Moving beyond coefficient interpretation, it is useful to confirm that the FE-1 
model and the binary setup reach similar conclusions regarding the general impact 
of common pool problems. If the two setups identify significantly different 
impacts it suggests that at least one of the descriptions of behavior is inaccurate. 
To compare the predicted impacts, it is helpful to normalize the coefficients, by 
using the average number of “rival” neighbors and the number of wells with 
“rivals”, respectively. Figure 5.6 shows the results obtained from this exercise. 
0 
100 
200 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Meters from well 
Change in extraction 
Coefficient as predicted by the FE-2 
Coefficient as predicted by the binary model 
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FIGURE 5.6. A COMPARISON OF THE NORMALIZED EFFECT OF “RIVALS” 
Notes: Error bars signify ninety-five percent confidence intervals. 
 
The comparison of the normalized effect of “rivals” shows that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the predictions of the two models. This 
clarifies that there is no reason to choose the binary setup over the FE-1 
specification. The choice of FE-1 as the main model is further supported by the 
findings presented in Figure 5.5. These indicated that the number of neighbors 
does affect behavior. Comparing a binary setup with the FE-1 model has, in sum, 
confirmed the robustness of the main results presented in this chapter. 
5.5.C. Reverse causality 
Thus far, the analysis has been based on the principle that neighbors drive 
extraction behavior rather than visa versa. This, however, is a simplification of 
reality if operators respond to the information provided by the extraction 
outcomes of others. An unforeseen increase in a well’s production is likely to give 
rise to expectations that resources are abundant. In turn, this might induce the 
well’s neighbors to pursue additional drilling around it. If such an information 
externality is strongly present within annual observations, the main model 
specification will suffer from problems of reverse causality. However, the panel 
structure of the data combined with the fact that wells are not built instantly 
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allows for determining the role of information. If reverse causality were 
important, one would expect current extraction to be strongly correlated with the 
number of neighbors observed in the following year. One can thus identify the 
role of information by estimating the FE-1 model using the one-year lead of 
neighbors, as is done in Table 5.4. If the two model specifications portray similar 
patterns, it shows that extraction shocks drive the number of neighbors and, by 
implication, the findings of this chapter would be biased. 
 
TABLE 5.4. USING THE LEAD OF NEIGHBOURS 
- ln(Annual extraction) 
Lead-1 
(Within) 
 
FE-1 
(Within) 
    
Number of “rival” wells: 
 
 
 
- Within: 0-100 m -0.045  
[0.124] 
 0.452*** 
[0.078] 
- Within: 100-200 m -0.067  
[0.179] 
 0.224** 
[0.091] 
- Within: 200-300 m 0.049  
[0.134] 
 0.033 
[0.068] 
              … …  … 
- Within: 900-1,000 m 0.004 
[0.031] 
 0.003 
[0.019] 
Number of wells:    
- Within: 0-100 m 0.016  
[0.022] 
 0.024*** 
[0.008] 
- Within: 100-200 m -0.033  
[0.051] 
 -0.040 
[0.032] 
- Within: 200-300 m -0.026  
[0.041] 
 -0.007 
[0.019] 
              … …  … 
- Within: 900-1,000 m -0.020  
[0.014] 
 -0.005 
[0.007] 
Other control variables ✓  ✓ 
Notes: The first stage DCA analysis is based on a subset of the complete sample as it rests on data about 
already decommissioned wells. Lead-1 substitutes current neighbors with the one-year lead of neighbors. 
“Other control variables” includes all controls used in the FE-1 model.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (clustered at field-level)  
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
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The results presented in Table 5.4 underline that reverse causality does not 
jeopardize the main findings. Current extraction shocks are not found to be 
associated with a statistically significant increase in surrounding neighbors in the 
following year. This applies independent of the type of neighbor. There is thus no 
evidence that an information externality plays a major role in the case of 
Colorado. The findings presented above also highlight the fact that future 
neighbors do not yet pose a leakage risk and therefore do not affect behavior. A 
likely explanation for why information externalities do not play a significant role 
in the case of Colorado is that the majority of fields in the state are already well 
developed. This means that the geology is largely known and in such a setting 
information must be assumed to play only a minor role in the deployment of 
wells. Consequently, problems of reverse causality are more likely in the initial 
exploration phase of field development.  
5.5.D. Accounting for spatial correlation 
The statistical inference presented in this chapter rests on the validity of the 
standard errors used and specifically their ability to correctly account for spatial 
correlation. In the main section, it was argued that residuals are likely correlated 
within fields and the standard errors were therefore clustered at this level. 
However, these standard erors would be biased if residuals are correlated on a 
broader spatial level. Therefore, this section explores whether clustering at the 
field level sufficiently accounts for spatial correlation, or whether one needs to 
cluster on a larger level.  
In the context of this chapter, there are three levels on which one might cluster 
the standard errors. First, the field level which is used in the main section of this 
chapter. Clustering on this level rests on the assumption that regressors and errors 
are correlated within single oil depostits but not beyond these. Second, the 
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formation level which is a superset of fields. Clustering on this level assumes that 
residuals are correlated within rock formations rather then single fields. Third, the 
county level which assumes spatial correlations are politically rather then 
geologically determined. Building on the FE-1 framework, the results obtained 
when clustering on these three levels are presented in Table 5.5.  
 
TABLE 5.5. CLUSTERING OF STANDARD ERRORS 
Second stage coefficients: 
- ln(Annual extraction) 
Clustering by field  
FE-1 (Within) 
Clustering by formation  
FE-1 (Within) 
Clustering by county  
FE-1 (Within) 
    
Number of “rival” wells: 
   
- Within: 0-100 m 0.452*** 
[0.078] 
0.452*** 
[0.079] 
0.452*** 
[0.091] 
- Within: 100-200 m 0.224** 
[0.091] 
0.224** 
[0.095] 
0.224 
[0.153] 
- Within: 200-300 m 0.033 
[0.068] 
0.033 
[0.036] 
0.033 
[0.141] 
              … … … … 
- Within: 900-1,000 m 0.003 
[0.019] 
0.003 
[0.016] 
0.003 
[0.034] 
ln(Expected reserves) 0.452*** 
[0.072] 
0.452*** 
[0.088] 
0.452*** 
[0.064] 
Other control variables ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Number of clusters 111 55 26 
Notes: The first stage DCA analysis is based on a subset of the complete sample as it rests on data about 
already decommissioned wells. “Other control variables” includes controls for extraction days, operator 
changes, neighbors in general, and fixed effects.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (clustered at field-level)  
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
 
There is no formal test of the level at which to cluster but to avoid bias there is a 
consensus to use bigger and more aggregated clusters when possible. However, 
there is a trade-off between bias and variance. When using large clusters, such as 
the 26 counties, there are very few clusters to average over and the resulting 
variance matrix can therefore be a poor estimate.  This could explain why there is 
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relatively little change in the standard errors when clustering on a formation rather 
then a field level whereas errors grow significantly when clustering on a county 
level. Despite this, the results in Table 5.5 highlight that findings remain robust 
notwithstanding clustering errors at broader levels. Even when clustering at the 
very restrictive county level, the closest of “rival” neighbors are thus found to 
motivate a statistically significant change in extraction.   
5.6. Conclusion 
Focusing on Colorado’s gas industry, the aim of this chapter was to test the 
empirical validity of the Hotelling framework, and specifically its assumption on 
forward-looking behavior. For this purpose, the chapter set out to assess how 
operators respond to potential resource leakage enabled by close “rival” 
neighbors. The chapter began by deducing testable predictions based on existing 
theory. Using these predictions, common pool problems in Colorado were 
quantified and a two-stage statistical model was introduced that isolates the 
impact of “rival” neighbors. The chapter then evaluated the predicted extraction 
response to leakage risk and assessed the robustness of the findings. 
In line with the theoretical predictions of the Hotelling framework, operators 
were found to significantly accelerate their extraction when faced with “rivals” 
located in close proximity. The response faded as distance increased and 
disappeared fully once the distance exceeded 200 meters. This declining pattern 
supports the prediction that operators respond to leakage risk, which falls as the 
likelihood of subsurface interaction decreases. Despite being geographically 
confined, the consequences of common pool problems across Colorado were 
identified to be economically significant. Spatial competition thus, ceteris 
paribus, motivates an average acceleration in extraction of 2.47 percent across 
wells in the state. The validity of this substantial result was evaluated by four 
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robustness checks. First, different reserve estimation techniques were used as 
control measures. These did not alter the insight that close “rival” neighbors 
motivate accelerated extraction. Second, a binary setup was tested and compared 
with the main statistical model employed in this chapter. This comparison 
indicated that the number of “rival” neighbors is influential for extraction 
behavior. More importantly, however, the binary setup confirmed the robustness 
of the findings even if the nature of agent behavior differed. Third, the findings 
were tested for reverse causality. This analysis highlighted that information 
externalities do not play a major role in the case of Colorado, and consequently 
the main findings were found to be robust. Fourth, it was explored whether 
clustered standard errors at the field level sufficiently account for spatial 
correlation. This investigation underscored that the findings remain robust when 
clustering at higher political or geological levels. 
The robust evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that operators make 
strategic extraction decisions even after the completion of their wells. This 
strongly supports the empirical relevance of the Hotelling framework. The 
observation that existing wells change their extraction when faced with “rival” 
neighbors is, however, not sufficient to prove that Colorado’s gas deposits are 
indeed common pools. As discussed earlier, it is practically impossible to 
determine the exact areal extent of production and thus whether gas actually 
migrates between owners. However, behavior is governed by perceptions, so the 
mere suspicion of resource leakage suffices to explain the behavioral patterns 
observed in this chapter. Irrespective of whether leakage is real or only perceived, 
spatial competition and the prospect of an extraction externality distort extraction 
in Colorado today. 
To foster non-rival extraction behavior, government intervention is required. 
Yet solving common pool problems in isolation might not lead to better global 
extraction outcomes. The evidence presented in this chapter highlights that there 
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is scope for regulators to ensure the enforcement of property rights in Colorado’s 
gas industry. Examples of intervention could include stricter regulation 
concerning the spacing of wells or the unification of resource deposits. Both of 
these policies would establish local monopolies on the management of 
underground natural gas. In turn, this eliminates the distorting risk of leakage and 
therefore motivates a deceleration in extraction. Pre-existing problems of market 
power may, however, jeopardize the efficiency of such policies. One of 
Hotelling’s main original findings was that, from a social perspective, monopolies 
extract their resources in an inefficiently slow manner. This behavior is motivated 
by the trade-off between increased extraction and falling prices. In an ideal world, 
there would be perfect price competition at the global scale but monopolies on 
extraction at the local level. This would ensure that owners act as price-takers but 
conduct their extraction under perfect property rights. Such a scenario of no 
market failures is, however, largely unfeasible in practice, as pre-existing 
problems of market power are likely. As an example, Russia accounts for almost 
18 percent of global gas production today (BP, 2015). Such a substantial share is 
likely to provide the country’s largely state-owned gas industry with substantial 
price setting ability. In this context, a second-best solution could be to allow local 
common pool problems as, ceteris paribus, these would counter the slower 
extraction associated with dominant market participants.   
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Chapter 6. 
Short-term oil extraction: A matter of regime stability 
By THOMAS BLIGAARD NIELSEN* 
This chapter evaluates the short-term relationship between 
government stability and oil extraction, using monthly production 
data from 32 authoritarian and oil-producing countries. 
Conventional Hotelling theory on non-renewable resources 
suggests that an unexpected surge in ownership risk should induce 
faster extraction. In the context of authoritarian petro-states, this 
implies that an unexpected fall in government stability should 
motivate accelerated oil production. This chapter tests this 
theoretical proposition, by using modern panel data techniques. 
Relying on monthly data, the analysis is unique in its ability to 
identify extraction responses to fast-developing political events, 
while controlling for endogeneity. The findings of the chapter 
challenge the empirical validity of the existing theoretical 
paradigm. Contrary to conventional Hotelling theory, it is 
concluded that a sudden fall in government stability is associated 
with slowed oil extraction in the most authoritarian of petro-states. 
* Grantham Research Institute, LSE, Houghton St, London, WC2A 2AE, e-mail: t.b.nielsen@lse.ac.uk. 
The oil production of authoritarian petro-states plays a key role in international 
energy markets and understanding what governs extraction decisions in these 
countries is therefore critical. Countries ruled by governments ranked among the 
25 percent least accountable regimes, according to the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), account for about 60 percent of global oil (BP, 
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2015; Kaufmann et al., 2014). Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia 
are notable examples of such oil producing nations that largely deny their citizens 
the right to participate in selecting their own governments. This highlights that 
globally important extraction decisions are essentially determined by a handful of 
authoritarian rulers. The aim of this chapter is to identify what economic 
mechanisms drive these decisions and specifically whether the dominant 
theoretical paradigm holds in this context.  
The literature on non-renewable resources such as oil is grounded in Hotelling’s 
theoretical model developed in 1931. Featuring forward-looking agents, this 
framework holds that resource owners maximize their wealth by trading off 
extraction today versus extraction in the future. According to this intuition, an 
unexpected surge in ownership risk should induce accelerated extraction, as it 
becomes more unlikely that one will have the ability to extract in the future. In the 
context of petro-states, it is the authoritarian ruler who acts as the custodian of 
underground hydrocarbon resources. This means that the ownership risk they face 
is directly linked to the stability of their regimes. Following the Hotelling 
principle, a threatened ruler should thus accelerate extraction.  
Despite the clear theoretical implications of the Hotelling framework, the 
question of how exactly government stability affects oil extraction remains 
unanswered. The tensions between short- and long-term effects help explain this. 
As described above, the Hotelling principle suggests that increased ownership risk 
motivates accelerated extraction. However, this effect will likely only apply in the 
short run. In the long run, ownership risk reduces the incentive to invest in capital 
expenditure such as drilling rigs or pipelines. Eventually, government instability 
would thus lead to slowed oil production. This leaves the empirical question of 
when the short run ends and the long run begins. Or in other words, on what 
timescale, if any, does government instability motivate accelerated extraction? 
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To empirically assess the role of political risk, Bohn and Deacon (2000) use 
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimation on cross-country data. When deploying 
this method, they find that the net long-run effect of political risk is slowed 
extraction. This supports the principle that prolonged ownership risk reduces 
extraction capabilities. Using within-country models, Bohn and Deacon also 
attempt to estimate short-run effects. In contrast to what might be expected, they 
find no consistent positive relationship between government instability and oil 
extraction. However, their estimation suffers from two problems that could 
explain why Hotelling behavior is not clearly identified in the short run. First, one 
can question whether Bohn and Deacon actually study short run effects, as they 
rely on annual data. It is thus likely that the long run effect of reduced capital 
investment might apply even within single observations. In other words, a year 
might not be short enough to identify the hypothesized Hotelling behavior. 
Second, Bohn and Deacon’s estimator presumably suffers from problems of 
endogeneity. The reason is that an extraction shock today is likely to affect 
political risk in the future. One mechanism could be that an increase in oil 
production provides additional funds to equip the army, which in turn might 
strengthen the regime’s stability in the future. If this is the case, Bohn and 
Deacon’s results would be biased and their conclusions questionable.  
Recognizing the limitations of the existing literature, this chapter improves 
empirical estimation in a twofold manner. First, it relies on monthly and not 
annual data. The use of relatively high frequency statistics makes it possible to 
study effects across shorter intervals than previous studies. This has the advantage 
that long-run effects, such as reduced capital investment, are less likely to apply 
within single observations. Second, this chapter improves on existing OLS models 
by applying a generalized method of moments (GMM) system estimator, which 
eliminates past problems of endogeneity. In sum, these improvements make it 
possible to determine whether government instability ever motivates accelerated 
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extraction as suggested by Hotelling theory. Or alternatively, if other intervening 
factors, such as reduced capital investment, mean that government instability is 
associated with reduced extraction even in the very short run. 
The chapter unfolds in six sections. First, a simple Hotelling model 
incorporating ownership risk is introduced in order to identify testable theoretical 
predictions. Second, the relevant variables are quantified and the panel dataset is 
outlined. Third, the empirical model is deduced. Fourth, results are discussed. 
Fifth, robustness is assessed and areas of future research are identified. The final 
section summarizes the main findings. Contrary to conventional Hotelling theory, 
this chapter finds that government instability is associated with slowed oil 
extraction even on a month-by-month basis. This pattern is found to be stronger 
for more authoritarian regimes. The result indicates that government stability 
functions as an enabling mechanism for oil extraction in petro-states, which calls 
for rethinking the dominant paradigm on extraction behavior. 
6.1. Predictions of Hotelling 
Capital theory is at the core of the Hotelling framework. It is therefore useful to 
begin by considering an agent who is faced with a conventional investment 
decision. Imagine a factory owner who has to decide how many machines to 
acquire. To further simplify the analysis, assume that this owner has perfect 
information about future conditions and that the demand function is well-behaved. 
Conventional capital theory holds that, in equilibrium, this profit-maximizing 
factory owner should be indifferent between investing in an additional machine 
and placing the money in the alternative interest-yielding asset (henceforth the 
financial asset). The condition in Equation 6.1 must thus apply in equilibrium: 
(6.1) 
𝑣𝑡+𝑝𝑡+1
𝑝𝑡⏟  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒
= 1 + 𝑖⏟
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
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The left side of Equation 6.1 gives the return obtained from investing in the 
machine and the right hand side the alternative return acquired from the financial 
asset. The return of the machine can be divided into two subcomponents: the yield 
that the machine generates (𝑣𝑡) and its future sales price (𝑝𝑡+1), which includes 
deductions for depreciation and wear. Both of these components are divided by 
the initial price of the machine to identify the percentage return. Unlike man-
made assets such as the evaluated machine, the stock of a non-renewable resource 
is unproductive in situ (𝑣𝑡 = 0) and cannot be increased through investments. As 
a result, resource owners face a one-dimensional decision-making problem, 
whereby the speed of extraction is the only parameter that can be influenced. 
Realizing this, Hotelling concluded that the owner of a non-renewable resource 
should only keep reserves in situ if prices increase with at least the alternative 
cost, which is the interest rate of the financial asset. Presented in Equation 6.2, 
this condition is called the Hotelling rule.  
(6.2) 
𝑝𝑡+1
𝑝𝑡⏟
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢
= 1 + 𝑖⏟
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
  
 
In its simplicity, the Hotelling rule governs both resource prices and extraction 
behavior, as its violation results in arbitrage possibilities on the part of the 
resource owner. Consider a situation in which the return from investing in the 
financial asset is greater than the potential yield from future price increases on in 
situ resources. This would provide the owner with incentives to extract today and 
place the potential sales revenue in the financial asset. All agents should realize 
this arbitrage potential. Their collective behavior will then lead to increased 
supply of the resource today. The expanded supply, coupled with an assumption 
of a well-behaved demand function will, ceteris paribus, result in falling resource 
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prices today (𝑝𝑡 ↓). This effect continues until all arbitrage possibilities are eroded 
and the Hotelling rule is restored. The same mechanisms apply in the reverse out-
of-equilibrium situation (𝑝𝑡+1 > (1 + 𝑖)𝑝𝑡): Relatively high future resource prices 
would provide an incentive to keep resources in situ, leading to falling supply and 
rising prices (𝑝𝑡 ↑). Drawing on information about the size of resource stock, the 
structure of demand and the alternative interest rate, the Hotelling rule thus 
governs optimal extraction behavior. 
The introduction of Hotelling theory has so far relied on an assumption of 
perfect information. In reality, resource owners must rely on their expectations 
when making extraction decisions (Krautkraemer, 1998). Rulers such as Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad are, at the time of writing, uncertain about their future 
power and continued custodianship of national resource reserves. To understand 
how this affects the Hotelling rule, consider a petro-state ruler who faces a 
revolution threat. Assume this ruler expects a successful revolt with a probability 
“𝑧” and that a completely safe investment alternative is available with a return of 
“𝑖”. Figure 6.1 illustrates this decision-making process graphically.  
 
 
FIGURE 6.1. ACCOUNTING FOR THE RISK OF REVOLUTION 
 
Drawing on insights from Konrad et al. (1994), the rational agent will base 
behavior on a relative comparison of the expected returns. In turn, the presence of 
revolution risk alters the Hotelling rule to that presented in Equation 6.3.  
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(6.3) (1 − 𝑧) ∗
𝑝𝑡+1
𝑝𝑡⏟        
𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢]
= 1 + 𝑖⏟
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
  
 
As seen, an increased risk of revolution (𝑧 ↑) reduces the expected return from 
the resource in situ and raises the opportunity costs of preservation. This means 
that the conventional Hotelling rule is no longer privately rational. Instead, a risk 
premium is required for the resource owner to remain indifferent between 
extracting today and preserving reserves. Keeping the interest rate and oil prices 
constant, the Hotelling principle thus entails that an unexpected rise in ownership 
risks should induce the authoritarian ruler to accelerate extraction. It is this 
theoretical proposition that is tested throughout the rest of this chapter. 
6.2. Empirical strategy 
This section develops the empirical model used to assess the empirical validity 
of the Hotelling framework in explaining short-run extraction patterns observed in 
authoritarian petro-states. The analysis rests on the assumption that the ruling 
government wields the ultimate power over oil resources in situ. This assumption 
is supported by the fact that National Oil Companies (NOCs) are major extractors 
in most petro-states and control about 75 percent of global production (Deutsche 
Bank, 2011). However, even in cases where a ruler does not directly control 
resources, the literature suggests that government stability and ownership risk are 
directly linked. Deacon and Bohn (2000) postulate that ownership risk is 
dependent on government stability and Olson (1993) argues that a change in 
government often is associated with shifts in property structures. By assuming 
that the incumbent government wields the ultimate power over resources, it is 
possible to assess the relationship between oil extraction and perceived ownership 
risk across countries. Expectations regarding a government’s stability can thus be 
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used as a proxy for ownership risk and it is therefore unnecessary to identify the 
risk faced by potential individual resource owners within countries. Accordingly, 
the empirical model of this chapter focuses on the relationship between oil 
extraction and government stability and can be summarized as follows: 
(6.4) 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑿′𝒋,𝒕𝜷𝟑 + 𝑣𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
 where 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 
 
The core model presented above consists of five explanatory elements. First, 
past oil extraction (𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1) as the non-renewable nature of oil deposits entails that 
this month’s extraction (𝑅𝑗,𝑡) is conditional on past production levels. Second, the 
main variable of interest, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑗,𝑡, which stands for the expected government 
stability of country 𝑗 at time 𝑡. Third, a vector of potentially endogenous 
covariates (𝑿′𝒋,𝒕). This includes the option value of in situ resources (i.e. the oil 
price multiplied by remaining reserves) and the interest rate, which, according to 
the Hotelling framework, both govern extraction. The fourth type of explanatory 
variable, 𝑣𝑗 , refers to country-specific factors. Geology is an example of such an 
effect that varies across countries but not across time. The fifth element is the 
country-specific error term, 𝜀𝑗,𝑡. 
Estimating the model as presented in Equation 6.4 is made challenging by the 
fact that most country-specific effects (𝑣𝑗) are unobservable. For example, there is 
no good account of extraction costs at the country level. Omitting country-specific 
factors from the analysis can, however, result in bias, as these effects are likely 
correlated with both government stability and extraction. One solution is to take 
first differences, as demonstrated in Equation 6.5. This allows the removal of any 
factors that vary across entities but not across time. Consequently, it is possible to 
omit the unobservable country-specific effects without causing bias. 
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 (6.5) ∆𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑗,𝑡 + ∆𝑿′𝒋,𝒕𝜷𝟑 + ∆𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
 
Using conventional statistical techniques to estimate Equation 6.5 is 
problematic, as the lagged dependent variable is, by design, correlated with the 
error term. For example, OLS estimates will be biased even if the errors 
themselves are not autocorrelated. To address these issues, Arellano and Bond 
(1991) developed a dynamic panel data estimator. Their method uses the levels of 
the dependent variable lagged two and more periods and the levels of the 
endogenous independent variables lagged two and more periods as instruments. 
This eliminates the problem of technical endogeneity. But since both the 
dependent and independent variables in Equation 6.5 are very persistent, the 
lagged levels would be weak instruments (Blundell & Bond, 1998). However, by 
assuming that the first-differences of the independent variables are uncorrelated 
with any individual effects, lagged values of the first-differences can be used as 
additional instruments, thereby increasing efficiency (Arellano & Bover, 1995). 
Faced by the potentially persistent nature of oil extraction and government 
stability, this chapter therefore relies on the Arellano and Bover GMM estimator 
when estimating Equation 6.5. 
Choosing the GMM moment conditions carefully allows the elimination of the 
endogeneity problems associated with previous studies. As an estimation 
technique, the GMM estimator relies on a set of moment conditions formed by 
assuming that particular lagged levels of the dependent variable are orthogonal to 
the differenced disturbances. Commonly, it is assumed that 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 for all 𝑠 
and 𝑡. However, as discussed earlier, an extraction shock today is likely to affect 
government stability tomorrow. This means, that the explanatory variables are not 
strictly exogenous and the whole vector of possible instruments can therefore not 
be used. To counter this problem, the explanatory variables are treated as 
predetermined. The GMM estimator used in this chapter thus relies on a less 
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restrictive assumption, namely that 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 for 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡. If this holds and the 
restricted lagged levels are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, 
then the estimator will be unbiased. 
Following the outline of the empirical model, it is now possible to identify the 
null hypothesis for testing the empirical applicability of the Hotelling framework 
in the short run. Assuming ultimate power, low government stability (i.e. a low 
value of 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑗,𝑡) is expected to be associated with high ownership risk. As outlined 
earlier, high levels of ownership risk should lead to accelerated extraction, 
according to theory. This means that the empirical analysis will support the 
validity of the Hotelling framework if a negative relationship between oil 
extraction and ownership risk is identified (i.e. 𝛽2 < 0). This can be used to infer 
the formal statistical null hypothesis (𝐻0) and alternative hypothesis (𝐻1) 
presented below: 
(𝐻0)  𝛽2 < 0: Support for the Hotelling framework 
(𝐻1)  𝛽2 ≥ 0: Reject the Hotelling framework 
6.3. Data 
This section quantifies the relevant factors in Equation 6.5 and outlines the 
dataset on which the analysis in this chapter is based. To make inferences about 
how government stability affects short-run oil extraction in authoritarian petro-
states, it is necessary to draw a representative sample of relevant countries. This 
requires, first and foremost, a definition of what constitutes an authoritarian petro-
state. In the context of this chapter, a country is defined as a petro-state if it 
satisfies two specific criteria: First, the country needs to produce a minimum of 
ten thousand barrels of oil per day. Second, the country’s government must be 
consistently ranked among the 50 percent least accountable regimes in the world 
according to the WGI index (Kaufmann et al., 2014). The exact threshold at 
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which a government is categorized as being authoritarian will later be investigated 
in more detail. Globally, there are 35 countries that satisfy the two criteria and 
these are all included in the initial sample. For a complete list of countries, the 
interested reader is referred to Appendix D. The panel consists of monthly data 
spanning a period of twelve years, that is, the beginning of 2003 to the end of 
2014. A detailed discussion of how the individual components of Equation 6.5 are 
quantified is presented in the following four subsections. 
6.3.A. Oil extraction 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2015) provides accounts on 
the monthly oil supply at the country level. These figures are used as 
approximations of a country’s total oil extraction and comprise the production of 
crude oil, natural gas fluids and other liquids including lease condensate. To 
account for positive skewness, the natural log of oil supply is used in the 
statistical model. This log-transformation furthermore ensures that the model does 
not overemphasize the behavior of big producers such as Saudi Arabia. The 
chapter thus focuses on identifying relative alterations in extraction (percentage 
changes) rather than absolute ones.  
6.3.B. Government stability 
Quantifying government stability is complicated by its non-numerical nature. 
Drawing on the methodology of Dietz et al. (2007) and Tusalem (2010), this 
chapter relies on assessments presented in the International Country Risk Guide 
(henceforth ICRG). This data catalogue is a product of the PRS Group (PRS, 
2015) and it consists of index scores that experts allocate to nation-states 
reflecting the prevailing political conditions. As a proxy for the ruling 
government’s ability to stay in power, this chapter specifically relies on the ICRG 
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index of government stability. Reported at the beginning of each month, this 
index runs from 0 to 12, where low values indicate a significant risk of 
government collapse. Representing predictions about future outcomes, this index 
thus serves as a good proxy of the expectations, which are hypothesized to govern 
behavior according to the Hotelling framework. 
6.3.C. Option value of in situ resources and interest rates 
Interest rates on alternative investments and the option value of remaining 
reserves are important factors for extraction behavior according to the Hotelling 
framework. Therefore, both variables are included in the analysis. The value of in 
situ resources is approximated by multiplying known reserves with the crude oil 
price. Reserve estimates are acquired from BP (2015) and oil prices are obtained 
from the World Bank (2015). The exact prices used are the equally weighted 
average spot of the three major oil benchmarks Brent, Dubai and West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI). The analysis uses the U.S. Treasury bill rate as a proxy for 
capturing international interest rates. The selection of this proxy is justified by the 
dollar’s de facto status as the global reserve currency, whilst its validity depends 
on the access of authoritarian rulers to international financial markets. Data on 
U.S. Treasury rates was gathered from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2015). 
6.3.D. Ability to extract 
So far, the empirical model incorporates all variables that, according to theory, 
govern extraction behavior. However, there are factors outside the theoretical 
Hotelling model that might limit (or alter) behavior. These factors must be 
controlled for in order to ensure an unbiased estimation of the relationship 
between oil extraction and government stability.  
 138 
The potential capability of an authoritarian ruler to act in accordance with the 
Hotelling framework is dependent on his or her ability to extract. Military 
conflicts between nation-states and/or civil war can forcibly make extraction 
impossible. The case of the Libyan revolt in 2011 illustrates this point. The 
combination of internal unrest and foreign airstrikes eliminated oil export 
opportunities and blocked the Libyan government’s access to oil deposits in the 
eastern part of the country (Darbauche & Fattouh, 2011). This case demonstrates 
that civil war and foreign pressure can be correlated with both oil extraction and 
government stability, thus highlighting the need to control for both factors.  
To account for incidents of internal armed conflict, this chapter relies on the 
ICRG index of “Civil War” (PRS, 2015). This index describes the actual or 
potential risk of situations where a domestic rebel force (that holds territory) is in 
armed conflict with the security forces of the ruling government. Based on expert 
assessments, the civil war index runs on a scale from 0 to 4, whereby low values 
indicate high levels of internal conflict. To account for incidents of armed conflict 
with other nations, this chapter again relies on estimates provided by the PRS 
group (2015). Specifically, the “War” index is used. This runs on a scale from 0 to 
4 where low values indicate a high level of armed conflict with another nation 
state. Table 6.1 below describes the complete panel used in this chapter. 
 
TABLE 6.1. DATA SUMMARY 
Variable: Min Mean Max Std. Dev 
Oil production (thousand barrels per day) 13 1,784.67 12,248 2,548.17 
Government stability index 2 8.86 11.5 1.83 
War index 0 3.79 4 0.42 
Civil war index 0.5 3.47 4 0.74 
U.S. treasury bill rate  0.5 2.25 6.25 1.98 
Oil price ($US avg. spot WTI, Brent and Dubai) 25.56 73.46 132.83 27.78 
Oil reserves (thousand million barrels) 0.43 39.15 298.35 66.30 
Balanced Panel 4,608 observations n = 32 countries T = 144 (12 years) 
Sources: EIA 2015; IMF 2015; PRS 2015 and World Bank 2015 
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6.4. Results 
With the building blocks of the empirical analysis in place, it can now be 
assessed whether the effect of government instability is indeed accelerated 
extraction in the short run. Table 6.2 presents the results obtained from estimating 
the empirical model using Arellano and Bover’s system GMM estimator. The four 
columns represent the estimates obtained from gradually more restricted samples. 
The first column of estimates is based on the entire sample. It therefore includes 
all petro-states that continuously ranked among the 50 percent least accountable 
regimes in the world in the period between 2003 and 2014, according to the WGI. 
Respectively, the second, third and fourth column restrict this sample to include 
only countries that are ranked among the 40, 30 and 20 percent least accountable 
regimes.  
 
TABLE 6.2. ESTIMATES CORE MODEL 
Δ ln(Oil production)  
Top 50 pct. 
(GMM) 
Top 40 pct. 
(GMM) 
Top 30 pct. 
(GMM) 
Top 20 pct. 
(GMM) 
Δ ln(Oil production):      
- lag 1   -0.053 
[0.075] 
-0.009 
[0.061] 
-0.013 
[0.064] 
-0.038 
[0.029] 
Δ Government stability index  0.070 
[0.043] 
0.108** 
[0.053] 
0.124** 
[0.055] 
0.155** 
[0.066] 
Δ ln(U.S. treasury bill rate)  0.008 
[0.005] 
0.005 
[0.004] 
0.005 
[0.005] 
0.008 
[0.007] 
Δ ln(Oil price * reserves)  0.011 
[0.016] 
0.018 
[0.018] 
0.023 
[0.022] 
0.041 
[0.035] 
Number of observations 4,544 3,266 2,840 1,420 
Number of countries 32 23 20 10 
Notes: “Δ” signifies the first difference. All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous and 
predetermined (i.e. 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 for 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 but 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] ≠ 0 for 𝑠 > 𝑡). The Arellano-Bond test for 
zero autocorrelation did not present evidence that the model is mis-specified (i.e. the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation was rejected at order one but not at higher orders) 
Robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (Windmeijer, 2005) in brackets.  
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
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Before interpreting the results, there are two important things to note about the 
estimation. First, we use robust standard errors as the Breusch-Pagan test suggests 
heteroskedasticity in the data-generating process. The lack of homoskedasticity 
also means that the conventional Sargan test of over-identifying conditions cannot 
be performed.24 If one wrongly attempts to estimate the Sargan test using normal 
standard errors, the null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level. Under 
assumptions of homoskedasticity, this would suggest problems of over-
identification. However, as shown by Arellano and Bond (1991), the Sargan test 
overrejects in the presence of heteroskedasticity and a test using normal standard 
errors can thus not be trusted. However, to limit any potential problems of over-
identification, the maximum number of lags used as instruments is limited to 
twelve.25 Second, it is important to recall the functional form of the variables in 
the model. Since the natural log of oil production is the dependent variable, a one-
unit increase in any of the depending variables, controlling for other explanatory 
variables, is expected to lead to a ?̂?-unit change in 𝑙𝑛(𝑅). The estimated 
coefficients for government stability are thus semi-elasticities.  
Returning to the results presented in Table 6.2, none of the estimates are 
statistically significant for the entire sample. However, for all of the restricted 
samples, government stability is significantly positive at the 5 percent level. The 
expected effect of a one-unit increase in the ICRG-index of government stability 
is thus, ceteris paribus, an expected increase in extraction of 11, 13 and 17 
percent respectively. Contrary to the predictions of the Hotelling framework, 
these results suggest that an increase in government stability is associated with 
accelerated extraction in petro-states even on a month-by-month basis. 
 
24
 Following Arellano and Bond (1991), only for a homoskedastic error term does the Sargan test have an asymptotic 
chi-squared distribution.  
25
 Six and 18 were assessed as alternative maximum lag limits but estimates were not found to be sensitive to this and 
12 lags were thus chosen as this limit represents the span of a year.   
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Furthermore, this relationship is found to be statistically and economically more 
significant, the more authoritarian the evaluated countries are. The results in 
Table 6.2, however, do not account for incidents of military conflict. To address 
this, Table 6.3 presents the estimates obtained when controlling for incidents of 
civil war and cross-border conflicts. 
 
TABLE 6.3. ESTIMATES ACCOUNTING FOR MILITARY CONFLICTS 
Δ ln(Oil production)  
Top 50 pct. 
(GMM) 
Top 40 pct. 
(GMM) 
Top 30 pct. 
(GMM) 
Top 20 pct. 
(GMM) 
Δ ln(Oil production):      
- lag 1   0.018 
[0.105] 
0.109 
[0.099] 
0.124 
[0.112] 
0.178 
[0.168] 
Δ Government stability index  0.057* 
[0.029] 
0.080*** 
[0.031] 
0.089*** 
[0.030] 
0.110*** 
[0.035] 
Δ War index  0.221 
[0.138] 
0.318** 
[0.143] 
0.362** 
[0.143] 
0.372** 
[0.181] 
Δ Civil war index  0.090 
[0.069] 
0.098 
[0.072] 
0.098 
[0.071] 
0.047 
[0.031] 
Δ ln(U.S. treasury bill rate)  0.009* 
[0.005] 
0.009* 
[0.005] 
0.007 
[0.005] 
0.011 
[0.009] 
Δ ln(Oil price * reserves)  0.014 
[0.015] 
0.018 
[0.018] 
0.025 
[0.015] 
0.039* 
[0.021] 
Number of observations 4,544 3,266 2,840 1,420 
Number of countries 32 23 20 10 
Notes: “Δ” signifies the first difference. All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous and 
predetermined (i.e. 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 for 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 but 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] ≠ 0 for 𝑠 > 𝑡). The Arellano-Bond test for 
zero autocorrelation did not present evidence that the model is mis-specified (i.e. the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation was rejected at order one but not at higher orders) 
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
 
Comparing the results from Tables 6.3 and Table 6.2, it becomes clear that 
accounting for armed conflicts generally reduces the expected effect of 
government stability. For example, the effect of a one-unit change in government 
stability falls from 17 percent to about 12 percent when evaluating the most 
restricted sample, that is, petro-states ranked among the world’s 20 percent least 
accountable regimes. This pattern is explained by armed conflicts decreasing both 
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government stability and the ability to extract oil. Incidents of civil war are not 
found to have a statistically significant effect on oil extraction. In contrast, 
military conflicts with other nations significantly reduce domestic oil production. 
In sum, the core model used earlier suffered from omitted variable bias, as it did 
not account for armed conflicts reducing extraction ability. As a consequence, the 
role of government stability was overestimated.  
However, even when controlling for conflicts, the testing procedure employed 
in this chapter offers no empirical support for the Hotelling framework. From 
Table 6.3, it is thus clear that ?̂?2 is significantly positive on a 1 percent level for 
all three restricted samples. The null hypothesis identified earlier can therefore be 
statistically rejected for petro-states ranked among the 40 percent least 
accountable regimes in the world. Contrary to the principles of Hotelling, growing 
government instability is thus found to result in decelerated extraction across the 
world’s least accountable petro-states. When evaluating the estimates for the full 
sample, government stability is only significantly positive at the six percent level. 
This matches the general pattern that stability plays a bigger role for oil extraction 
in more authoritarian societies. One explanation for this could be that the 
instability of a government only affects extraction if the threatened regime has 
substantial powers over the wider society. Neither the interest rate nor the proxy 
value of in situ resources is found to be statistically significant on a 5 percent 
level. This further supports the conclusion that the Hotelling principal does not 
explain monthly variations in the extraction of authoritarian petro-states. 
Another important observation is that monthly changes in extraction are not 
persistent over time. For all samples presented in Table 6.3, the lagged dependent 
variable is thus statistically insignificant. This means that, ceteris paribus, 
changes in extraction are not correlated across months. However, it does not mean 
that extraction itself cannot be persistent. Analyzing month-on-month changes in 
extraction, this chapter thus only concludes that extraction is first-difference-
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stationary on a monthly basis. In other words, in the very short run it is only 
instability, in the form of armed conflicts or government weakness, which 
systematically influence changes in extraction. 
6.5. Robustness 
The conclusions of this chapter are vulnerable to the statistical design used.  
There are three broad areas of concern: data reliability, unaccounted constraints 
on extraction and sampling period bias. This section is dedicated to highlighting 
these potential caveats, assessing robustness and suggesting future research to 
improve our understanding of the empirical results. 
6.5.A. Data reliability 
The conclusions reached in this chapter fundamentally rest on the quality of the 
chosen dataset. The statistical results cannot be trusted if the underlying data is 
inaccurate. In the context of this chapter, there are two potential reasons for 
concern. First, the chosen variables might not be good representatives of the 
factors described by theory. Second, the reliability of the data itself might be 
questionable. This subsection introduces these potential concerns and discusses 
the pre-emptive measures taken to avoid bias.  
The fact that the ICRG-index of government stability is not a perfect proxy for 
perceived ownership risk should motivate concerns. As argued earlier, it is the 
expectations of resource owners that determine extraction within the Hotelling 
framework. Ideally, one should thus use psychological assessments to identify the 
degree to which individual authoritarian rulers or entire regimes feel that their 
status as custodians of national resources is threatened. Yet, in practice, such an 
assessment is impossible hence this chapter’s reliance on the ICRG-index as a 
proxy. Relying on proxies is, both in the context of this chapter and more 
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generally, a source of fundamental concern for data reliability. However as argued 
earlier, the use of government stability indexes finds support in the wider 
literature and this limits the risk associated with using them. Furthermore, there is 
no clear reason to believe that the government stability index, used systematically, 
mismeasures the perceived ownership risk of authoritarian rulers. In this case, a 
potential measurement error would only result in attenuation bias meaning that 
estimates would converge towards zero. However, this chapter found a 
significantly positive effect of government stability and potential attenuation bias 
will thus only make it more unlikely to reject the Hotelling framework. 
Another concern is that weak monitoring capability and potentially skewed 
incentives jeopardize the reliability of self-reported data. The analysis relies on 
reserve and extraction data from BP (2015) and the EIA (2015), which originates 
from figures supplied by national statistical agencies and governments. A problem 
with this is that some countries might consider extraction and reserves data a state 
secret and therefore can have skewed incentives to misreport. A second challenge 
facing the self-reported data is that certain countries lack the institutions needed to 
keep a statistical record of monthly oil production levels. Weak monitoring 
capability, coupled with potentially skewed incentives, should motivate concerns 
about the reliability of the oil production data used in this chapter. If the data is 
inaccurate in a non-random manner, then the statistical model will estimate biased 
results. To counter this problem, countries that displayed persistently stable 
production levels or limited precision in reported data were temporarily removed 
and the analysis was repeated. Venezuela constitutes a case in point of this 
practice; it was temporarily omitted because it had reported the same production 
levels over a period of four consecutive months. However, this did not 
significantly affect results. Consequently, all countries were included in the final 
analysis to ensure that the sample did not suffer from the researcher imposing 
arbitrary selection bias. 
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6.5.B. Constraints on extraction 
The performance of the empirical model is dependent on the implicit 
assumption that resource owners are capable of altering their extraction. Hotelling 
theory describes the voluntary behavior of resource owners. Therefore, it is 
important to statistically distinguish between forced and voluntary changes in 
behavior. This was the reason why incidents of armed conflict were controlled for 
earlier. However, it remains uncertain whether the employed method fully 
succeeds in identifying purely voluntary extraction patterns.  
One reason the statistical model fails to identify Hotelling behavior may be that 
the chosen strategy overemphasizes the power of governments and neglects 
capital constraints. The oil industry is capital-intensive, and considerable 
investments are needed to expand extraction capacities (Krautkraemer, 1998). 
This technical feature puts constraints on governments seeking to adjust 
extraction quickly. Also, many petro-states rely on international oil companies to 
operate their fields and the government might therefore not control production on 
a daily basis. As a consequence, this chapter might mistakenly denounce the 
Hotelling framework simply because constraints outside the theory prevent 
extraction adjustments within the short intervals assessed.  
To test whether the results of this study are driven by an intervening effect of 
technical constraints, it is helpful to use OPEC countries26 as a robustness check. 
This is because the governments of OPEC countries wield more power than others 
over their monthly oil extraction levels. There are two reasons for this. First, 
industry experts widely consider OPEC members to have excess production 
capacity (Deutsche Bank, 2013, p. 28). This means that the problem of capital 
constraints is less of a concern for this subset of twelve countries. Second, 
 
26
Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Venezuela. 
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government-controlled NOCs manage a significant share of the daily extraction 
made in OPEC countries. As an example, Saudi Aramco controls almost all oil 
production in Saudi Arabia.27 This ensures that the ruling governments of OPEC 
members are relatively less dependent on international oil companies and that 
they therefore have actual ability to change monthly extraction levels. To ensure 
robustness, it is thus useful to compare the results introduced earlier with those 
obtained when estimating the empirical model for the restricted sample of twelve 
OPEC countries. The estimates obtained from performing this exercise are 
presented in Table 6.4. 
 
TABLE 6.4. ESTIMATES FOR OPEC COUNTRIES 
Δ ln(Oil production)  
Top 40 pct. 
(GMM) 
Top 30 pct. 
(GMM) 
Top 20 pct. 
(GMM) 
OPEC 
(GMM) 
Δ ln(Oil production):      
- lag 1   0.109 
[0.099] 
0.124 
[0.112] 
0.178 
[0.168] 
0.175 
[0.119] 
Δ Government stability index  0.080*** 
[0.031] 
0.089*** 
[0.030] 
0.110*** 
[0.035] 
0.089** 
[0.035] 
Δ War index  0.318** 
[0.143] 
0.362** 
[0.143] 
0.372** 
[0.181] 
0.310 
[0.207] 
Δ Civil war index  0.098 
[0.072] 
0.098 
[0.071] 
0.047 
[0.031] 
0.225* 
[0.129] 
Δ ln(U.S. treasury bill rate)  0.009* 
[0.005] 
0.007 
[0.005] 
0.011 
[0.009] 
0.007 
[0.006] 
Δ ln(Oil price * reserves)  0.018 
[0.018] 
0.025 
[0.015] 
0.039* 
[0.021] 
0.034 
[0.029] 
Number of observations 3,266 2,840 1,420 1,704 
Number of countries 23 20 10 12 
Notes: “Δ” signifies the first difference. All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous and 
predetermined (i.e. 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 for 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 but 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] ≠ 0 for 𝑠 > 𝑡). The Arellano-Bond test for 
zero autocorrelation did not present evidence that the model is mis-specified (i.e. the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation was rejected at order one but not at higher orders) 
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
 
 
27
A complete list of the main NOCs of the petro-states evaluated in this chapter is presented in Appendix E. It should, 
however, be noted that many of the companies included in this list do not function as actual operators. 
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As can be seen from Table 6.4, the estimated effect of government stability 
identified for the subset of OPEC countries is similar to that found for the three 
restricted samples. This underlines the robustness of the result that increased 
government stability in the short run is associated with accelerated extraction in 
petro-states. The main findings of this chapter can thus not be attributed to a lack 
of spare capacity or limited direct influence of governments.  
6.5.C. Sample period concerns 
Apart from concerns regarding technical capability, one might worry that the 
findings of this chapter are dependent on the specific period of assessment. As 
discussed, the original sample covers the time span between 2003 and 2014. 
These years were characterized by a series of major events, which have affected 
the oil industry. Notably, these include the Iraq war (2003), the global financial 
crisis (2007) and the Arab Spring (2010). One should be concerned that these 
specific events are driving results. The findings of this chapter might thus not be 
robust outside the specific period of assessment. To test this, it is useful to split 
the sample by date and estimate the model separately. One can then compare 
whether the conclusions differ significantly depending on the sample period 
chosen. In the context of this chapter, the original sample is split into two equal 
halves. The first of these covers the years 2003 to 2008 and the second covers the 
period 2009 to 2014. Using these subsamples, the original empirical model is then 
estimated separately. Drawing on earlier insights, this exercise is only performed 
for the 30 percent least accountable regimes. However, performing the same 
exercise for other subsets of countries does not affect overall conclusions. Table 
6.5 presents the results obtained when estimating the Arellano and Bover GMM 
model for the subsamples as described above. Furthermore, the third column 
includes the original estimates for the full sample (i.e. 2003-2014). 
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TABLE 6.5. ESTIMATES FOR DIFFERENT PERIODS 
Δ ln(Oil production) 
2003-2008  
Top 30 pct. (GMM) 
2009-2014  
Top 30 pct. (GMM) 
Full period 
Top 30 pct. (GMM) 
Δ ln(Oil production):    
- lag 1  0.255 
[0.246] 
0.098 
[0.061] 
0.124 
[0.112] 
Δ Government stability index 0.119*** 
[0.034] 
0.043* 
[0.023] 
0.089*** 
[0.030] 
Δ War index 0.474** 
[0.224] 
0.132 
[0.112] 
0.362** 
[0.143] 
Δ Civil war index 0.005 
[0.018] 
0.211* 
[0.126] 
0.098 
[0.071] 
Δ ln(U.S. treasury bill rate) 0.011* 
[0.006] 
-0.011 
[0.029] 
0.007 
[0.005] 
Δ ln(Oil price * reserves) 0.024 
[0.026] 
0.018 
[0.019] 
0.025 
[0.015] 
Number of observations 1,400 1,420 2,840 
Number of countries 20 20 20 
Notes: “Δ” signifies the first difference. All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous and 
predetermined (i.e. 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 for 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 but 𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑡] ≠ 0 for 𝑠 > 𝑡). The Arellano-Bond test for 
zero autocorrelation did not present evidence that the model is mis-specified (i.e. the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation was rejected at order one but not at higher orders) 
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
** Significant at 5 percent level  
* Significant at 10 percent level 
 
As seen from Table 6.5, the effect of government stability remains significantly 
positive on at least a 10 percent level when evaluating the subsamples separately. 
Furthermore, the estimates of the three samples are not statistically different from 
one another. This suggests that the conclusions of this chapter are robust across 
periods. Earlier findings can thus not be attributed to single events such as the 
Arab Spring but represent general patterns in the data. However, the above 
robustness check only confirms within-sample validity. External validity outside 
the sample period can thus not be determined. 
6.5.D. Further research 
As the three previous subsections showed, a combination of due diligence and 
robustness checks allows for ensuring both the validity and reliability of the 
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chapter’s empirical conclusions. Despite these verifications, there remains room 
for further research to confirm that the findings carry external validity beyond the 
narrow arena of short-term oil extraction in authoritarian petro-states.  
As a commodity, oil has unique features that distinguish it from many other 
non-renewable resources. These differences might be what jeopardize the 
Hotelling framework’s explanatory power in this setting. A significant share of 
global oil is traded on long-term forward contracts (Fattouh, 2011). This is largely 
because refinery capacity is required before the raw material can be sold to end-
users. A consequence of this market structure is that, even if extraction capacity 
exists, it can be challenging to accelerate or decelerate oil exports in the short run. 
A related problem is the potential constraint imposed by transportation 
infrastructure. In 2014, 17,073,000 barrels of oil were exported daily from the 
Middle East (BP, 2015). These significant physical flows require infrastructure 
such as harbors, shipping lanes and tanker capacity. The consequence is that 
transport bottlenecks can reduce a ruler’s incentive and ability to rapidly 
accelerate extraction in times of government instability. However, other non-
renewable resource types, such as secondary diamonds, have a more 
unconstrained way from mine to market (Lujala et al., 2005). The limitations on 
rapid extraction adjustment thus vary across different types of non-renewable 
resources. It might, therefore, be that Hotelling theory is better suited to explain 
the extraction of resources other than oil. To ensure the external validity of the 
findings, one should thus apply the high frequency empirical model used in this 
chapter to a wider category of non-renewable resources. 
The discussion above highlights the potential limits to short-term extraction 
responses. However, it does not explain the finding that oil production is 
accelerated in times of high government stability. To explain this empirical 
pattern, it is necessary to study the incentives of domestic actors as well as those 
of international trade partners. A promising avenue for future research could thus 
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be to analyze the role of retrospective punishment. Domestic agents such as a 
country’s bureaucracy or the employees of state oil companies might not desire to 
assist a weakened ruler in accelerating extraction because they fear that a future 
leader might punish this action retrospectively upon gaining power. Also, 
international trade partners might not wish to be overly affiliated with a “sunset” 
government, as this is likely to weaken relations with a potential future leader. 
The consequence of these intertemporal incentives could, as identified in this 
chapter, be that extraction falls as a ruler is weakened. Likewise, a government 
that carries momentum in terms of stability might have an easier time convincing 
international and domestic actors to help them accelerate extraction. There is thus 
room for further research into the underlying mechanisms driving the observed 
patterns in order to explain the empirical relationships identified in this chapter. 
6.6. Conclusion 
With the aim of testing the empirical relevance of Hotelling theory, this chapter 
assesses the short-run relationship between government stability and oil extraction 
in authoritarian petro-states. The focus on undemocratic societies was grounded 
on the observation that a significant share of global oil originates from nations 
where the citizens are unable to participate in selecting their own governments. 
As a consequence, it was argued that vital extraction decisions rest with a few 
authoritarian rulers and understanding their behavior was therefore deemed to be 
crucial. The Hotelling principle was outlined as the dominant theoretical 
paradigm on the economics of non-renewable resource management. It was 
argued that an implication of this framework is that authoritarian rulers, as the 
custodians of oil resources, should accelerate their extraction when threatened. 
This relationship should mainly apply in the short-run, as political instability has 
not yet limited production capabilities. To test the empirical validity of this 
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theoretical description, a panel dataset comprising 32 countries was used. Unlike 
the existing experimental literature on Hotelling, this chapter relied on monthly 
data that uniquely allowed for identifying responses to sudden political events. 
Furthermore, the analysis improved on existing studies by applying a dynamic 
panel data system GMM estimator that eliminated the risk of endogeneity. 
Contrary to conventional theory, the empirical analysis found that government 
instability, ceteris paribus, is associated with reduced oil extraction in the most 
authoritarian of petro-states. The Hotelling framework can thus not explain the 
short-run monthly variations in oil extraction observed in the data. 
However, one cannot denounce the wider relevance of the Hotelling principle 
purely on the basis of this chapter. As argued, oil as a commodity has 
characteristics that distinguish it from other non-renewable resources. An analysis 
similar to the one introduced here is thus needed to establish whether the 
conclusions apply outside the realm of oil production in authoritarian petro-states. 
More broadly, a theory is always a simplification of a complex world. This very 
simplification may thus mean that parts of the theory fall short in its description of 
reality. This does not change the fact that a theoretical framework such as 
Hotelling's may generate deeper insights, by simplifying the complexity of reality. 
Nonetheless, this chapter has found no empirical support for Hotelling’s 
description of extraction. It is thus not evident that the existing theoretical 
paradigm offers any insight into the short-run relationship between government 
stability and oil production in authoritarian petro-states. As a consequence, there 
remains room for future research to map and understand the underlying 
mechanisms driving the patterns identified in this chapter. 
 152 
REFERENCES CHAPTER 6 
Arellano, M., and O. Bover. "Another Look at the Instrumental Variable 
Estimation of Error-Component Models." Journal of Econometrics 68, no. 1 
(1995): 29-51. 
Arellano, M., and S. Bond. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations." Review of 
Economic Studies 58, no. 3 (1991): 277-297. 
BP. (2015). Statistical Review of World Energy 2015. London: BP. 
Blundell, R., and S. Bond. "Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models." Journal of Econometrics 87, no. 1 (1998): 115-
143. 
Bohn, H., and R. T. Deacon. "Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of 
Natural Resources." The American Economic Review 90, no. 3 (June 2000): 526-
549. 
BP. Statistical Review of World Energy 2015. Industry Report, London: BP, 
2015. 
Darbauche, H., and B. Fattouh. "The Implications of the Arab Uprisings for Oil 
and Gas Markets." Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Working Paper, 2011: No. 
MEP2. 
Deutsche Bank. A guide to the oil & gas industry. Industry, London: Deutsche 
Bank Market Research, 2013. 
Deutsche Bank. A User Guide To Commodities. London: Deutsche Bank AG, 
2011. 
Dietz, S., E. Neumayer, and I. De Soysa. "Corruption, the resource curse and 
genuine saving." Environment and Development Economics 12, no. 1 (2007): 33-
53. 
 153 
EIA. International Energy Statistics. June 1, 2015. 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject (accessed June 1, 2015). 
Fattouh, B. "An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing System." The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies Working Paper No 40 (2011). 
Hotelling, H. "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources." Journal of Political 
Economy 39, no. 2 (1931): 137-175. 
IMF. June 1, 2015. https://www.imf.org/external/data.htm (accessed June 1, 
2015). 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. January 1, 2014. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (accessed June 1, 
2015). 
Khalatbari, F. "Market Imperfections and the Optimum Rate of Depletion of 
Natural Resources." Economica 44, no. 176 (1977): 409-414. 
Konrad, K. A., T. E. Olsen, and R. Schöb. "Resource Extraction and the Threat 
of Possible Expropriation: The Role of Swiss Bank Accounts." Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 25, no. 2 (1994): 149-162. 
Krautkraemer, J. A. "Nonrenewable Resource Scarcity." Journal of Economic 
Literature 36, no. 4 (1998): 2065-2107. 
Lujala, P., N. P. Gleditsch, and E. Gilmore. "A Diamond Curse? Civil War and 
a Lootable Resource." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 538-
568. 
Olsen, M. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." American Political 
Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 567-576. 
PRS. International Country Risk Guide. June 1, 2015. 
https://www.prsgroup.com (accessed June 1, 2015). 
 154 
Tusalem, R. F. "Determinants of Coup d'État Events 1970-90: The Role of 
Property Rights Protection." International Political Science Review 31, no. 3 
(2010). 
Windmeijer, Frank. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear 
efficient two-step GMM estimators." Journal of Econometrics 126, no. 1 (2005): 
25-51. 
World Bank. A citizen's guide to national oil companies: Part A and B. 
Working Paper, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008. 
—. Databank. June 1, 2015. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
(accessed June 1, 2015). 
 
 
 
  
 155 
Chapter 7. 
Concluding remarks 
Oil and gas resources continue to dominate international energy markets and 
serve as a major engine for economic growth. Grasping what drives extraction 
decisions of these resources is thus essential if we are to understand the 
development of the wider global economy. Harold Hotelling’s description of 
forward-looking agents continues to be the dominant theoretical paradigm in the 
field of non-renewable resource management. However, the empirical validity of 
this theoretical framework remains questionable to date. In addition, spatial 
considerations are neglected in the classic Hotelling model. This is problematic, 
since spatially-dependent extraction and information externalities are important 
during exploration and production. As discussed, previous studies have sought to 
address this limitation. Yet none have modeled oil and gas recovery as the two-
dimensional spatial problem it is. Set against this lack of comprehensive modeling 
and limited empirical evidence, the main objective of this research project was to 
identify the mechanisms that govern the behavior of resource owners. To make 
headway, this dissertation deduced a new theoretical framework and analyzed 
original data, using modern methodological tools. This chapter summarizes the 
main findings, their implications and avenues for future research.  
7.1. Summary of findings 
This dissertation unfolded in four main chapters, each of which constitutes a 
discrete piece of research. What unites them is their shared focus on how fear of 
losing access to future extraction affects the behavior of owners today.  
Chapter 3 deduced a novel interdisciplinary model capable of realistically 
describing the deployment of exploration wells. This theoretical framework is 
unique in its ability to model extraction and information externalities across a 
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two-dimensional space. Knowledge about the location of resources was thus 
designed to propagate across space, as exploration was deployed. This realistic 
property was achieved by using the Ising model, borrowed from the field of 
statistical physics. Based on this interdisciplinary environment, Monte Carlo 
simulations were used to compare two competing exploration strategies. Both of 
these accounted for knowledge spillovers from exploration and thereby 
significantly improved on a strategy of random deployment. However, substantial 
differences in the relative profits associated with different strategy combinations 
were revealed. These resulted in a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ type problem, where the 
only possible Nash equilibrium is for both neighboring landowners to cluster their 
exploration near the property line during early stages of exploration. This 
behavior was motivated by the fear of losing access to common pool resources in 
border areas. Yet, it occurred at the expense of a socially more efficient spacing of 
wells. Forward-looking strategic behavior in combination with common 
reservoirs was thus theoretically identified as the cause of efficiency losses, as 
information externalities were not internalized.  
A limitation of the complete two-dimensional model introduced in Chapter 3 
was its computational complexity. This complicated the testing of the empirical 
relevance of its predictions. To address this shortcoming, Chapter 4 relied on a 
simplified version of the original model that described oil and gas exploration 
along a line. This setup could be understood as a situation of two neighboring 
countries and made it possible to identify the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 
strategies, using backwards induction. In turn, this allowed for deducing the 
expected spatial distribution of wells around borders under different scenarios of 
resource leakage and information spillover. These simulated distributions were 
compared to those observed in international oil and gas exploration data covering 
more than 100,000 individual wells in over 120 countries. The findings of this 
analysis confirmed the empirical validity of the theoretical framework deduced in 
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this dissertation. In line with the predictions of the model, a general clustering of 
offshore exploration was found around borders without unitization agreements. 
Furthermore, unitization agreements were found to shift the peak in exploration 
away from borders and towards the interior of countries. This finding was in line 
with the theoretical insight that agents seek to internalize the informational 
spillover from exporation. Combined, Chapters 3 and 4 deduced and tested how 
fear of losing access to common pool resources affects exploration.  
Maintaining the focus on common pools, Chapter 5 tested how spatial 
competition affects the extraction of existing wells. Focusing on Colorado’s gas 
industry, the empirical analysis was rooted in the principle that spatially close 
neighbors can jeopardize a well’s future extraction. Drawing on the Hotelling 
framework, it was argued that such a risk of resource leakage should motivate 
owners to accelerate extraction. This theoretical prediction was tested by 
analyzing how the entrance of a “rival” neighbor affects extraction. In line with 
Hotelling theory, rivals located in close proximity were found to motivate 
accelerated extraction, whereas distant neighbors did not affect behavior. As 
predicted, fear of losing access to future extraction thus induces the owners of 
already installed wells to change extraction behavior.  
Departing from the focus of the three previous chapters, Chapter 6 examined 
how political risk influences extraction behavior in the short run. Specifically, it 
assessed the month-on-month relationship between government stability and oil 
extraction, using production data from 32 authoritarian petro-states. Drawing on 
the Hotelling principle, it was argued that a regime should accelerate extraction 
when its future custodianship over national resources becomes more uncertain. 
However, as discussed by Bohn and Deacon (2000), political unrest in the long 
run reduces extraction capabilities due to lack of capital investments. This left the 
empirical question of whether government instability in the very short run leads to 
accelerated extraction as predicted by Hotelling theory. To test this, Chapter 6 
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refined existing empirical studies in a twofold manner. First, the use of monthly 
data allowed for identifying short run extraction responses to sudden political 
events. Second, the analysis applied a dynamic panel data system GMM estimator 
to eliminate the risk of endogeneity (e.g. that a current fall in oil extraction drives 
future government instability). In contrast to conventional theory, Chapter 6 found 
that oil extraction slows as instability in authoritarian regimes increases. Classic 
Hotelling theory can thus not explain the short-run variations observed in the data. 
This result suggests that government stability is an enabling factor rather than a 
cause of oil extraction even in the very short run. 
The four main research chapters of this dissertation have all studied how fear of 
the future influences the behavior of resource owners in the oil and gas industry. 
Of these, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 demonstrated that the theoretical description of 
forward-looking behavior applies both during exploration and extraction of 
common pool deposits. The mere prospect of resource leakage thus motivates 
socially inefficient clustering of exploration around property lines and overly 
rapid extraction. In contrast, government instability, which was argued to 
constitute a different form of ownership risk, was not found to motivate the 
changes in behavior predicted by theory. The fear that a dictator whose political 
power is in decline will accelerate extraction is thus unfounded.  
7.2. Implications 
The findings of this dissertation have important implications for both the 
optimal management of oil and gas resources and the effectiveness of current 
climate regulation. Focusing on questions of resource management, Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 examined how common pool problems result in economic inefficiencies 
both during the exploration for and the extraction of hydrocarbons. Recognizing 
this problem, regulators should consider intervention to internalize externalities.  
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As discussed, there are three main avenues for alleviating problems of spatial 
competition. These are command and control policies, taxes/subsidies and 
Coasian solutions. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, implementing any of these 
in practice poses difficulties. For example, whilst existing spacing regulation 
might eliminate extraction externalities, it does so by leaving some underground 
resources inaccessible. Similarly, a Pigouvian solution (Pigou, 2002) was deemed 
impractical, as regulators needed unrealistic levels of information to identify the 
optimal level of tax/subsidy. Coasian bargaining, such as the acquisition of 
neighboring lands, joint development agreements or unitization contracts, 
presented the most promising solutions to achieving the efficient management of 
resources. Nonetheless, problems of bargaining and enforcement were highlighted 
as limitations. For example, no international body exists to ensure that property 
rights are respected. Consequently, it will be difficult to solve the cross-border 
common pool problems identified in Chapter 4 using Coasian bargaining. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, it remains unclear whether solving local 
common pool problems in isolation results in improved global extraction 
outcomes from a social planner perspective. This is because problems of market 
power may persist in international oil and gas markets. However, from an 
operator perspective, this dissertation has shown that there are clear profit losses 
associated with spatial competition. To improve profitability, private companies 
should thus seek to internalize spatial externalities, by buying up neighbors or 
engaging in joint production agreements. 
Apart from questions of resource management, the findings of this dissertation 
suggest that the effectiveness of existing climate regulation may be questionable. 
As outlined by Sinn (2008), the gradual expansion of demand-reducing regulation 
can exacerbate the problem of anthropogenic climate change. The core thesis 
guiding this logic is that existing climate policies induce expectations of falling 
future demand and resource prices. Drawing on the Hotelling framework, this 
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should incentivize owners to extract more of their fossil fuels today. 
Consequently, the flow of greenhouse gases (GHG), and thereby the process of 
climate change, is accelerated. By implication, forward-looking behavior, as 
identified in this dissertation, can render existing demand-reducing climate 
policies counterproductive.  
Faced by resource owners who act according to the Hotelling principle, 
regulators should refrain from implementing sharply increasing fossil fuel taxes as 
this could, counterproductively, motivate accelerated extraction (Hoel, 2010). 
Instead, as argued by Kalkuhl and Edenhofer (2010), climate policies should be 
focused on binding quantitative targets such as carbon quotas. There are, 
however, at least two developments that will likely constrain the ability of 
policymakers to execute this course of action. First, the damage caused by climate 
change will become more apparent to the public over time, which in turn, will 
probably increase political pressure to adopt gradually more stringent regulation. 
Second, climate damage is likely to be convex with respect to the stock of GHG 
in the atmosphere (IPCC, 2007). Damages would thus increase with extraction. In 
isolation, this implies that an economically efficient fossil fuel tax should rise 
over time. This argument is supported by Stern:  
 
“The social cost of carbon is likely to increase steadily over time because 
marginal damages increase with the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere, and that 
stock rises over time. Policy should therefore ensure that abatement efforts at the 
margin also intensify over time” (2007:17). 
 
In sum, the above discussion underlines that regulators have to understand the 
inter-temporal mechanisms governing the supply of oil and gas when designing 
effective climate and resource management regulation. As shown by Chapter 6, 
the extent to which resource owners act as described by the Hotelling principle, 
however, depends very much on the circumstances. Consequently, other 
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behavioral models are needed to describe the range of possible mechanisms in the 
oil and gas industry. 
7.3. Future research 
Despite the advances made by this dissertation, there remains room for further 
research to improve understanding of the mechanism governing the supply-side of 
oil and gas.  Various suggestions for future work have been discussed in earlier 
chapters. The remainder of this section draws these together. 
As current computational constraints diminish, future research should seek to 
identify the optimal extraction strategy for the two-dimensional framework 
developed in Chapter 3. This ought to be done numerically, employing the same 
backward induction reasoning used for the simpler line model deduced in Chapter 
4. The difficulty with performing such an exercise is that it requires 
computational capacity that is currently unavailable to most researchers. High-
performance cluster computers at the Physics Department at the University of 
Oxford were used to perform the simulations needed for Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation. However, even when relying upon such extensive capacity, that 
equates to approximately 150 home computers. The calculations took almost two 
weeks of uninterrupted computational activity. Such practical limitations are, 
however, likely to diminish over time, as technological innovation improves 
computing capacity (see Brock, 2006).  
Once the exact optimal strategy is determined, the model developed in Chapter 
3 could easily be expanded to account for aspects such as realistic fluid dynamics, 
asymmetric agents, potential physical damage to the reservoir, and non-public 
seismic information. All of these additions would make the framework capable of 
replicating more realistic exploration problems in the oil and gas industry. 
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Empirically testing the predictions of the full two-dimensional model is a 
natural next step after having determined the optimal strategy. Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation tested whether neighboring nations portrayed the strategic behavior 
predicted by the theoretical framework. However, it did so based on a simplified 
line version of the complete framework developed in Chapter 3. Whilst this 
simplification is unproblematic in the case of neighboring nations, most 
exploration does not occur in such simplified two-player setups. As discussed in 
this dissertation, the American extraction landscape is a patchwork of many small 
resource owners. This means that a single owner can have many “rival” neighbors 
to whom he needs to respond. The complete two-dimensional model is thus a 
better representation of American hydrocarbon exploration and its predictions 
should therefore be tested in such settings. This would not only test the empirical 
validity of the framework; it would also allow for assessing how small private 
companies engage in exploration as opposed to the country-level focus adopted in 
Chapter 4. 
Finally, there remains room for determining the underlying mechanisms driving 
the observed relationship between short-term government stability and oil 
extraction. As described in Chapter 6, oil production is found to decelerate in 
times of government instability. In the context of authoritarian petro-states, the 
direct predictive power of the dominant theoretical paradigm is thus limited. This 
is problematic because these regimes control the majority of global oil and gas 
production, which makes it necessary to understand their behavior. Consequently, 
there remains room for future research to determine what explains the empirical 
relationships observed in petro-states. As discussed in Chapter 6, this 
investigation should focus on the inter-temporal incentive structures of domestic 
agents as well as those of international trade partners. Specifically, the fear of 
retrospective punishment by a potential future leader provides interesting avenues 
for further research.  
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Overall, any theory is a simplification of a complex reality. Harold Hotelling’s 
description of forward-looking extraction might thus not explain all behavior 
observed in the multifaceted oil and gas industry. There is thus a need for further 
research improvements in the literature on resource management, by developing 
more realistic theoretical models and offering refined empirical investigations. 
The work presented in this dissertation makes an important step in this direction. 
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Appendixes 
A. Ising and the resource generating process 
This appendix introduces the stochastic process that generates the spatially-
correlated resource landscapes of the underlying Ising model used in Chapters 3 
and 4. By doing so, it is illustrated how the expected probability of discovery 
changes when a well is drilled. To ease understanding, this appendix focuses on a 
one-dimensional line setup. However, results are easily transferable to a two-
dimensional space such as that used in Chapter 3. 
Assume we have 𝐿 unopened drilling sites, which are located between a left and 
a right site as presented in Figure A.1.  
 
 
FIGURE A.1. ILLUSTRATION OF DRILLING LANDSCAPE 
 
In this setup, the probability of finding oil at 𝑥 ∈ [1, 𝐿] is given by: 
(A1) 𝑃𝜎0,𝜎𝐿+1(𝑥) =
1
𝑍
∑ (
1 + 𝜎𝑥
2
) 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [𝐽 ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑖+1
𝑖∈[0,𝐿]
+ ℎ ∑ 𝜎𝑖
𝑖∈[1,𝐿]
]
{𝜎𝑖},𝑖∈[1,𝐿]
 
 
Here, 𝜎0 = −1, 0, +1 is the state of the Left drilling site and 𝜎𝐿+1 = −1, 0, +1 
is the state of the Right site. In both cases +1 means that the site is a discovery, 
−1 means that the site is a dry well and 0 means that the site is outside the 
domain. The normalization is given by: 
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(A2) 𝑍 = ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [𝐽 ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑖+1
𝑖∈[0,𝐿]
+ ℎ ∑ 𝜎𝑖
𝑖∈[1,𝐿]
]
{𝜎𝑖},𝑖∈[1,𝐿]
 
 
In the equations above, 𝐽 governs the clustering of resources (the temperature in 
the original Ising model) and ℎ governs the unconditional probability of discovery 
(the magnetic field in the original Ising model). Figure A.2 plots the conditional 
probability of discovery for different resource landscapes using the model 
calibration ℎ = 0.5 and 𝐽 = 0.5. 
 
(LEFT SITE: END OF DOMAIN) 
 
(LEFT SITE: OIL DISCOVERY) 
 
(LEFT SITE: DRY WELL) 
 
FIGURE A.2. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF DISCOVERY FOR DIFFERENT LANDCAPES 
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B. Deriving the optimal strategy 
This appendix is dedicated to deriving the optimal exploration strategy 
introduced in Chapter 4. The market consists of two identical and neighboring 
resource owners who sequentially explore a one-dimensional landscape. It is 
assumed that a discovery yields one unit of profit whereas a non-discovery (dry 
well) yields a negative profit of one. Each agent decides his or her exploration 
strategy, 𝑆, seeking to maximize their expected profit: 
(B1) 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑆𝐸[𝜋] = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑆(𝐸[𝑁𝑜. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠] − 𝐸[𝑁𝑜. 𝑑𝑟𝑦 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠]) 
 
The domain of exploration is given by a fixed number of potential drilling sites, 
𝑁. As information about the likely location of resources evolves with exploration, 
we define the dynamic exploration “landscape” as a function 𝐵(𝑥) with 𝑥 ∈
[1, 𝑁] and 𝐵 = −1, 0, +1 for a dry well, an unexplored site and a discovery, 
respectively. Every time a player has to make an exploration decision, all 
information is contained in 𝐵(𝑥). Hence, a strategy is defined as a conditional 
decision function 𝑆[𝐵(𝑥)], where 𝑆 can either be the choice of deploying a well at 
a given unexplored drilling site 𝑦, or the decision to not explore (STOP). As 
described in the main text, each player has a subset of drilling sites on which they 
can drill. Given that the one-dimensional landscape is evenly split, we can define 
the strategy for player 1, 2, respectively as:  
(B2) 𝑆1[𝐵] = {
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑥 ∈ [1,
𝑁 + 1
2
]  𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐵(𝑥) = 0
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(B3) 𝑆2[𝐵] = {
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑥 ∈ [
𝑁 + 1
2
,𝑁]  𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐵(𝑥) = 0
 
 
We define Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵, 𝑥) as the expected profit for the rest of the game if tile 𝑥 is 
explored in the current turn. This function is defined only for 𝑥 such that 𝐵(𝑥) =
0. The optimal strategy is given by: 
(B4) 𝑆1
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐵] = {
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥∈[1,
𝑁+1
2 ]
(Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵, 𝑥)) < 0
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑥0 ∈ [1,
𝑁 + 1
2
]  𝑖𝑓 Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵, 𝑥) 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡 𝑥0 
 
 
(B5) 𝑆2
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐵] = {
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥∈[
𝑁+1
2 ,𝑁]
(Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵, 𝑥)) < 0
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑥0 ∈ [
𝑁 + 1
2
,𝑁]  𝑖𝑓 Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵, 𝑥) 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡 𝑥0 
 
 
We now define Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵) = max (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥(Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵, 𝑥), 0)) as the expected profit 
for the rest of the game if the optimal strategy is deployed. The optimal strategy is 
found using backwards induction. First, one computes the following function for 
all 𝑥 such that 𝐵(𝑥) = 0, 
(B6) Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵, 𝑥) = 𝑃(𝐵, 𝑥) (1 + Π𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐵+)) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐵, 𝑥))(−1 + Π𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐵−)) 
 
In the equation above, 𝑃(𝐵, 𝑥) is the probability of discovery, which can be 
calculated using the formula introduced in appendix A. 𝐵− stands for a 
modification of the landscape 𝐵 where the tile 𝑥 has been explored and the well 
was dry. Correspondingly, 𝐵+ stands for a modification of the landscape 𝐵 where 
the tile 𝑥 has been explored resulting in a discovery. Π𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐵±) is the expected 
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profit for the rest of the game, for a given landscape and a given player after his/her 
turn of exploration. It is given by: 
(B7) Π𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐵±) = {
Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵±) 𝑖𝑓 𝑆2
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐵±] = 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑃
𝑃(𝐵±, 𝑦)Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵±,+) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐵±, 𝑦))Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵±,−) 𝑖𝑓 𝑆2
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐵±] = 𝑦
 
 
In the equation above, 𝐵±,− stands for a modification of the landscape 𝐵 where 
the tile 𝑥 has been explored resulting in a dry well (-) or a discovery (+), and 
where the tile 𝑦 was explored by player two and the well was dry. 
Correspondingly, 𝐵±,+ stands for a modification of the landscape 𝐵 where the tile 
𝑥 has been explored resulting in a dry well (-) or a discovery (+), and where the 
tile y was explored by player 2 and a discovery was made. 
By recursively computing Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 for landscapes with a smaller and smaller 
number of unopened drilling sites, one ends up eventually computing Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒  for 
the situation where there is only one unexplored drilling site remaining, x𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙. 
For this site the expected profit for the rest of the game is equal to: 
(B8) Π𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒(𝐵, x𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙) = 𝑃(𝐵, x𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐵, x𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙))(−1) 
 
Recognizing that the game can only end with either both players terminating 
exploration (two consecutive STOPs) or complete exploration, one can now 
recursively determine the chain of expected profits and thereby determine the 
optimal strategy for all possible landscapes.  
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C. An example of unequal exploration capabilities 
In the main theoretical model presented in Chapter 4, agents were assumed to 
have equal exploration capabilities, and deployment was therefore modeled to 
occur sequentially and the first-mover advantage is assigned randomly. This is, 
however, a simplification of reality, as most neighboring landowners differ in 
their investment capabilities.  
Consider the situation of the South Pars/North Dome natural gas field located in 
the Persian Gulf. This hydrocarbon deposit is shared between Qatar and Iran. 
However, these two countries have very different drilling capabilities. Due to the 
sanctions imposed until recently by the European Union and the United States, 
Iran has had reduced access to modern petroleum technology and sources of 
financing. This means that Qatar can deploy wells at a relatively faster rate. The 
main model setup introduced in Chapter 4 does not describe such a situation, and 
its distributional predictions are therefore likely flawed. To address this limitation, 
the assumption of identical agents is relaxed, whereby one of the two is equipped 
with superior exploration capabilities. In the modified setup, agent B is provided 
with the first-mover advantage and the ability to complete exploration before his 
neighbor, agent A, can build any wells (Figure C.1). 
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FIGURE C.1. CHANGING THE EXPLORATION CAPABILITIES 
Notes: Dotted lines are fourth-order polynomial approximations. The drilling sites are categorized as follows: ∀ ∈ [𝐴] 
access resources private to agent 𝐴, ∀ ∈ [𝐵] access resources private to agent 𝐵, ∀ ∈ [𝐶] access-contested resources. Agent 
𝐵 initiates and completes exploration before agent 𝐴 is allowed to deploy any wells. 
 
As Figure 4.5 illustrates, unequal exploration capabilities are predicted to result 
in the stronger party dominating the border area. The weaker agent is thus 
incentivized to avoid exploration of contested resources, since the first mover will 
already have drained a potential common pool deposit. This clarifies that border 
exploration can be discouraged if a dominant neighbor is already present. A non-
symmetric distribution of wells around property lines thus serves as an indicator 
of systematically unequal exploration capabilities. 
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D. Deriving the Hotelling model with leakage 
This appendix is dedicated to derivations omitted in the main text. Based on the 
framework of Khalatbari (1977), the Hotelling model introduced in Section 5.1 is 
derived. The market consists of n identical resource owners who operate under 
perfect competition and who each seek to maximize their individual discounted 
profit: 
(D1) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑅𝑗,𝑡
∫ 𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑒
−𝑖𝑡𝑡=∞
𝑡=0
𝑑𝑡  
 
Attributing common pool characteristics to reserves however changes the 
constraint as resources can now migrate between owners. As discussed in the 
main text, the rate of leakage between neighbors is defined as “𝑙” and flows are 
assumed identical in both directions. Incorporating this into the problem means 
that maximization in D1 must be subject to the following: 
(D2) ∫ 𝑅𝑡 𝑑𝑡 =
∞
0
𝑆̅ = 1 
(D3) ?̇?𝑗,𝑡 = −𝑅𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑙 ∗ 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑙
𝑛−1
∗ (𝑆1,𝑡+. . . +𝑆𝑗−1,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑗+1,𝑡+. . . +𝑆𝑛,𝑡)⏟                                    
𝑔(𝑆𝑗,𝑡, 𝑅𝑗,𝑡,𝑡)
   
 
The Hamiltonian to this problem is: 
(D4) ℋ = 𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑒
−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 ∗ [𝑔(𝑆𝑗,𝑡, 𝑅𝑗,𝑡, 𝑡)] 
 
As agents operate under perfect competition, the necessary conditions for 
maximizing discounted profit are: 
(D5) ℋ𝑅𝑗,𝑡
′ = 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑒
−𝑖𝑡 − 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 = 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑡 = 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑒
𝑖𝑡 
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(D6) ℋ𝑆𝑗,𝑡
′ = −?̇?𝑗,𝑡 ⇒ 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 ∗ (−𝑙) = −?̇?𝑗,𝑡 ⇒ ?̇?𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑙 ∗ 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 
 
Following on from D6: 
(D7) 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑗 ∗ 𝑒
𝑙𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜔𝑗 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  
 
“𝜔𝑗,𝑡” is the time-dependent marginal value of the resource for owner “𝑗”. 
Inserting D7 into D5 yields:  
 (D8) 𝑃𝑡 = 𝜔𝑗 ∗ 𝑒
𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ⇒ 𝑃𝑡 = 𝜔𝑗 ∗ 𝑒
(𝑙+𝑖)𝑡 
 
By utilizing the symmetry of agents, this expression can be summed over all 
resource owners:  
 (D9) 𝑛 ∗ 𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝜔𝑗 ∗ 𝑒
(𝑙+𝑖)𝑡𝑗=𝑛
𝑗=0  
 
Market demand for the resource is assumed to be isoelastic and defined by 𝑃𝑡 =
𝑅𝑡
−𝑣 where 0 < 𝑣 < 1 and 𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝑗=𝑛
𝑗=0 . Inserting this in the expression above 
yields the following result: 
 (D10) 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑛
1
𝑣 ∗ 𝜔−
1
𝑣 ∗ 𝑒−
(𝑙+𝑖)𝑡
𝑣  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜔 = ∑ 𝜔𝑗
𝑗=𝑛
𝑗=0  
 
From the resource constraint on total production, it is possible to identify the 
following: 
(D11) ∫ 𝑅𝑡
𝑡=∞
𝑡=0
 𝑑𝑡 = 1 ⇒ ∫ 𝑛
1
𝑣 ∗ 𝜔−
1
𝑣 ∗ 𝑒−
(𝑙+𝑖)𝑡
𝑣
𝑡=∞
𝑡=0
 𝑑𝑡 = 1 
 
Integration by parts yields:  
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(D12) [𝑛
1
𝑣 ∗ 𝜔−
1
𝑣 ∗ (−
𝑣
(𝑙+𝑖)
) ∗ 𝑒−
(𝑙+𝑖)𝑡
𝑣 ]
𝑡=0
𝑡=∞
= 1 
 
Using that lim
𝑡⟶∞
𝑒−
(𝑙+𝑖)𝑡
𝑣 = 0 and that 𝑒0 = 1, D9 becomes: 
(D13) 𝑛
1
𝑣 ∗ 𝜔−
1
𝑣 ∗
𝑣
(𝑙+𝑖)
= 1 ⇒ 𝜔−
1
𝑣 =
(𝑙+𝑖)
𝑣
∗ 𝑛−
1
𝑣 
 
By inserting D13 into Equation D10, it is now possible to identify the optimal 
extraction path as: 
(D14) 𝑅𝑡 =
(𝑙+𝑖)
𝑣
∗ 𝑒−(
𝑙+𝑖
𝑣
)∗𝑡 ⇒ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∗ (
(𝑙+𝑖)
𝑣
∗ 𝑒(
−𝑙−𝑖
𝑣
)∗𝑡⏟    
𝑆𝑡
) 
 
It should be noted, that the model introduced in this appendix rests on the 
assumptions that perfect forward markets exist, agents are rational and that 
arbitrage opportunities are instantly eliminated.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that gas markets are local rather then global and 
prices are as a consequence endogenously determined in the model. This 
assumption rests on the observation that transport costs continue to limit the 
intergration of global gas markets. However, one might alternatively argue that 
gas prices are internationally determined and therefore exogenous to extraction 
decisions made in Colorado. To illustrate how this affects optimal extraction 
behavior it is useful to assume that global gas prices follow a classic Hotelling 
pathway, as presented in equation D15. 
(D15) 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃0𝑒
𝑖𝑡 
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Drawing on this exogenous pricepath, one can rewrite the resource owner’s 
maximization problem as follows:  
(D16) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑅𝑗,𝑡
∫ 𝑃0 ∗ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡
𝑡=∞
𝑡=0
𝑑𝑡  
 
This remains subject to D2 and D3 as the exogenous price path does not alter 
the resource constraint. One can therefore write the Hamiltonian as follows: 
(D17) ℋ = 𝑃𝑜 ∗ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 ∗ [𝑔(𝑅𝑗,𝑡, 𝑆𝑗,𝑡, 𝑡)] 
 
The necessary conditions for maximizing discounted profit are therefore: 
(D18) ℋ𝑅𝑗,𝑡
′ = 0 ⇒ 𝑃0 − 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 = 0 ⇒ 𝑃0 = 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 
(D19) ℋ𝑆𝑗,𝑡
′ = −?̇?𝑗,𝑡 ⇒ 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 ∗ (−𝑙) = −?̇?𝑗,𝑡 ⇒ ?̇?𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑙 ∗ 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 
 
Following on from D19: 
(D20) 𝜔𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑗 ∗ 𝑒
𝑙𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜔𝑗 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  
 
Again “𝜔𝑗,𝑡” is the time-dependent marginal value of the resource for owner “𝑗”. 
Inserting D20 into D18 yields:  
 (D21) 𝑃0 = 𝜔𝑗 ∗ 𝑒
𝑙𝑡 
 
This condition only holds for all values of 𝑡 if 𝑙 = 0. For any positive leakage 
rate (𝑙 > 0), there is no incentive to postpone extraction. By utilizing the 
symmetry of agents, one can identify the optimal extraction outcome as: 
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 (D22) 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∗ 𝑆̅ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ∈ ]0,∞] 
 
This simple example illustrates that resource leakage induces accelerated 
extraction independent of whether prices are exogeonous or endogenously 
determined. This result applies as long as there is a positive margin between 
resource prices and marginal extraction costs. 
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E. Countries and their NOCs 
E.1. COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE 
Country Main National Oil Company Voice and Accountability ranking (WGI) 
Equatorial Guinea GEPetrol 1.9 
Saudi Arabia Saudi Aramco 2.8 
Sudan Sudapet 3.3 
Syria Syrian Petroleum Company 3.8 
Iran NIOC  4.3 
China CNPC 5.2 
Azerbaijan SOCAR 10.9 
Yemen None 11.4 
Vietnam Petrovietnam 11.8 
Kazakhstan KazMunayGas 14.2 
DR Congo SNPC 15.6 
Angola Group Sonangol 16.1 
Iraq INOC 16.6 
Egypt EGPC 18.0 
UAE Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 18.5 
Russia Rosneft 19.0 
Oman Oman Oil Company S.A.O.C. 19.4 
Libya National Oil Corporation  19.9 
Venezuela Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.  21.8 
Algeria Sonatrach 22.7 
Qatar Qatar Petroleum 23.7 
Gabon GOC 24.2 
Nigeria NNPC 27.5 
Kuwait Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 28.4 
Brunei Brunei Shell Petroleum* 32.2 
Guatemala None 35.5 
Malaysia Petronas 37.4 
Ecuador Petroecuador 39.8 
Turkey TPAO 40.8 
Colombia Ecopetrol 44.1 
Tunisia ETAP 44.5 
Bolivia YPFB 46.0 
Notes: The Voice and Accountability ranking is the WGI percentile rank among all countries 
in 2013 (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank); *50 percent owned by the government 
of Brunei 
Sources: Kaufmann et al. 2014 and World Bank 2008 
 
 
